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INTRODUCTION
The Senate Report accompanying the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 19821 promised that the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit would have a “rich docket,” composed of “unusually
complex and technical” cases.2 Since then, the richness and
complexity of the court’s docket has grown as the court has applied
the patent laws to increasingly sophisticated technologies.  The
patent law opinions published by the Federal Circuit in 2001
illustrate the breadth of the court’s work.  The opinions are
summarized here by subject matter.  Those opinions that provide a
detailed analysis of the construction of particular claim terms are
listed in the appendix.
                                                          
1. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (creating the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit).
2. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6-7 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 16-17.
AUTHREVBENAMIPP 9/11/02  11:00 AM
2002] 2001 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 641
I. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.3  They may hear
cases raising a federal question, such as a dispute arising out of the
patent laws, or controversies among parties having diverse
citizenship.4  Once they have acquired subject matter jurisdiction,
federal courts may also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state
law claims that are part of the same case or controversy.5  If
jurisdiction of the district court is based, in whole or in part, on the
existence of a patent issue, the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction.6 The Federal Circuit also has jurisdiction of appeals from
final determinations of the International Trade Commission made
under 19 U.S.C. § 13377 and from interlocutory decisions in such
cases.8
In Crater Corp. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc.,9 the plaintiff (“Crater”)
alleged that the defendants (“Lucent”) had infringed Crater’s patent
for an underwater coupling device.10  Lucent moved to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that any work it had
performed using the claimed device was done with the authorization
and consent of the United States Government pursuant to a classified
development contract.11  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, the patentee’s
exclusive remedy for infringement by the United States Government
or its contractors12 is an action in the Court of Federal Claims.13  The
Federal Circuit held that § 1498 is to be applied “as a codification of a
                                                          
3. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (outlining federal
question jurisdiction and providing the standard for diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction); id. § 1338(a) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . .”).
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994) (requiring all claims to be related to the
original claim so that they meet Article III requirements).
6. Id. § 1295(a)(1).
7. Id. § 1295(a)(6).
8. Id. § 1292(d).
9. 255 F.3d 1361, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
10. Id. at 1361, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1045.
11. Id. at 1365, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1046-47.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (“[T]he use or manufacture of an invention described in
and covered by a patent of the United States by a contractor, a subcontractor, or any
person, firm or corporation for the Government and with the authorization or
consent of the Government shall be construed as use or manufacture for the United
States.”).
13. Id.; see also Crater Corp., 255 F.3d at 1365, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1046
(noting that § 1498(a) both grants jurisdiction to the court of claims and provides an
affirmative defense to contractors).
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defense and not as a jurisdictional statute,”14 and that the district
court should have treated the motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction as a motion for summary judgment.15  The court held that
the motion for summary judgment should have been granted since
Crater had not presented evidence sufficient to raise a material issue
of fact as to whether there had been any commercial sales of the
alleged infringing product or to contradict the evidence that all sales
had been made to the government pursuant to the government
contract.16  The court remanded the state law claims to the district
court so that it could determine whether, in its discretion, it would
retain jurisdiction over them.17
In Schaefer Fan Co. v. J & D Manufacturing,18 the Federal Circuit
considered the question of whether the federal court had subject
matter jurisdiction over a claim arising out of an alleged breach of a
settlement agreement that the parties had made to resolve a prior
infringement lawsuit.19  Although an action for breach of contract is
usually a state court matter, a federal court may have ancillary
jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement arising out of federal
litigation,20 if the party’s obligation to comply with the agreement is
made part of the order of dismissal by a provision retaining
jurisdiction over the agreement or by incorporation of the agreement
into the order of dismissal.21  Here, the dismissal order stated that it
was made “pursuant to a confidential settlement agreement,” and the
agreement provided that either party could bring a motion before
the district court to enforce the terms of the agreement.22  Because
the court order relied upon the agreement and the agreement gave
both parties the power of enforcement, both parties agreed to the
court’s jurisdiction when the agreement was incorporated into the
order to dismiss.23
                                                          
14. Crater Corp., 255 F.3d at 1364, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1046 (quoting Manville Sales
Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 554, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587, 1595
(Fed. Cir. 1990)).
15. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1046.
16. Id. at 1369, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049.
17. Id. at 1371, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1051.
18. 265 F.3d 1282, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
19. Id. at 1286, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197.
20. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197 (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994)).
21. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197 (quoting Miener v. Mo. Dep’t of Mental
Health, 62 F.3d 1126, 1127 (8th Cir. 1995)).
22. Id. at 1286-87, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197.
23. Id. at 1287, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1198.
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Judge Dyk dissented, arguing that under Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Insurance Co. of America,24 the federal courts do not have automatic
continuing jurisdiction over actions to enforce settlement agreements
arising out of federal lawsuits.25  In this case, Judge Dyk contended
the district court merely approved the stipulation which referred to
the settlement agreement, and then entered a separate order of
dismissal which did not mention the agreement.26  Since there was no
evidence that the district court had reviewed the agreement or was
aware of the language granting jurisdiction, there was no basis for a
finding that the court intended to retain jurisdiction.27
B. Personal Jurisdiction
Courts must also have personal jurisdiction over the parties of a
case in order to properly hear their claims.28  Federal courts may
exercise their powers over a defendant in an appropriate case if the
defendant is present in the forum state.29  In the alternative, personal
jurisdiction is appropriate if the defendant has sufficient contacts
with the forum state such that the assertion of the federal court’s
power will not “offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”30
In Inamed Corp. v. Kuzmak,31 a former licensee and corporate
resident in California brought suit in California against the patentee,
a resident of New Jersey.32  The Federal Circuit noted that the
determination of personal jurisdiction required two inquiries: first,
whether the forum’s long-arm statute allows service of process, and
second, whether asserting personal jurisdiction would violate due
process.33  Determining that California’s long-arm statute is
co-extensive with the limits of due process, the court focused solely
upon the second inquiry.34
                                                          
24. 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
25. Schaefer Farm Co., 265 F.3d at 1291-93, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1201-02 (Dyk,
J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 1292-93, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1201-1202 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 1292, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202-03.
28. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (noting that
historically, part of the federal courts’ jurisdiction involved de facto power over a
defendant’s person).
29. See id. (stating that originally, a person’s physical presence in the forum was a
prerequisite to binding him to a court’s jurisdiction) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714, 733 (1877)).
30. Id. at 316 (internal quotations omitted).
31. 249 F.3d 1356, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1774 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
32. Id. at 1358-59, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775-76.
33. Id. at 1359, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776.
34. Id. at 1360, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776.
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The Federal Circuit summarized the requirements for due process
as involving three factors: whether the defendant has purposefully
directed its activities at residents of the forum, whether the claim
arises out of or relates to those activities, and whether the assertion of
personal jurisdiction is reasonable and fair.35  In the present case, the
court considered relevant an infringement letter that the defendant
sent into the state relating to the activities of the former licensee.36
While the Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that “the sending of an
infringement letter, without more, is insufficient to satisfy the
requirements of due process when exercising jurisdiction over an
out-of-state patentee,”37 in this case, the court also relied on the fact
that the defendant had successfully negotiated four license
agreements with the plaintiff, and so determined that the defendant
purposefully directed its activities at the forum.38 The litigation also
met the second due process requirement since the claim arose out of
the act of sending the infringement letter.39
In an attempt to avoid jurisdiction, the defendant relied on his
illness and inability to travel.40  The court determined that these
factors did not require denying jurisdiction on the basis of due
process, since alternative means were available through which the
defendant could obtain relief.41  The court sought to limit cases
where a defendant may defeat otherwise constitutional personal
jurisdiction “to the rare situation in which the plaintiff’s interest and
the state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute in the forum are so
attenuated that they are clearly outweighed by the burden of
subjecting the defendant to litigation within the forum.”42
In Pieczenik v. Dyax Corp.,43 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of an infringement action brought in New York by the
patentee and licensee of patents directed to DNA products and
                                                          
35. Id. at 1359, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776.
36. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776-77.
37. Id. at 1361, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777.
38. Id. at 1361-62, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777-78.
39. See id. at 1362, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778 (concluding that a defendant’s
physical presence within the state was not required, where the negotiation efforts,
carried out almost exclusively by mail and telephone, were purposefully directed at
California residents).
40. See id. at 1363, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778 (acknowledging that the
inventor’s back injuries prevented him from traveling long distances and sitting or
standing at length).
41. See id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778-79 (suggesting alternatives such as filing
for a change of venue or making a forum non conveniens motion).
42. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779 (quoting Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541,
1549, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1505, 1511 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
43. 265 F.3d 1329, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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processes.44  The Federal Circuit held that because New York’s
long-arm statute did not exhaust the limits of due process,45 it needed
to consider only whether New York law would permit the assertion of
jurisdiction over a defendant based on the conduct alleged.46  The
court found the two alleged grounds for jurisdiction insufficient
under New York law.47  First, the alleged shipment of products to New
York, made according to the claimed process, did not create a basis
for jurisdiction because the products themselves were not alleged to
infringe the patent; thus, the use of patented technology in
Massachusetts to make the products did not create a basis for
jurisdiction.48  Second, an agreement to license the defendant’s
technology (which the plaintiffs claimed was dominated by their
patents) to a New York corporation could not form a basis for
personal jurisdiction, where the plaintiff did not allege that the
agreement was negotiated or executed in New York, and the
agreement did not require the defendant to provide any services in
New York or to ship any goods into New York.49
C. Standing
Article III of the Constitution permits the federal courts to decide
only actual cases or controversies.50  The federal courts have created
the standing requirements to ensure that cases or controversies are
litigated by parties with an appropriate legal interest in their
outcome.51  In order to establish standing and invoke federal
jurisdiction under Article III, a party must establish three elements:
first, the plaintiff must have sustained an injury in fact which is
concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, as opposed to
conjectural or hypothetical; second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and
third, it must be likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
                                                          
44. Id. at 1330-31, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305-06.
45. Id. at 1333, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307-08 (citing Talbot v. Johnson
Newspaper Corp., 522 N.E.2d 1027, 1029 (N.Y. 1988)).
46. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307.
47. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307-08 (stating that both transactions failed to
meet the narrow “nexus test,” which requires that the cause of action arise from a
business transaction in New York).
48. Id. at 1334, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308.
49. See id. at 1334-35, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308-09 (listing five factors that
New York courts focus on to determine whether a cause of action based on a
contractual relationship meets jurisdictional requirements).
50. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
51. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1999) (“[T]he
core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case or
controversy requirement of Article III.”).
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decision.52  Failure to meet standing requirements will bar a party
from bringing a claim into the federal courts.53
In Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Medical Device Alliance, Inc.,54 the Federal
Circuit raised the question of whether an exclusive licensee had
standing to sue in its own name, even though the issue had not been
raised in the district court.55  Under 35 U.S.C. § 281, only a patentee
can bring an action for patent infringement, although the term
“patentee” includes “not only the patentee to whom the patent was
issued but also the successors in title to the patentee.”56  Thus, a
licensee can qualify as a patentee if it holds all substantial rights in
the patent and is, in effect, an assignee.57  If the exclusive licensee
does not have all substantial rights, then it has standing to sue third
parties only as a co-plaintiff with the patentee.58  In the present case,
the court interpreted the contract documents and determined that
the patent owner retained significant ownership rights in the patent,
including the right to develop and manufacture products, to
supervise and control the licensee’s product development, and the
first obligation to sue infringers.59  The exclusive licensee was
authorized to sue only in the event that the owner failed to do so.60
The Federal Circuit invited the licensee to move pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 21 to add the patent owner as a party
plaintiff, and then granted the motion, holding that to do so at the
appellate stage would not prejudice the defendants, since they
already had adequate discovery from the patentee’s principals.61
In Intellectual Property Development, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of California,
Inc.,62 the Federal Circuit applied the three part constitutional test for
standing described above to determine that an exclusive licensee had
constitutional standing to bring a patent infringement action,
although it had properly been required to join the patentee as a
necessary party.63  The exclusive licensee was not an assignee in this
case because the patentee retained substantial rights to the patent,
                                                          
52. Id. at 560-61 (citations omitted).
53. See id. at 561 (stating that these elements are an indispensable part of the
plaintiff’s case, not mere pleading requirements, and thus the plaintiff bears the
burden of proof to maintain his claim in federal court).
54. 240 F.3d 1016, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1819 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
55. Id. at 1017, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820.
56. 35 U.S.C. § 100(d) (1994).
57. Mentor H/S, Inc., 240 F.3d at 1017, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820.
58. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820.
59. Id. at 1018, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820.
60. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820.
61. Id. at 1019, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
62. 248 F.3d 1333, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
63. Id. at 1340, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687.
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including the right to withhold its consent to infringement litigation
and the right to prevent the assignment of the license agreement to a
third party.64  Nevertheless, although it was not an assignee, the
licensee had constitutional standing to sue.65  The Federal Circuit
held that the statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 281 did not limit
standing to patentees and assignees.66  Since the exclusive licensee
satisfied the three-part Article III standing test, the court had subject
matter jurisdiction over the action.67  The requirement that the
patentee be joined as a necessary party in an infringement suit
brought by an exclusive licensee that did not have all substantial
rights in the patent, was not constitutional, but prudential i.e., a
judicially self-imposed limit on the exercise of jurisdiction.68  Thus,
the court was not required to dismiss the action for lack of
jurisdiction so that it could be re-filed.69
In Lans v. Digital Equipment Corp.,70 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of an action brought by an inventor who had assigned his
patent to a corporation of which he was the sole shareholder and
managing director.71  The Federal Circuit held that because the
assignor lacked title to the patent, he had no standing to bring an
infringement action.72  The Federal Circuit also held that the district
court had not abused its discretion in denying the assignor’s motion
to amend the pleadings to add the assignee.73
In Chou v. University of Chicago,74 the Federal Circuit confronted an
issue of first impression: whether a putative inventor who has an
obligation to assign her invention to another is entitled to sue for
correction of inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256.75  The court held
that § 256 does not require that those seeking to invoke the provision
have any potential ownership interest in the patent.76  In this case, the
putative inventor, although required to assign her interests, retained
                                                          
64. Id. at 1344-45, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687 (finding that such limitations on
the assignment of rights are significant factors weighing in favor of finding a transfer
of fewer than all substantial rights).
65. Id. at 1347, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689.
66. Id. at 1345, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
67. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
68. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
69. Id. at 1348-49, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1691.
70. 252 F.3d 1320, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
71. Id. at 1324, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
72. Id. at 1325, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
73. Id. at 1328, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062 (denying the party standing for lack
of legal rights and interests and affirming the district court’s denial pursuant to Rule
60(b)(2)).
74. 254 F.3d 1347, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
75. Id. at 1355, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
76. Id. at 1358, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
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a right to receive twenty-five percent of the proceeds of certain
licensing activities.77  Since this financial interest was sufficient to
confer constitutional standing on the putative inventor, the court was
not required to consider her contention that a reputational interest
alone would be enough to satisfy the requirements of Article III
standing.78
In Viskase Corp. v. American National Can Co.,79 the Federal Circuit
held that the district court had correctly refused to reopen its
judgment when reexamination proceedings and a petition to correct
inventorship resulted in the addition of an inventor to one of the
patents-in-suit.80  The action had been brought by the assignee of the
patents.81  Since the added inventor had an obligation to assign the
invention to the same assignee, the inventor had no ownership
interest in the patent and therefore was not required to join in the
litigation.82
In Intellectual Property Development, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of California
Inc.,83 the Federal Circuit also considered whether a defendant had
standing to appeal when the district court had dismissed the
plaintiff’s infringement complaint with prejudice after the plaintiff
had filed a statement of non-liability and a motion for voluntary
dismissal.84  The Federal Circuit held that only an aggrieved party has
standing to appeal and therefore a party that receives all that it has
sought is generally not aggrieved by a judgment and cannot appeal
from it.85  In this case, however, the district court’s order dismissing
the complaint with prejudice failed to address the merits of the
defendant’s counterclaims for declaratory judgment on the issues of
invalidity and unenforceability, and the defendant therefore had
standing to appeal.86
D. Vacatur and Remand
In Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc.,87 the Federal Circuit held that the district
                                                          
77. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
78. Id. at 1359, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262 (noting that a potential loss of
licensing proceeds is an injury-in-fact).
79. 261 F.3d 1316, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
80. Id. at 1328, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831.
81. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832.
82. Id. at 1329, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832 (stating that absent fraud or
deceptive intent, a correction of inventorship does not affect validity or
enforceability of the patent).
83. 248 F.3d 1333, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
84. Id. at 1339, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685.
85. Id. at 1340, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685.
86. Id. at 1343, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687.
87. 236 F.3d 1342, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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court, on remand, had misinterpreted the Federal Circuit’s mandate
by reducing punitive damages when it had been authorized to
reconsider only the issue of compensatory damages.88  On a prior
appeal, the Federal Circuit had remanded the case for a new
compensatory damages determination and, on remand, the district
court reduced compensatory damages from $7,134,000 to $520 and
reduced punitive damages from $20,000,000 to $52,000.89  The
Federal Circuit held that, by failing to appeal the award of punitive
damages on the prior appeal, Biomet had waived this issue and was
barred from raising it on remand.90  The court held that the appeal
on compensatory damages did not raise an issue as to the amount of
punitive damages although the issue was ripe on the prior appeal.  As
a result, the Federal Circuit reinstated the punitive damage award.91
In Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell Inc.,92 the Federal Circuit upheld
summary judgment of non-infringement.93  On a prior appeal, in
light of its decision in Warner Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical
Co.,94 the Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration.95
The Federal Circuit construed certain claim terms, affirmed a
judgment of no literal infringement, and remanded for consideration
of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.96  On remand, the
district court granted summary judgment of non-infringement,
holding that there could be no infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents because of prosecution history estoppel, Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.97 having been decided in the
                                                          
88. Id. at 1347-48, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
89. Id. at 1349, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388-89.
90. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
91. Id. at 1352, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391.
92. 238 F.3d 1376, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
93. Id. at 1380, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656.
94. 520 U.S. 17, 18-19 (1997) (holding that the doctrine of equivalents is not
inconsistent with the Patent Act, and the doctrine must be applied to individual
elements of the patent claim and not to an invention as a whole).
95. Litton Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 1376, 1379, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653, 1655 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (discussing the complex procedural history of the case).
96. See Litton Sys., Inc. v.  Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1455, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (suggesting that amendment of a patent claim
does not automatically bar all equivalents for the element that is the subject of the
amendment).
97. 234 F.3d 558, 563, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1868 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding
that an amendment to a patent claim for any reason, that is related to patentability,
will give rise to prosecution history estoppel, which will bar a finding of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents for the amended claim element).  On May 28,
2002, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision vacating and remanding the
Federal Circuits decision.  Festo Corp v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushki Co., 122
S. Ct. 1831 (May 28, 2002) (N0. 00-1543).  In its decision, the Court ruled that any
claim narrowing amendment made to comply with the patent statute—not just
amendments made to avoid prior art—will give rise to prosecution history estoppel.
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interim.98  In Litton Systems, the Federal Circuit held that, although
the flexible bar approach had been applied in this case on the prior
appeal, the law of the case doctrine did not require that the same
approach be used on remand, since controlling authority had since
made a contrary rule of law applicable to the issue.99
In Aqua Marine Supply v. AIM Machining, Inc.,100 after the district
court had granted summary judgment to the defendants on the issue
of infringement and had granted a declaratory judgment of
invalidity, the parties settled the action and jointly moved to vacate
the district court’s declaratory judgment of invalidity.101  The district
court denied the motion to vacate and the patentee appealed from
the declaratory judgment of invalidity.102  The Federal Circuit held
that the appeal was moot and dismissed it.  The court further held
that vacatur of the declaratory judgment would not be appropriate
because mootness had resulted from the voluntary action of the party
seeking relief from the judgment.103
In Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania Inc.,104 the district court granted
summary judgment, holding the patents infringed and not invalid.105
The Federal Circuit reversed the infringement determination,
holding that there could be no infringement as a matter of law, and
that the district court had erred in granting summary judgment on
the validity issues.106  The court decided that it would be “a poor use
of judicial resources” to remand for determination of the unresolved
issue of validity in light of its infringement ruling.107  The court
vacated the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment
holding the patents not invalid.108
                                                          
But the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s view that prosecution history estoppel,
whenever it applies, creates a “complete bar” to the application of the doctrine of
equivalents.  Thus, many of the cases decided by the Federal Circuit  in 2001, in
which it applied the “complete bar,” may no longer be reliable precedent on the
issue of the scope to be given to prosecution history estoppel.
98. Litton Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d at 1378, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
99. Id. at 1380, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656 (noting that law of the case is a
discretionary judicial doctrine that precludes reconsideration of an issue decided
earlier, unless exceptional circumstances exist).
100. 247 F.3d 1216, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1536 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
101. Id. at 1218-19, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1537.
102. Id. at 1219, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1538.
103. Id. at 1221, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1539 (stating that where mootness results
from a settlement, the losing party has voluntarily forfeited his right to appeal).
104. 256 F.3d 1298, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
105. Id. at 1302-03, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240.
106. Id. at 1305, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242-43.
107. Id. at 1308, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245.
108. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245.
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E. Preemption
Under the Constitution, Congress has the power to preempt state
law.109  Even where a federal statute does not contain an express
provision preempting state law, state law may nevertheless be
preempted if Congress intends the federal law to “occupy the field”
or where the state law would interfere with the accomplishment of
the congressional purpose.110
In Kroll v. Finnerty,111 the Federal Circuit held that statutes
authorizing the Patent and Trademark Office to adopt regulations
concerning the conduct of attorneys and agents appearing before it
and to discipline them for misconduct112 did not preempt the
authority of the New York State Disciplinary Committee to bring a
disciplinary action against an attorney, who was a member of the New
York and patent bar, concerning the attorney’s alleged misconduct in
connection with several patent applications.113  The Federal Circuit
held that the allegation of preemption was “so attenuated and
unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,”114 such that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to the merits of the
complaint.115  The case was remanded to the district court for the
purpose of dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.116
F. Declaratory Judgments
A federal court “may declare the rights and other legal relations of
any interested party” only in a “case of actual controversy within its
                                                          
109. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
110. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000)
(stating that state law may be deemed invalid under the Supremacy Clause).
111. 242 F.3d 1359, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
112. See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D) (1994) (The Patent and Trademark Office may
establish regulations which “may govern the recognition and conduct of agents,
attorneys or other persons representing applicants or other parties before the
office . . . .”); id. § 32 (“The Director may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing,
suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case, from further practice
before the Patent and Trademark Office, any person, agent, or attorney shown to be
incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who does not comply
with the regulations established under section 2(b)(2)(D) of this title . . . .”).
113. 242 F.3d at 1365-66, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100 (quoting Sperry v. State of
Florida, 393 U.S. 379, 402 (1963)) (“[T]he State maintains control over the practice
of law within its borders, except to the limited extent necessary for accomplishing
federal objectives.”).
114. Id. at 1366, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099 (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S.
528, 536-37 (1974)).
115. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099.
116. Id. at 1366-67, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102.
AUTHREVBENAMIPP 9/11/02  11:00 AM
652 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:639
jurisdiction.”117  In order to determine whether subject matter
jurisdiction exists in actions to declare patent rights, the court applies
a two part justiciability test:  first, there must be an explicit threat or
other action by the patentee which creates a reasonable
apprehension that the declaratory judgment plaintiff will face an
infringement suit; and second, there must be present activity on the
part of the declaratory judgment plaintiff which would constitute
infringement or concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such
activity.118  The actual controversy “must be extant at all stages of the
review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.”119
Thus, in Intellectual Property Development, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of
California, Inc.,120 the Federal Circuit held that, by filing a statement of
non-liability and a motion for voluntary dismissal, the patentee and
its exclusive licensee had deprived the court of subject matter
jurisdiction to consider the declaratory judgment counterclaims.121
The statement of non-liability removed any reasonable apprehension
by the defendant that it would face an infringement suit.122
G. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
The Federal Circuit has characterized the issue of claim
construction as a question of law,123 and it reviews the district court’s
claim construction de novo.124  Similarly, the Federal Circuit reviews
decisions granting summary judgment de novo.125  The Federal Circuit
also regards prosecution history estoppel as a question of law and has
reviewed decisions on prosecution history estoppel de novo.126  Thus,
                                                          
117. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).
118. See Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1058, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1139, 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (explaining that the purpose of the
two-part test is to determine whether there is a real and immediate need for judicial
attention).
119. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975).
120. 248 F.3d 1333, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
121. Id. at 1341, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685-86.
122. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684-85.
123. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970-71, 34
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
124. See, e.g., Wenger Mfg., Inc. v. Coating Mach. Sys., Inc., 239 F.3d 1225, 1231, 57
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1679, 1683 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Chesapeake
Energy Corp., 236 F.3d 684, 689, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1293, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
125. See, e.g., Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp., 238 F.3d 1341, 1344,
57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,
238 F.3d 1376, 1379, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653, 1655 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  The court,
however, reviews decisions denying summary judgment for abuse of discretion.  See,
e.g., Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc., 264 F.3d 1358, 1364, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1173, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Wenger Mfg., Inc., 239 F.3d at 1231, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1683.
126. See, e.g., Biovail Corp. Int’l v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 239 F.3d 1297, 1299, 57
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813, 1815 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Pioneer Magnetics, Inc., 238 F.3d at
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a substantial number of infringement claims have been disposed of
without trial based upon claim construction and prosecution history
estoppel summary judgment decisions.  Other questions of law that
the Federal Circuit reviews de novo include determinations of
enablement,127 obviousness,128 indefiniteness,129 subject matter
jurisdiction130 and personal jurisdiction.131
The Federal Circuit reviews findings of fact for clear error.132  Such
findings include determinations of both literal infringement and
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,133 the factual
underpinnings of an enablement determination,134 and the factual
findings underlying a decision on inequitable conduct (i.e., whether
information withheld was material, and whether it was withheld with
intent to deceive).135  The Federal Circuit also reviews for clear error
the district court’s determination of whether a case is “exceptional”
within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 285 so as to support an award of
attorney’s fees.136  The Federal Circuit, however, reviews the district
court’s decision of whether to grant attorney’s fees or other
enhanced damages for abuse of discretion rather than clear error.137
Similarly, the court reviews for abuse of discretion the district court’s
determination of whether to hold a patent unenforceable due to
inequitable conduct.138
In reviewing the district court’s grant or denial of a preliminary
injunction, the Federal Circuit considers whether the district court
abused its discretion, committed an error of law or seriously
misjudged the evidence.139  The Federal Circuit also applies the
deferential abuse of discretion standard in reviewing decisions
granting or denying a new trial,140 granting or denying equitable
                                                          
1344, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 155.
127. See, e.g., Union Pac. Res. Co., 236 F.3d at 690, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296.
128. See, e.g., In re Roemer, 258 F.3d 1303, 1307, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1527, 1529
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
129. See, e.g., Union Pac. Res. Co., 236 F.3d at 692, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297.
130. See, e.g., Wenger Mfg., Inc., 239 F.3d at 1231, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
131. See, e.g., Inamed Corp. v. Kuzmak, 249 F.3d 1356, 1359, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1774, 1776 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
132. See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases in
which the Federal Circuit re-examined lower courts’ findings of fact).
133. See, e.g., Biovail Corp. Int’l v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 239 F.3d 1297, 1300, 57
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813, 1815 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
134. See, e.g., Union Pac. Res. Co., 236 F.3d at 690, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296.
135. See id. at 693, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299.
136. Id. at 694, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299.
137. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299.
138. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299-1300.
139. See, e.g., Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 236 F.3d
1363, 1367, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1542, 1544-45 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
140. See, e.g., Shockley v. Arcan, Inc., 248 F.3d 1349, 1358, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
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intervening rights,141 denying a motion to amend pleadings142 and
decisions on the equitable defense of laches.143
In reviewing decisions by the district court on motions for
judgment as a matter of law, the Federal Circuit reapplies the
standard used by the district court, and seeks to determine whether
there is legally sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could
find for the nonmoving party.144  Finally, the Federal Circuit reviews a
jury’s findings of fact to determine if substantial evidence supports
the factual determinations supporting the jury’s verdict.145
H. Evidentiary Issues:  Privilege
The doctrine of privilege has a long history in common law and
allows a party not to disclose communications that meet certain
requirements of confidentiality.146  Four common elements exist to
establish a privilege against the disclosure of evidence: “(1) the
communications must originate in confidence that they will not be
disclosed [;] (2) . . . confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties [;]
(3) [t]he relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered [;] (4)[t]he injury that
would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefits thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation.”147 Among these privileges is an attorney-client
privilege that limits disclosure of communications made in
confidence to an attorney, a privilege that extends only to the client
and not third parties.148  In conjunction with attorney-client privilege,
the doctrine of work product protects materials prepared in
                                                          
1692, 1696 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Electro Scientific Indus. v. Gen. Scanning, Inc., 247 F.3d
1341, 1349, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1498, 1503.
141. See, e.g., Shockley, 248 F.3d at 1358, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1696.
142. See, e.g., Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 265 F.3d 1294,
1303, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
143. See, e.g., Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc., 264 F.3d 1358, 1364, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1173, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
144. See, e.g., Electro Scientific Indus., 247 F.3d at 1349, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1503; Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 238 F.3d 1376, 1379-80, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1653, 1656 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
145. See, e.g., Shockley, 248 F.3d at 1357, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1696.
146. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Assoc., 320 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 1963)
(discussing Wigmore’s Treatise on Evidence).
147. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE AT TRIALS IN COMMON LAW 2290, at 542
(J. McNaughton Rev. 1961).
148. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 398 (1976) (holding that
attorney-client privilege is available only to the party seeking counsel); see also FED. R.
EVID. 501 (“[T]he privilege of a witness, person . . . shall be governed by the
principles of common law . . . .”).
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anticipation of litigation or for trial.149
In In re Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.,150 an action alleging patent
infringement and other claims relating to recombinant DNA
technology for conferring pesticide resistance on plants, the
defendant sought a writ of mandamus to vacate orders of the district
court requiring the defendant to produce materials and information
claimed to be privileged or protected under work product privilege.151
Although the remedy of mandamus is generally “available only in
extraordinary situations to correct a clear abuse of discretion or
usurpation of judicial power,”152 it may also be used to prevent
privileged communications from being improperly exposed.153  With
respect to the question of whether the defendant had waived its
attorney-client privilege, the Federal Circuit applies the law of the
regional circuit, here, the Eighth Circuit.154  In this case, the district
court held that the defendant had waived the privilege by referring to
advice of counsel in a proxy statement submitted to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and to the public.155  The advice
related to the tax consequences of a merger.156  The district court also
held that the privilege had been waived by disclosure of certain
communications to expert witnesses, by disclosure of
communications during merger negotiations, and possibly by the
defendant’s designation of in-house counsel as its Rule 30(b)(6)
representative.157
The Federal Circuit held that the district court had overstated the
scope of the waiver.158  The Federal Circuit further held that the
privilege with respect to merger negotiations was not waived by
disclosure of the existence of the merger, the negotiations between
the parties or the property rights of the respective parties, but is
waived only when a party relies on or discloses advice of counsel in
connection with the merger.159  In this case, the only advice of counsel
                                                          
149. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) (holding that the disclosure
of an attorney’s thoughts and writings prepared for litigation would create
inefficiency, unfairness, and would not serve the cause of justice); FED R. CIV. P.
26(b)(3) (“[T]he court shall protect against disclosures of the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a
party concerning the litigation.”).
150. 238 F.3d 1370, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
151. Id. at 1372-73, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
152. Id. at 1373, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660.
153. Id. at 1374, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660.
154. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660.
155. Id. at 1373, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
156. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
157. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
158. Id. at 1376, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662.
159. Id. at 1374, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660.
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disclosed or relied upon related to the tax consequences of the
merger.160  Thus, privilege with respect to that subject was waived.161
There was no waiver, however, with respect to privilege on other
matters such as the financial benefits of the merger or the merger’s
effect on intellectual property.162
The Federal Circuit agreed that under the 1993 amendments to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, attorney-client privilege and work
product protection are waived by the disclosure of confidential
information to an expert witness, irrespective of whether the expert
has relied on the documents or information in forming his
opinions.163  The Federal Circuit held, however, that the mere
designation of in-house counsel to testify as a corporate
representative under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) did
not result in the waiver of any attorney-client privilege or work
product protection.164
In GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp.,165 the holder of a patent on a sectional
sofa appealed from a judgment that, among other things, had held
one of the patents in suit unenforceable for inequitable conduct.166
The patentee claimed that the district court had improperly forced it
to disclose privileged information.167  The Federal Circuit again
applied the law of the regional circuit to review the district court’s
ruling on waiver of attorney-client privilege.168  The Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s finding that the patentee had waived
privilege when its patent attorney testified in a prior litigation
concerning his state of mind, his knowledge of prior art and
communications with his client concerning, among other things, the
duty of disclosure and various items of prior art.169
I. Claim and Issue Preclusion
Both claim and issue preclusion stand for the notion that
something determined by a court cannot later be disputed by the
same parties. Under the broader doctrine of claim preclusion, or res
judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the
                                                          
160. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660-61.
161. Id. at 1375, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661.
162. Id. at 1374-75, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661.
163. Id. at 1375, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661.
164. Id. at 1376, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662.
165. 265 F.3d 1268, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
166. Id. at 1272, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142.
167. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142.
168. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142-43 (reviewing findings of fact using the
clearly erroneous standard and reviewing determinations of law de novo).
169. Id. at 1273, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
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parties from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in
that action.170 Under the doctrine of issues preclusion, or collateral
estoppel, once a court of competent jurisdiction determines an issue,
that decision precludes either of the parties from raising that issue in
subsequent suits based on a different cause of action.171  Unlike claim
preclusion, however, issue preclusion does not prevent parties from
relitigating issues never raised in the prior suit.172
In Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc.,173 the parties arbitrated an
infringement dispute relating to a patent for a prosthetic foot
device.174  That arbitration was conducted pursuant to a settlement
agreement which had terminated prior litigation and had not only
provided for arbitration, but also provided that the defendant would
not challenge the validity, enforceability or scope of the patent in any
subsequent proceedings.175  The defendant sought, however, to vacate
the arbitrators’ award and to persuade the district court to consider
its invalidity defense.176  The district court affirmed the arbitrators’
award.177
The Federal Circuit held that while the stipulation of dismissal with
prejudice following the prior settlement agreement did not give rise
to collateral estoppel, it gave rise to “contractual estoppel.”178  The
court went on to consider the question of whether a contractually
created estoppel was the kind of “licensee estoppel” the court in Lear
v. Adkins179 declared void as against public policy.180  The Federal
Circuit distinguished Lear on the ground that there, the license did
not contain or accompany any promise by the licensee not to
challenge the validity of the patent.181
                                                          
170. 18 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 132.01 (3d ed.
1997).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 238 F.3d 1362, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
174. Id. at 1364, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637.
175. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1636-37.
176. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637.
177. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637 (entering a permanent injunction against
the defendant and concluding that the defendant was collaterally estopped from
challenging the validity of the patent).
178. Id. at 1367-68, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639.
179. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
180. Flex-Foot, Inc., 238 F.3d at 1367-68, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639 (construing
Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969), which overruled the doctrine of licensee estoppel
and held that the technical requirements of contract law were outweighed by the
public interest in permitting competition in the use of public ideas).
181. Id. at 1368, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640 (contrasting Lear to the instant case
where the defendant had clearly and unambiguously entered into a voluntary
settlement promising not to challenge the patent in the future).
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Moreover, the Federal Circuit stated that there is a compelling
public interest in enforcing settlement agreements.182  Thus, if an
accused infringer, having challenged patent validity and having had
an opportunity to conduct discovery, has voluntarily elected to settle
the litigation and agreed not to challenge validity, the accused
infringer is contractually estopped from raising any such challenge in
any subsequent proceedings.183
In Aqua Marine Supply v. AIM Machining, Inc.,184 the Federal Circuit
suggested, without deciding the issue, that a patentee might be able
to relitigate the question of patent validity in a future lawsuit against a
different alleged infringer despite the fact that the district court had
entered a declaratory judgment of invalidity.185  After judgment had
been entered, but before appeal, the patentee and alleged infringer
had entered into a settlement agreement which provided for the
settlement and dismissal with prejudice of all claims by and between
all parties, as well as for the vacatur of the district court’s declaratory
judgment.186  The district court, however, refused to vacate its
judgment and the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal from that
decision as moot.187
In Hallco Manufacturing Co. v. Foster,188 the Federal Circuit
considered, as a threshold issue, whether the declaratory judgment
barred plaintiff, by the doctrine of claim preclusion, from seeking a
declaration in a subsequent litigation that its redesigned product did
not infringe a patent and that the patent was invalid.189  The parties
were competitors in the market for reciprocating conveyors used to
move cargo into and out of trucks, and had settled a prior lawsuit
involving the same patent and a prior-generation conveyor with
prejudice.190  Pursuant to the settlement, the alleged infringer
accepted a non-exclusive, royalty-bearing license.191  The Federal
                                                          
182. Id. at 1369, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640-41 (acknowledging that res judicata
was not an important consideration in Lear).
183. Id. at 1370, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1641 (noting that upholding a settlement
agreement that was reached in such a situation promotes judicial economy and
encourages settlement of disputes).
184. 247 F.3d 1216, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1536 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
185. Id. at 1221, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1539 (suggesting that the district court’s
judgment could be used as a defense by the other infringer).
186. Id. at 1218-19, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1537-38.
187. Id. at 1220, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1539 (holding that, although a case
would not be automatically rendered moot by a settlement of the infringement
question if the validity issue was still in dispute, the infringer here had no interest in
defending the judgment of invalidity).
188. 256 F.3d 1290, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
189. Id. at 1294, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348.
190. Id. at 1293, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348.
191. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348.
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Circuit reviewed a number of prior cases on claim preclusion and
concluded that if the settlement agreement did not explicitly reserve
the right on the part of the alleged infringer to pursue a validity
defense in later litigation and if the underlying cause of action was
the same as the one brought earlier, then the alleged infringer would
have no right to raise invalidity.192  Thus, if the accused device in the
second litigation was the same as or essentially the same as the device
accused in the previously settled suit, then relitigation of the validity
defense as well as the infringement issue would be prohibited.193  The
court remanded the action to the district court for a determination of
whether the newly accused device was the same or essentially the
same as the device involved in the settled case.194
In Innovad Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,195 the patentee sued a number of
defendants for alleged infringement of patents relating to an
automatic telephone dialer system.196  On appeal, the patentee
challenged the district court’s claim construction, which had resulted
in summary judgment of non-infringement.197  The defendants
argued that, since the patentee had appealed from the judgment as
to several defendants but had not appealed as to one of the
defendants, the doctrine of issue preclusion prohibited the patentee
from challenging the district court’s claim construction underlying
that judgment.198  The Federal Circuit noted that the doctrine of issue
preclusion prevented relitigation in a second suit of issues already
litigated and determined in a prior suit.199  Such prevention of
relitigation occurs only if the issues were identical, the issues were
actually previously litigated, the resolution of the issue was essential
to a final judgment in the first action, and the allegedly precluded
party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.200  In this
case, the court concluded that there was no “first” or “second” action
for the purpose of the issue preclusion doctrine since the allegedly
preclusive judgment was rendered in the very action being
appealed.201  A “full and fair opportunity to litigate,” the Federal
                                                          
192. Id. at 1298, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1351-52 (stating that the court would not
“give parties the power to agree to waste the resources of the courts in revisiting
infringement determinations that have already been made.”).
193. Id. at 1296-97, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1350-51 (citing Scosche Indus. v. Visor
Gear, Inc., 121 F.3d 675, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1659 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
194. Id. at 1298, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352.
195. 260 F.3d 1326, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1676 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
196. Id. at 1330, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678.
197. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678.
198. Id. at 1334, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
199. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
200. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
201. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681 (finding that no action before the court
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Circuit held, includes the right to appeal.202  Moreover, settlements
would be discouraged by a rule that required an appellant to include
in its appeal all parties involved in the district court.203  The patentee
was free to appeal as to some defendants and to settle with others
without being precluded from challenging the district court’s claim
construction.204
II. PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY
A. Anticipation
In order to invalidate a patent claim for anticipation, a party must
show that the invention is not novel.205  This means that a single prior
source must contain all of the essential elements of the invention.206
Anticipation cannot be shown simply by combining the elements
from more than one reference.207
In Karsten Manufacturing Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co.,208 the Federal
Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling, on summary judgment, that
six claims of a patent for an improved golf club head were invalid as
anticipated by a prior art club head.209  In this case, the patentee
argued that the claims should be narrowly construed to avoid
describing a prior art club head which was literally covered by the
claims but different from the club head shown in the drawings of the
patent.210  The Federal Circuit recognized that claims amenable to
more than one construction should be read, when possible, to
preserve their validity, but held that, if the claim language
encompasses the prior art, the court cannot narrow the claims in
litigation so as to exclude it.211  Although the prior art club head and
the embodiments illustrated in the patent were not identical, the
differences were not reflected in the language of the claims.212  The
                                                          
had been fully resolved through “prior litigation”).
202. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
203. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681-82.
204. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681-82.
205. 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.02 (1998).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 242 F.3d 1376, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
209. Id. at 1383, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291-92 (stating that, in order to find an
invention invalid for lack of novelty, “[t]he invention must have been known to the
art in the detail of the claim; that is, all of the elements and limitations of the claim
must be shown in a single prior reference, arranged as in the claim.”) (citing C.R.
Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1349, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1229-30
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
210. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291-92.
211. Id. at 1384, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292.
212. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292.
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court stated that the role of claim construction “is to describe the
claim scope as it was intended when examined and obtained by the
applicant, not as it might have been limited upon a different record
of prosecution and prior art.”213
In Electro Scientific Industries v. General Scanning, Inc.,214 the patentee
owned two related patents on a system and a method for using lasers
to vaporize links to defective memory cells on silicon chips.215  After a
jury trial, the claims of one patent were found valid as neither
anticipated nor obvious, while the claims of a related patent,
although not anticipated, were found to be obvious.216  The
defendant requested judgment as a matter of law, arguing, among
other things, that the invalid claims anticipated the claims of the
patent that the jury had found valid.217  The district court denied the
motion for judgment of invalidity and the Federal Circuit affirmed.
The court observed that the claims differed in one very important
feature: while the invalid claims disclosed a system for vaporizing
non-metal links, the claim which the jury found valid explicitly
claimed a system for severing metal links.218  The court held that the
jury had sufficient evidence to find the metal link vaporizing system
valid over the prior art, including expert testimony, scientific papers
and patents, the failure of others to sever metal links, and the
skepticism of those skilled in the art about whether lasers could be
used to vaporize metal links without harming the underlying
silicon.219
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc.,220 the
Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part a district court’s
summary judgment that claims to a method of treating cancer using
the anti-tumor drug paclitaxel were invalid as anticipated by a prior
art reference.221  Responding to the patentee’s argument that “new
uses of old processes are patentable,”222 the Federal Circuit held that,
                                                          
213. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292.
214. 247 F.3d 1341, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1498 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
215. Id. at 1348, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
216. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
217. Id. at 1350, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504.
218. Id. at 1351, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504-05.
219. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504-05. Additional secondary evidence of non-
obviousness included the commercial success of one of the patentee’s own laser
systems and evidence that the defendant had copied the claimed system.  Id., 58
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504-05.
220. 246 F.3d 1368, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
221. Id. at 1371, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1510.
222. Id. at 1376, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514.  While the court acknowledged
that patent law defines a patentable process to include “a new use of a known
process,” 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1994), it held that the process claimed here was not
new, and that the patent claimed “newly discovered results” of a known process.
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where the prior art reference contained a disclosure of each of the
limitations of the claimed inventions, the prior reference would
invalidate the subsequent claims, even where the prior reference
disparages the present invention, and even though the author of the
prior art reference did not actually carry out the treatment program
he recommended.223  The Federal Circuit noted that the prior art
reference, while suggesting the use of premedication, did not disclose
the specific classes of premedicants claimed by the patentee.224
Although anticipation requires a showing that each limitation of the
claim is found in a single reference, the disclosure of a small genus
may anticipate the species of that genus, even species that are not
explicitly recited.225  The Federal Circuit therefore remanded to the
district court to determine whether there were so few suitable classes
of premedicants that a general suggestion to premedicate would have
been understood by one skilled in the art as a suggestion to use the
specific classes of agents mentioned in the claims.226
In Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc.,227 the patent described
a mobile phone system that automatically debits the cost of each call
from a prepaid credit account stored within the cellular phone.228
The district court granted summary judgment because certain claims
were anticipated by prior art.229  The Federal Circuit noted that while
anticipation is a question of fact, it may still be decided on summary
judgment if the material facts are not in dispute.230  In this case, the
claim required the use of a “complex billing algorithm.”231  The prior
                                                          
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 246 F.3d at 1376, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514.  Such results
were held to be inherent, e.g., In re May, 574 F.2d 1082, 1090, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
601, 607 (C.C.P.A. 1978), and therefore unpatentable.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 246
F.3d at 1376, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514.
223. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 246 F.3d at 1377, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514-15.
The prior art reference (“Kris”) used paclitaxel in a three hour infusion, as described
in the claims of the patent-in-suit, but observed no anti-tumor response.  Id. at 1372,
58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511.  Kris did, however, report hypersensitivity reactions in
patients who received doses of paclitaxel higher than those claimed in the
Bristol-Myers patent.  Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511.  Kris suggested that further
studies with, inter alia, pre-treatment regimens, were needed to see whether such
dosages could be given safely, but Kris did not carry out such studies.  Id., 58
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511.
224. Id. at 1380, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517.
225. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517 (citing In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 682,
133 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 275, 280 (C.C.P.A. 1962)).
226. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517.
227. 247 F.3d 1316, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
228. Id. at 1319, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546.
229. Id. at 1331-32, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555-56.
230. Id. at 1327, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.
231. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.  The basic “complex billing algorithm” of
the claim was construed by the court to include the ability to calculate call charges
for local, long distance, international and roaming calls.  Id. at 1326-27, 58
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art disclosed a debit phone that calculated call charges using charge
rates stored within the phone.232  Although the prior art reference did
not expressly identify the rate categories included within the claimed
billing algorithm, the district court found those features inherent.233
The Federal Circuit noted that, to anticipate a claimed invention, a
prior art reference must disclose every limitation of the claimed
invention, either explicitly or inherently.234  Inherency is a question of
fact,235 which the court may decide by recourse to extrinsic
evidence.236  Such evidence must make clear that “the missing feature
is necessarily present and that it would be so recognized by persons of
ordinary skill in the relevant art.”237  The Federal Circuit reviewed the
evidence238 and, finding no genuine issue of material fact, affirmed
the partial summary judgment of invalidity due to anticipation.239
In Acromed Corp. v. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc.,240 the court did not
find that a missing element was inherent in a prior art reference for
purposes of anticipation.241  The patent in this case related to a bone
screw for attaching plates to a spine, connecting broken bones or
connecting prostheses to bones.242
                                                          
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551.
232. Id. at 1327, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.
233. Id. at 1321, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.
234. Id. at 1327, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552 (holding that the prior art
anticipates if it necessarily functions in accordance with, or includes, the claimed
limitations) (citing In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429,
1431 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
235. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.
236. Id. at 1328, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553.
237. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553.  Inherency may, however, not be
“coterminous” with the knowledge of artisans of ordinary skill.  See, e.g.,
MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1365, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1303, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (recognizing that artisans of ordinary skill may not
recognize the inherent characteristic of the prior art); Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc.,
190 F.3d 1342, 1347, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943, 1946-47 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting
that although an artisan of ordinary skill may not recognize the inherent
characteristic, “the discovery of a previously unappreciated property of prior art
composition . . . does not render the old composition patentably new to the
discoverer.”).
238. Telemac Cellular Corp., 247 F.3d at 1328, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.  The
prior art reference based charges on “data normally included in a Call Detail
Record.”  Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.  The court looked to several of the
patentee’s internal documents and other patents as well as to testimony to conclude
that a Call Detail Record would include each of the four rate categories required by
the “complex algorithm” of the claim.  Id. at 1329, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552-54.
239. Id. at 1329, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554 (stating that “broad conclusory
statements” by experts were not sufficient, absent substantive testimony of record, to
create a genuine issue of fact).
240. 253 F.3d 1371, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
241. See id. at 1383-84, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138-39 (concluding that the
patent did not disclose the “means integral” as cited in the claims).
242. Id. at 1376-77, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134.  The missing element was a
“means . . . for engaging a portion of the . . . opening in the bone portion to restrict
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In Rapoport v. Dement,243 the Federal Circuit affirmed a decision of
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences relating to claims for a
method for the treatment of sleep apnea by the use of azapirone
compounds.244  The prior art suggested the use of such compounds
for treating anxiety in patients who had sleep apnea, but did not
suggest the use of such compounds for treating sleep apnea itself.245
The Board held that the claimed method was not inherent in the
prior reference.246  After applying the substantial evidence test, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision.247
In Brown v. 3M,248 the patent claimed a system for resetting
computer clocks to avoid Y2K problems that the Federal Circuit
found was anticipated by prior art.249  The system in question
provided for resetting year-date data stored in 2-digit, 3-digit or
4-digit representations, while the prior art disclosed a system for
resetting years stored in a 2-digit format.250  The court stated “[t]hat
which infringes, if later, anticipates, if earlier,”251 and held that the
claim was anticipated by the prior art because the claim would be
infringed by a system which reset only dates stored in a 2-digit format
as well as by systems that could reset dates stored in other formats.252
Chief Judge Mayer, noting that the prior art was before the
examiner, dissented on the ground that the claim required a system
that would reset the clock irrespective of whether the data was in
2-digit, 3-digit or 4-digit format (or in any combination).253  Thus, he
concluded that a system capable of resetting only 2-digit dates would
not infringe.254
                                                          
movement . . . and to block effluence from the opening . . . .”  Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1134.
243. 254 F.3d 1053, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1215 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
244. Id. at 1059, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1220 (finding the phrase “treatment of
sleep apnea” as referring to the treatment of the underlying sleep apnea disorder
and not to the treatment of other conditions secondary to sleep apnea itself).
245. Id. at 1060, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1220 (stating that the written description
of the application contained no evidence of the treatment’s effect on the
symptomatology commonly associated with sleep apnea).
246. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1220.
247. Id. at 1060-61, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221 (“What a reference teaches is a
question of fact . . . .  Therefore we review the Board’s characterization . . . for
substantial evidence.”).
248. 265 F.3d 1349, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
249. Id. at 1353, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378.
250. Id. at 1351-52, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377.
251. Id. at 1352, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 1256, 1573, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561, 574 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
252. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377.
253. Id. at 1353-54, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that in order to anticipate the prior art the reference must disclose
every limitation, while in the instant case the reference did not).
254. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378-79 (noting that the burden of proving a
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B. Obviousness
Even if an invention is not identically described in a single prior art
reference, the invention is not patentable if the differences between
that which one seeks to patent and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which the subject matter pertains.255  To establish a prima facie case of
obviousness there must be some suggestion or motivation to modify
the reference or combine the reference teachings, some reasonable
expectation of success, and the prior art must teach or suggest all the
claim limitations.256  Four factual determinations, described in Graham
v. John Deere, Co.,257 ought to be made when obviousness is in question:
(1) a determination of the scope and contents of the prior art;
(2) the differences between the prior art and that which one seeks to
be patented; (3) the level of ordinary skill needed in the art; and
(4) evidence of secondary considerations, such as commercial
success.258
In Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc.,259 the Federal Circuit
vacated a preliminary injunction, which prohibited the defendant’s
use of a website feature that allegedly infringed the plaintiff’s patent
for a method and system for “single action” ordering of items on the
Internet.260  The Federal Circuit held that, while Amazon.com had
demonstrated it was likely to succeed at trial on its infringement
case,261 the defendant had raised substantial questions of invalidity.262
The court noted that at the preliminary injunction stage, a challenger
to a patent “can raise substantial questions of invalidity on evidence
that would not suffice to support a judgment of invalidity at trial.”263
In this case, the district court failed to recognize that several prior art
references raised substantial questions of invalidity and therefore the
                                                          
patent anticipated is particularly high when the prior art was before the examiner
during prosecution of the application) (quoting Hewlett Packard Co. v. Baush &
Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1467, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1525, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
255. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
256. LESTER HOROWITZ, PATENT OFFICE RULES AND PRACTICE:  MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2142 (8th ed. 2001).
257. 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
258. Id.
259. 239 F.3d 1343, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
260. Id. at 1346, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748.
261. Id. at 1358-65, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757-63.
262. Id. at 1358, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757 (noting that some of their prior art
references appeared to have used “single action” ordering technology).
263. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757 (citing Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208
F.3d 1339, 1352, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1299, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
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Federal Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction.264
In Karsten Manufacturing Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co.,265 the Federal
Circuit reversed a district court holding of invalidity based on
obviousness.266  The Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s
determination on the issue of obviousness as a question of law based
on underlying questions of fact,267 and, because there was no dispute
as to the underlying facts, the court reviewed the judgment of
invalidity by applying the law to the undisputed facts.268  Where an
invention is alleged to be “obvious in view of a combination of
references, there must be some suggestion, motivation, or teaching in
the prior art that would have led a person of ordinary skill in the art
to select the references and combine them in a way that would
produce the claimed invention.”269  In the present case, the Federal
Circuit held that the teachings of the prior art references were
conflicting and could not reasonably be viewed as suggesting their
combination.270  The court reversed as a matter of law and remanded
the claims for determination of the question of infringement.271
In re Haruna272 involved a design patent for an ornamental design
for a prerecorded optical disk.273  The Federal Circuit reversed a
decision in which the Board of Patent Appeals held the claim obvious
in light of a prior art utility patent that disclosed a disk similar to the
claimed invention but which had used an opaque, instead of
transparent, outer rim.274  The court noted that color may play a role
in the patentability of a design and it distinguished prior cases in
which the prior art did not teach away from the claimed invention.275
                                                          
264. Id. at 1359, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756-57.  In the case of one reference,
the district court apparently concluded that the prior art reference could not raise
an issue of obviousness because the author of the reference had never thought of
combining or modifying the prior art to create the “single action” invention.  Id. at
1364, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1762.  The Federal Circuit pointed out that this
approach was erroneous as a matter of law, since the appropriate inquiry was not
what the author did or did not personally realize at the time, but what a hypothetical
person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from the references at the
time the patent application was filed.  Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1761-62.
265. 242 F.3d 1376, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
266. Id. at 1385, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.
267. Id. at 1384, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292.
268. Id. at 1385, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.
269. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.
270. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.  One prior art reference showed a club
design for raising the head’s center of gravity, while the second prior art reference
showed  a club design for lowering it.  Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.
271. Id. at 1385-86, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.
272. 249 F.3d 1327, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1517 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
273. Id. at 1329, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518 (discussing design differences).
274. Id. at 1336, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523 (finding that the transparent outer
rim cannot conceal the defects in the disk, as does the opaque rim).
275. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
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In Electro Scientific Industries, Inc. v. General Scanning, Inc.,276 the
Federal Circuit sustained a jury verdict of invalidity based on
obviousness where there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to
find that a prior art reference inherently contained certain claim
limitations with respect to a system for severing links to defective
memory cells on a microchip.277  Prior art disclosed the use of lasers
for trimming thin film resistors, and expert testimony supported the
conclusion that this was an analogous art to using lasers to sever
non-metal links.278  In addition, the patentee had failed to introduce
any objective secondary evidence of non-obviousness.279
The Federal Circuit addressed obviousness-type double patenting
in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.280  The court reviewed the
policy reasons for the doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting,
which was created by the courts to prevent an inventor from
obtaining inappropriate extensions of the right to exclude others
from practicing a claimed invention by making claims in a later
patent not patentably distinct from claims in a commonly owned
earlier patent.281  The analysis involves two steps: first, as a matter of
law, the court construes the claim in the earlier patent and the claim
in the later patent to determine the differences; second, the court
decides whether the differences in subject matter between the two
claims make them patentably distinct.282  A later patent claim is not
patentably distinct from the earlier claim if the later claim is either
obvious over, or anticipated by, the earlier claim.283  In this case, the
court held that the biological property of inhibiting serotonin uptake
was inherent in the use of fluoxetine hydrochloride for treating
depression in humans.284  Thus, a later claim which describes the use
of fluoxetine hydrochloride to inhibit serotonin uptake was held
obvious over an earlier-issued claim to the use of the same compound
to treat anxiety in humans.285
                                                          
276. 247 F.3d 1341, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1498 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
277. Id. at 1351, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505 (noting testimony that showed that
the prior art reference “encompassed laser cutting of any element of a circuit”).
278. Id. at 1351-52, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505.
279. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505.
280. 251 F.3d 955, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
281. Id. at 967, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877-78 (holding that the doctrine has no
explicit statutory basis but is necessary to prevent inappropriate term extensions)
(citing In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 645, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
282. Id. at 968, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
283. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
284. Id. at 969, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879 (noting that “a panoply of evidence
supports the recognition of this inherent biological function of fluoxetine
hydrochloride”).
285. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879 (finding that the difference between the
claims was that the former described the treatment of anxiety in humans and the
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Judge Newman dissented on the ground that the claim that
described the specific biological properties of the compound had
been filed nine years earlier than the earlier-issued claim for the use
of the compound to treat anxiety in humans.286  She argued that the
obviousness-type double patenting rejection was appropriate where
neither of the patents was prior art against the other, but not, as here,
where the two claims lacked a common priority date.287
In In re Zurko,288 the Federal Circuit reversed a finding by the Board
of Patent Appeals and Interferences, which rejected an application
describing a method for creating a secure computer environment.289
The claims provided for relaying commands to a user along a “trusted
path” and for the user to send a confirming signal back along the
trusted path.290  The Board had held that communication through
such trusted paths was “basic knowledge.”291  The Federal Circuit held
that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence
because the Board’s “assessment of basic knowledge and
commonsense was not based on any evidence in the record.”292
In Okajima v. Bourdeau,293 the Federal Circuit affirmed a decision by
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, which held that the
senior party’s claims were not unpatentable for obviousness.294  The
claims related to a snowboard boot.295  The Board concluded that it
would not have been obvious to one of skill in the art to combine
prior art boots in order to produce the claimed invention.296  The
Federal Circuit held that the Board was not required, as a matter of
law, to make findings of fact regarding the level of skill in the art
                                                          
latter described inhibiting serotonin uptake in animals).
286. Id. at 974, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866 (Newman, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 973, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867-68 (Newman, J., dissenting).
288. 258 F.3d 1379, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
289. Id. at 1381, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694 (reversing because the factual
findings lacked substantial evidence).
290. Id. at 1382, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1695.
291. Id. at 1383, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1695.
292. Id. at 1385-86, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1697.
[T]he Board clearly has expertise in the subject matter . . . .  This expertise
may provide sufficient support for conclusions as to peripheral issues.  With
respect to core factual findings in a determination of patentability, however,
the Board cannot simply reach conclusions based on its own understanding
or experience—or on its assessment of what would be basic knowledge or
common sense.
Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1697.
293. 261 F.3d 1350, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1795 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
294. Id. at 1352, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1795.
295. Id. at 1352-53, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1796.
296. Id. at 1354-55, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1797 (noting that appellant claimed
error because the Board did not make any findings of fact regarding the skill level in
the art).
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where the parties agree that the level of skill was high.297  The Federal
Circuit affirmed the Board’s conclusion that there was no motivation
in the art to combine the prior art references to produce the
invention.298  Since the Board’s decision set forth distinct findings of
fact in a manner that a district court is required to do under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), the Board’s findings deserved broad
deference.299
In Sandt Technology, Ltd. v. Resco Metal & Plastics Corp.,300 the Federal
Circuit reviewed the district court’s adoption of a magistrate judge’s
report, which held Claim 1 of the patent in suit invalid as anticipated
by a device invented by the defendant’s president and Claims 3 and
19 obvious in light of prior art.301  The district judge, however, held all
claims in the patent invalid, including the dependent claims, without
a specific discussion of his reasoning.302 With respect to the
obviousness determination, the Federal Circuit summarized the
Graham factors303 and reviewed the district court’s obviousness
determination de novo because it had been made on motion for
summary judgment and the district court had not made findings of
underlying fact.304  The court held that there was no error in the
district court’s claim construction or in its determination that the use
of studs instead of welds to fasten a security device for coin-operated
payphones was an obvious change.305  The Federal Circuit remanded,
however, for consideration of whether claims other than claims 1, 3
and 19 were invalid.306  Although the parties had cross-moved for
summary judgment on all claims, they had presented evidence on
only 3 of the 21 claims of the patent.307  Since all claims are presumed
valid independently of the other claims, the district court could not
hold the dependent claims invalid simply because independent
                                                          
297. Id. at 1385, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1797 (“While it is always preferable . . . to
specify the level of skill . . . , the absence of specific findings on the level of skill in
the art does not give rise to reversible error ‘where the prior art itself reflects an
appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown.’” (quoting Litton Indus.
Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 34, 38
(Fed. Cir. 1985))).
298. Id. at 1355, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798 (differentiating between the two
references on the basis that one described lateral movement and the other described
forward movement).
299. Id. at 1356, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798.
300. 264 F.3d 1344, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
301. Id. at 1349, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1093.
302. Id. at 1355, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098.
303. See supra note 257 and accompanying text (listing the factors).
304. Sandt Tech., 264 F.3d at 1354, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1097.
305. Id. at 1355, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1097.
306. Id. at 1357, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099.
307. Id. at 1355-56, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098.
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claims were properly found invalid.308
In In re Inland Steel Co.,309 the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences invalidated, on reexamination, a patent relating to a
method for producing cold-rolled electrical steel with improved
magnetic properties.310  The Federal Circuit held that the Board was
supported by substantial evidence in finding that a prior art reference
taught the use of antimony in both hot-band annealing and in
cold-rolling.311  Although the prior art reference focused on the use of
antimony in conjunction with hot-band annealing, the Board
correctly found that the reference nevertheless teaches that the
addition of antimony improves the magnetic properties of the steel
even in the absence of a hot-band annealing step.312  The Federal
Circuit also found supported by substantial evidence the Board’s
finding that there was a motivation to combine two closely related
prior art references because they addressed the same problem in the
same field of art and produced complementary solutions.313
In Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Matsushita Electronic Industries,314  the
Federal Circuit reversed a summary judgment of invalidity based on
obviousness.315  The patent claimed a process for manufacturing a
charge-coupled device (CCD).316  The district court had granted
summary judgment on the ground that the invention was obvious in
view of a publication made prior to the filing date.317  The Federal
Circuit reviewed the requirements for summary judgment318 and the
parties’ burdens of proof.319  In this case, the patentee did not argue
                                                          
308. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 282 (Supp. V 1999)
for the proposition that “[a]ll claims are ‘presumed valid independently of the
validity of the other claims.’”).
309. 265 F.3d 1354, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1396 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
310. Id. at 1356, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398.
311. Id. at 1360-61, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401 (adding that there was no
compelling evidence contrary to the Board’s position).
312. Id. at 1360, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401.
313. Id. at 1362, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1402.
314. 266 F.3d 1358, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
315. Id. at 1360, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1362.
316. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1362.
317. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1363 (noting that the district court also ruled
that application of the doctrine of equivalents was precluded by the prior art
publication).
318. Id. at 1361, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1363. Summary judgment is proper only
when no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party; the trial
court must assume that all evidence presented by the non-movant is credible and
must draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the non-movant’s favor.  See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
319. Loral Fairchild Corp., 266 F.3d at 1361, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1363.  The
challenger, at trial, would need to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
publication, which was relied on for proving obviousness, was published prior to the
patentee’s reduction of the invention to practice; the patentee would have the
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that it conceived the invention prior to the publication date and then
diligently worked toward reducing it to practice, but argued that it
actually reduced the invention to practice before the publication was
made.320
The Federal Circuit held that on a motion for summary judgment,
the district court may not assess the credibility of testimony.321  Thus,
the inventor’s assertion that he had reduced his invention to practice
prior to the publication date of the alleged invalidating reference was
taken as true for purposes of summary judgment.322  To establish an
actual reduction to practice, however, the inventor’s testimony had to
be corroborated by independent evidence,323 the sufficiency of which
is evaluated under a “rule of reason” considering all the pertinent
evidence.324  In this case, the corroborating evidence consisted of
contemporaneously made, custom-fabricated lithographic masks as
well as contemporaneous proposals to provide CCDs produced using
the claimed process.325  The Federal Circuit regarded this evidence as
sufficient, reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded
the case for further proceedings.326
In a concurring opinion, Judge Newman asserted that the
significant date to consider when seeking to antedate a reference is
the date of invention, i.e. the date of conception, not the date of
reduction to practice.327  Judge Newman also argued that while
corroboration is necessary in a patent office interference proceeding,
it is not appropriate to require it in an infringement action because
the evidentiary standard for antedating a reference in response to a
validity challenge is not the same as the Patent Office requirement
for establishing priority in an interference contest.328
                                                          
burden of producing evidence of its asserted actual reduction to practice prior to the
filing date of its patent application.  Id. at 1362, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1364.
320. Id. at 1362-63, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1364 (stating that reduction to
practice is complete once the invention has been made and shown to work for its
intended purpose).
321. Id. at 1363, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365.
322. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365.
323. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365 (citing Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321,
1330, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1896, 1903 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
324. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365.
325. Id. at 1363-64, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365.
326. Id. at 1365, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366.
327. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366-67 (Newman, J., concurring).
328. Id. at 1366, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367-68 (“Antedating a reference is a
common occurrence, governed by a stable and non-controversial jurisprudence.  Let
us not add uncertainties to this law.”).
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C. Prior Invention
U.S. patent law is unique in that the patent right is granted to the
first inventor, rather than the first to file a patent application.329  To
benefit as a prior inventor, a party must show that he not only
conceived the invention but also reduced it to practice first or
exercised diligence in reducing it to practice.330  Where an invention
has been intentionally concealed or suppressed, however, the party
may forfeit all rights to the invention.331
In Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GmbH,332 the district
court granted the patentee’s motion for a preliminary injunction on
patents related to a formulation of “controlled release oxycodone”
for pain medication.333  The defendant argued that the patent was
anticipated by the claims of a parent patent, which the defendant
contended was prior art because the inventive entity of the parent was
different from that of its progeny.334  The patentee claimed, however,
that the inventions disclosed in the patents-in-suit were conceived
and reduced to practice before the filing date of the parent
application.335  The district court relied on the testimony of one of the
inventors, as corroborated by documentary evidence, to find
conception and reduction to practice.336  Under the rule of reason,
the district court did not err in holding the proof adequate.337
In Mycogen Plant Science, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,338 the Federal Circuit
reviewed a jury verdict of invalidity based upon prior invention with
respect to all of the claims of two patents which described a method
                                                          
329. ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 3.4(d) (3d ed.
1994).
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. 237 F.3d 1359, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
333. Id. at 1364, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650.
334. Id. at 1365, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
335. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.  Conception and reduction to practice are
questions of law, based on subsidiary findings of fact.  In order to antedate a prior art
reference, the patentee must show either an earlier reduction to practice or an
earlier conception followed by diligence in reducing the invention to practice.
Conception requires proof that the inventor had formed a definite and permanent
idea of the complete and operative invention; reduction to practice requires that the
inventor actually have prepared the composition and knew that it would work.  See,
e.g., Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1190, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1031, 1037-38 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (holding that priority goes to the first party to reduce an invention to
practice unless the other party can show that it was the first to conceive the invention
and that it exercised reasonable diligence in later reducing that invention to
practice); Hybritech v. Monoclonel Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376, 231
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81, 87 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (defining conception as a final idea as it is to
be applied in practice).
336. Purdue Pharma L.P., 237 F.3d at 1366, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
337. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651-52.
338. 243 F.3d 1316, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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for designing a synthetic Bacillus thuringiensis (“Bt”) gene so that it
would be expressed more efficiently in plants.339  The Federal Circuit
found that the jury’s factual findings were supported by substantial
evidence and the facts sufficient to support the judgment as a matter
of law.340  The court noted that for Monsanto to establish that it was
the prior inventor, it was required to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that it either reduced its invention to practice first or
conceived the invention first and then acted diligently to reduce the
invention to practice.341  In order to establish an actual reduction to
practice, the inventor must prove that he made an embodiment or
carried out a process that met all of the limitations of the claim and
determined that it would work for its intended purpose.342
In this case, the patentee claimed that the Monsanto inventors did
not appreciate that they had used any of the claimed processes in
synthesizing their gene at the time of reduction to practice.343  While
prior cases have held that accidental, unappreciated results should
not be regarded as anticipatory,344 the work which Monsanto
performed in preparing its synthetic genes was carried out as part of a
research program specifically directed to that end.345  Therefore, the
court held that Monsanto’s prior invention of genes causing
increased Bt expression in plants cannot be regarded as accidental.346
In a second action between the same two parties, Mycogen Plant
Science, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,347 Mycogen sued for infringement of a
third patent also related to a synthetic gene for increasing Bt
production in plants.348  This patent was a parent to the two patents
                                                          
339. Id. at 1324-26, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036-38.
340. Id. at 1331-37, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037-38 (finding that the district
court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law to enter a finding of infringement
effectively cured potential inconsistency in jury verdicts).
341. Id. at 1332, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1043 (citing Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d
1187, 1190, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1031, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
342. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1043.  In cases where determining that the
invention will work requires testing, reduction to practice is not complete until
testing has been carried out and the inventor has recognized and appreciated that
the tests were successful.  See, e.g., Estee Lauder Inc. v. L’Oreal, 129 F.3d 588, 594-95,
44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1610, 1615 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (commenting that successful test
results are irrelevant unless those results are appreciated by the inventor).
343. Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc., 243 F.3d at 1335, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1044-45. 
The processes related to replacing codons of the bt gene with codons that would be
more acceptable to a plant host.  Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1044-45.
344. See, e.g., Erbel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 66
(1923) (holding that accidental results do not constitute anticipation); Tilghman v.
Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711-12 (1880) (establishing that accidental discovery does not
suffice for proving anticipation).
345. Mycogen Plant Sci. Inc., 243 F.3d at 1336, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1046.
346. Id. at 1336, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1046.
347. 252 F.3d 1306, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1891 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
348. Id. at 1309, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1893.
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that the jury in the prior action held invalid based on Monsanto’s
prior invention.349  On granting summary judgment, the district court
ruled that Monsanto’s prior invention had been reduced to practice
before the invention underlying Mycogen’s third patent.350  The
Federal Circuit, however, noted that collateral estoppel did not
resolve the question of whether Mycogen had been first to conceive
the invention and was thereafter diligent in reducing it to practice.351
In order to prevail on its prior invention defense, Monsanto was
required to show that a reasonable fact finder would have concluded
by a clear and convincing standard that Mycogen’s inventors—
assuming Mycogen had conceived the invention first—had not been
diligent during the critical period in reducing the invention to
practice.352  To prove reasonable diligence, a party need not establish
that it worked continuously on the invention, or that it ceased all
other work while reducing the invention to practice.353  The Federal
Circuit concluded that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether
Mycogen was diligent in reducing the invention to practice, and
reversed the grant of summary judgment.354
In Apotex USA Inc. v. Merck & Co.,355 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court’s summary judgment holding invalid, on the ground of
prior invention, patents relating to a process for making a
formulation of enalapril sodium for use in treating high blood
pressure.356  It was undisputed that Merck had invented the patented
process in the United States well before the date of conception by the
                                                          
349. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1893.
350. Id. at 1312, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
351. Id. at 1310-11, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1894 (“As a result of collateral
estoppel, a judgment of invalidity in one patent action renders the patent invalid in
any later action based on the same patent.  Collateral estoppel also applies to
common issues in actions involving different but related patents.”).  Likewise, where
the two patents include common claim terms, those claim terms must be construed
consistently with each other; thus, claim construction litigated in a prior action is
determinative of the construction of common terms raised in a later action.  See
Blonder Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349-50 (1971)
(confirming that a plea of estoppel is available to those who are charged with
infringing a patent that has already been declared invalid); Amgen, Inc. v. Genetics
Inst., Inc., 98 F.3d 1328, 1329-32, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524, 1524-27 (Fed. Cir.
1966) (defining issue and claim preclusion).
352. Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc., 252 F.3d at 1312, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1894.  The
critical period is defined as the period between Monsanto’s conception of the
invention and reduction of the invention to practice.  Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1894.
353. Id. at 1316, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898-99 (noting that short gaps where no
work was done did not necessitate a finding of lack of reasonable diligence).
354. Id. at 1335, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1046.
355. 254 F.3d 1031, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
356. Id. at 1039-40, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144-46.
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plaintiff’s assignor.357  The sole issue was whether Merck had
suppressed or concealed the process.358  The Federal Circuit held that
the “in this country” language of 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) modifies the
place of invention but does not require that activities negating
abandonment, suppression or concealment take place in this
country.359  The court then addressed the issue (which the court had
not squarely addressed in prior cases) of how the burdens of proof
should be allocated on a defense under § 102(g).360  Reasoning that
the rule should recognize the presumption of patent validity but
should also be consistent with ways in which the burdens are
allocated under established interference law, the court held that the
challenger must produce clear and convincing evidence of prior
invention.361  Once an accused infringer has proven that it was first to
invent, the patentee bears the burden of coming forward with
evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the prior inventor has suppressed or concealed the
invention.362  The challenger, however, retains the ultimate burden of
persuasion on the defense of invalidity throughout the litigation, and
the standard remains clear and convincing evidence.363
The Federal Circuit reviewed the case law distinguishing between
two types of suppression or concealment: active suppression or
concealment, and the legal inference of suppression or concealment
arising from unreasonable delay in filing a patent application or in
otherwise disclosing the invention to the public.364  In this case, Merck
did not disclose its invention to the public for nearly five years after it
perfected its process and began using it commercially.365  The court
                                                          
357. Id. at 1035-36, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142.
358. Id. at 1036, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142 (stating that suppression or
concealment is a question of law that the Federal Circuit reviews de novo).
359. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142 (finding that the plain language of the
statute and the legislative history clearly indicate that the invention need only be
made in the United States).
360. Id. at 1036-37, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142-43 (commenting that while
interference law would not require proof negating suppression or concealment once
a party establishes an earlier date of invention, infringement actions would require
the challenger to carry the burden of proof on this issue).
361. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142-43.
362. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
363. Id. at 1037, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
364. See, e.g., Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1567, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1895, 1901 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (describing intentional suppression as when an inventor
intentionally withholds his/her invention with the purpose of maximizing his/her
own profit); Peeler v. Miller, 535 F.2d 647, 655, 190 U.S.P.Q. 117, 122 (C.C.P.A.
1976) (noting that whether the length or circumstances of the delay are
unreasonable must be decided on the unique facts of each case).
365. Apotex USA Inc., 254 F.3d at 1039 n.3, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145 n.3
(noting that if Merck’s process could be reverse engineered, the invention would
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held that such a delay raised a question of material fact as to
suppression and concealment sufficient to shift the burden of proof
back to Merck.366  The Federal Circuit held, however, that Merck had
succeeded in rebutting the inference of suppression or concealment
because it ultimately disclosed the ingredients used in its process to
the public, albeit outside the United States, well before its opponent’s
entry into the field.367
In Dow Chemical Co. v. Astro-Valcour, Inc.,368 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s summary judgment holding a patent
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).369  In this case, the Federal Circuit
considered whether a prior invention can invalidate a patent even if
the prior inventor did not realize that his invention was patentable.370
Here, the challenger made a plastic foam by following the teachings
of a prior art patent, but used isobutane as a blowing agent.371  The
challenger understood that this process worked well and produced a
desirable product, but did not immediately realize that the process
was independently patentable over the prior art.372  Reviewing the law,
the Federal Circuit noted that, in order to establish a first inventor
defense, the prior inventor must show that it made an invention and
appreciated what it had made, even if it did not appreciate that the
invention was patentable.373
In the absence of active suppression or concealment, the court
addressed the issue of whether abandonment could be inferred solely
from the prior inventor’s delay in making the invention publicly
known.374  While failure to file a patent application, to publish the
invention, or to use the invention publicly may result in such an
inference, mere delay is not sufficient, and each case must be decided
                                                          
have been considered public upon commercialization and no presumption of
concealment would have arisen).  
366. Id. at 1037-38, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144-45.
367. Id. at 1039-40, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145 (finding that appellee published
the product’s ingredients six years before appellant’s alleged conception).
368. 267 F.3d 1334, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1519 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
369. Id. at 1336, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520-21.
370. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520-21.
371. Id. at 1336-37, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520-21.
372. Id. at 1341, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523-24.
373. Id. at 1340, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523.  The court distinguished cases
where the prior inventor did not appreciate that he had made something new.  See,
e.g., Silvestri v. Grant, 496 F.2d 593, 597, 121 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 706, 708 (C.C.P.A.
1974) (“It is now well settled that in such a case there is no conception or reduction
to practice where there has been no recognition or application of the existence of
the new form.”); Heard v. Burton, 333 F.2d 239, 241-43, 142 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97, 99-
100 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (finding dispositive that the inventor believed he was only
recreating prior art).
374. Dow Chem. Co., 267 F.3d at 1342-44, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524-25.
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on its own facts.375  Delay may be excused if the inventor worked
during the delay period to perfect or improve the invention.376  In
cases where the invention is disclosed to the public by
commercialization, delay has been excused “upon proof that the first
inventor engaged in reasonable efforts to bring the invention to
market.”377  Here, bringing the invention to market required the
challenger to first procure financing and construct a new production
plant that incorporated special safety provisions made necessary by
the use of isobutane as a blowing agent.378  These efforts were
sufficient to prevent a finding of suppression or concealment.379
D. On-Sale Bar
A party may be barred from obtaining a patent if the invention
claimed was in public use or on sale in this country more than one
year prior to the application.380  An on sale bar exists where the
invention was embodied in or obvious from the object of sale, the
invention was tested as operable and marketable, and the sale (or its
offer) was for profitable, and not experimental, purposes.381
In Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,382 the Supreme Court held that, to
establish invalidity of a patent using the on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b), two conditions must be met prior to the critical date:383
“First, the product must be the subject of a commercial [sale or] offer
for sale. . . .  Second, the invention must be ready for patenting.”384
The Federal Circuit applied this test from Pfaff in several cases to
resolve challenges to patents under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
In Monon Corp. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc.,385 the Federal Circuit
reviewed a district court’s decision granting summary judgment
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and holding invalid a patent on a trailer
designed to hold more cargo without having larger outside
                                                          
375. Id. at 1342, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524 (refusing to create a bright-line rule
about how long is too long in regard to an inventor’s delay in making his invention
known).
376. Id. at 1343, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.
377. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525 (quoting Checkpoint Sys. Inc. v. United
States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 54 F.3d 756, 762, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1042, 1047 (Fed.
Cir. 1995)).
378. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525 (noting that “a prior inventor is not
required to take the fastest route to commercialization . . . .”).
379. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.
380. See HARMON, supra note 329, § 3.4(c).
381. Id.
382. 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
383. Id. at 57-58 (defining the critical date as one year before the date on which
the patent application was filed).
384. Id. at 57.
385. 239 F.3d 1253, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1699 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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dimensions than prior art trailers.386  In this case, the patentee relied
upon an argument that the use or sale of its patented device was
primarily experimental.387  In concluding that there was an issue of
fact as to whether the sales here were experimental rather than
commercial, the Federal Circuit took under consideration the testing
conditions, whether the patentee had control over the
experimentation, and whether the sale involved a payment.388  The
Federal Circuit found plausible the patentee’s assertion that it
needed to test the trailers under conditions of actual use, which it
could not do itself because it only manufactured trailers and did not
operate them.389  As to control over the experimentation, the facts
were in dispute, and the Federal Circuit found that the trial court
had likely erred in judging the credibility of witnesses on this point.390
Finally, the court noted that the fact of payment is important, but not
dispositive.391  In this case, although payment was made for the
trailers, it was undisputed that, upon completion of approximately
one year of use, the buyer would return the trailer to the
manufacturer for analysis in exchange for a full credit of the
purchase price.392  Thus, the court found that genuine issues of
material fact precluded the award of summary judgment, and
remanded the case for further proceedings.393
In Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech Microelectronics International,
Inc.,394 the Federal Circuit again found material issues of fact as to
whether an alleged sale was experimental or commercial.395  In this
case, the district court conducted a jury trial on infringement,
validity, enforceability and damages, but, at the close of evidence,
granted the patentee’s motion for judgment as a matter of law that
the patent was not invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).396  The Federal
Circuit reviewed the disputed evidence as to whether certain sales
and shipments were commercial exploitation or simply shipments of
                                                          
386. Id. at 1257, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1702-03.  The Federal Circuit reviewed
the district court’s ultimate decision to apply the on-sale bar as a question of law
based upon underlying factual considerations.  Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1702.
Whether the on-sale bar defense met the two conditions required by the Supreme
Court in Pfaff, is an issue of fact.  Id. at 1257, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1702.
387. Id. at 1258-59, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704.
388. Id. at 1258-61, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1703-05.
389. Id. at 1258, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704.
390. Id. at 1259-60, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704.
391. Id. at 1260, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1705 (citing Baker Oil Tools v. Geo
Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1564, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
392. Id. at 1260-61, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1705.
393. Id. at 1264, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707-08.
394. 246 F.3d 1336, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1953 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
395. Id. at 1352-53, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1961-62.
396. Id. at 1342, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1955.
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engineering samples to a customer site for confidential testing.397
Construing the evidence in a light favorable to the non-movant, the
Federal Circuit held that it was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to
find an on-sale bar, and the Federal Circuit remanded for trial on this
issue.398
In Robotic Vision Systems, Inc. v. View Engineering, Inc.,399 the patentee
appealed from a judgment entered after a bench trial, holding that
its patent was invalid under the on-sale bar provision of 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b).400  In this case, the application of the on-sale bar turned on
the second part of the Pfaff test, namely, whether the invention was
ready for patenting prior to the critical date.401
The patentee claimed that the invention was not ready for
patenting because software necessary to implement the claimed
method for scanning leads of integrated circuit devices did not exist
at the time of the offer for sale.402  The evidence established, however,
that one of the inventors had described the invention prior to the
critical date to a co-employee who was skilled in the art of writing
software and code.403  This description was sufficiently specific to allow
the co-employee to understand the method and to write the software
code necessary to implement the method.404  Although one of the
inventors, prior to the actual reduction of the invention to practice,
had expressed some skepticism as to whether the invention would
work, the court was not prevented from finding that the conception
was complete prior to reduction to practice.405  The two-part test for
finding an on-sale bar contains no requirement that the inventor
have complete confidence that his invention will work for its
intended purpose.406 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
judgment invalidating the patent because the district court’s factual
findings were not clearly erroneous, and supported its conclusions
                                                          
397. Id. at 1352-53, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1961-62.
398. Id. at 1342, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1955.
399. 249 F.3d 1307, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1723 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
400. Id. at 1309-10, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1724-25.
401. Id. at 1311, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1726.
An invention may be shown to be ready for patenting in at least two ways: ‘by
proof of reduction to practice; or by proof that prior to the critical date the
inventor had prepared drawings or other descriptions of the invention that
were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the
invention.’
Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1726 (quoting Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67-
68 (1998)).
402. Id. at 1310, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1725-26.
403. Id. at 1311, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1726.
404. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1726.
405. Id. at 1312, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1727.
406. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1727.
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that the invention had been the subject of a commercial offer for sale
and was ready for patenting prior to the critical date.407
In Group One Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,408 the invention related to
a machine and method for producing curled and shredded ribbons
for decorative packaging.409  It was agreed that there had been no sale
of the invention before the critical date, but it was alleged that there
had been an offer to sell, which was sufficient to trigger the on-sale
bar.410
In finding an on-sale bar, the district court had relied on language
from RCA Corp. v. Data General Corp.,411 which suggested that an offer
could trigger the on-sale bar even if it “does not rise to the level of a
formal ‘offer’ under contract law principles.”412  The Federal Circuit
characterized this language as dictum, since, “[i]n RCA, the court
found that the offer at issue could have been ‘accepted’ and
therefore was in fact an offer in the contract sense.”413  In addition,
the Federal Circuit suggested that, under Pfaff, a “‘commercial offer
for sale’  . . . must meet the level of an offer for sale in the contract
sense, one that would be understood as such in the commercial
community.”414  Thus, the Federal Circuit held that an on-sale bar
cannot be shown by “activity which does not rise to the level of a
formal ‘offer’ under contract law principles.”415
In determining whether an offer is sufficiently definite and formal
to meet the on-sale bar test, the Federal Circuit also directed that the
district courts should apply Federal Circuit law and should analyze
the issue under the law of contracts as generally understood, looking
primarily to the Uniform Commercial Code and to the Restatement
of Contracts for guidance.416  The parties did not dispute the district
court’s conclusion that there had been no commercial offer to sell.417
Thus, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s decision that
                                                          
407. Id. at 1313, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1728.
408. 254 F.3d 1041, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
409. Id. at 1043, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122.
410. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122. In order to take advantage of the bar by
relying on an offer to sell, the challenger must demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that there was a “definite sale or offer to sell” prior to the critical date and
that “the subject matter of the sale or offer to sell fully anticipated the claimed
invention.”  Id. at 1045-46, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124 (quoting UMC Elecs. Co. v.
United States, 816 F.2d 647, 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
411. 887 F.2d 1056, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
412. Group One Ltd., 254 F.3d at 1046, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125 (quoting RCA
Corp., 887 F.2d at 1062, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154).
413. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125.
414. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125.
415. Id. at 1046-47, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125.
416. Id. at 1047-48, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
417. Id. at 1048, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
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there was an on-sale bar, which had been based upon the less
demanding RCA standard.418
In Scaltech, Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, L.L.C.,419 the district court granted
summary judgment of invalidity with respect to a patent on an
improved process for treating oil refinery waste.420  First, the Federal
Circuit found that there was a commercial offer for sale when the
patentee offered to process the oil refinery waste of third parties and
to return to them “clean oil, water and a deoiled wet slurry suitable to
be sent to the coker.”421  Thus, although the inventor did not offer to
let others use its process, the Federal Circuit held that the invention
was offered for sale.422  Second, the Federal Circuit held that the offer
included all claim limitations of the invention.423  In this case, the
defendant argued that each claim limitation for all typical
applications had to be covered by the offer.424  The Federal Circuit
disagreed, holding that it is sufficient to show that one embodiment
of the invention was offered for sale.425  Finally, the court held that
the invention was ready for patenting.426  The patentee contended
that the invention could not be ready for patenting until the inventor
had conceived of each of the claim limitations.427  However, the
Federal Circuit noted that “sale of the [invention] in question
obviates any need for inquiry into conception.”428  Moreover, in this
case, prior to the critical date, the inventor had prepared drawings or
a description sufficient for enablement.429
In Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc.,430 the patentee had contracted
with a supplier to have the patent’s commercial embodiment
mass-produced more than one year before the filing of a patent
application.431  The district court granted summary judgment holding
that this arrangement produced an on-sale bar.432  There was no
                                                          
418. Id. at 1048-49, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126-27.
419. 269 F.3d 1321, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1687 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
420. Id. at 1327, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
421. Id. at 1329, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692.
422. Id. at 1328-29, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692.
423. Id. at 1329-30, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692; see also Atlas Powder v. Ireco,
Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943, 1948 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The
subject matter of the offer for sale must satisfy each claim limitation of the patent,
though it may do so inherently.”).
424. Scaltech, Inc., 269 F.3d at 1329, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692.
425. Id. at 1330, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1693.
426. Id. at 1331, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1693-94.
427. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694.
428. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharms.,
Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1318-19, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1307, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
429. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694.
430. 270 F.3d 1353, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1537 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
431. Id. at 1354, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1538.
432. Id. at 1353-54, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1538.
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dispute that the arrangement was commercial and that the invention
was ready for patenting at the time the supply contract was made.433
The patentee argued, however, that the on-sale bar had never
expressly been applied to sales by a supplier to the inventor.434  The
Federal Circuit rejected the idea that there should be an exception to
the on-sale bar, which would allow an inventor to stockpile
commercial embodiments of an invention prior to filing a patent
application.435  The court held that 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) does not
require that the inventor make the sale; it requires only that someone
place the invention on sale.436
The Federal Circuit expressly repudiated the reasoning of a prior
district court case, M&R Marking System, Inc. v. Top Stamp, Inc.,437
which had refused at the preliminary injunction stage to apply the
on-sale bar to a sale from a manufacturer to the inventor.438  In that
case, the district court had applied the “totality of the circumstances”
test now abandoned by Pfaff.439  Finally, the Federal Circuit noted that
its refusal to create a “supplier exception” furthered the primary
policy of the on-sale bar, namely, to encourage inventors to enter the
patent system promptly.440
In Space Systems/Loral, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,441 the district
court granted summary judgment, holding that a patent on an
attitude control system for maintaining the position and orientation
of a satellite was invalid by reason of an on-sale bar.442  Evidence
showed that, prior to the critical date, the inventor prepared an
“Engineering Change Proposal” that included a description of his
idea and how he proposed to achieve it, some rough drawings, and
an estimate of the cost of developing the system.443  The inventor
testified, however, that when he sent the engineering proposal, he
had only conceived of the idea and did not know whether it would
work.444  He did not determine that the idea would work, until many
                                                          
433. Id. at 1355, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1539. 
434. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1539.
435. Id. at 1355-58, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1539-41.
436. Id. at 1355, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1539.
437. 926 F. Supp. 466 (D.N.J. 1996).
438. Special Devices, Inc., 270 F.3d at 1357, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541.
439. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541.  “The Supreme Court has disavowed the
‘totality of the circumstances’ test used in [M&R Marketing Sys., Inc.].”  Id., 60
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541 (quoting Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 66 n.11
(1998)).
440. Special Devices, Inc., 270 F.3d at 1357, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541.
441. 271 F.3d 1076, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1861 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
442. Id. at 1077-78, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862.
443. Id. at 1078, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863.
444. Id. at 1079, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863.
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months later, after developing and testing an engineering model.445
The challenger did not produce evidence disputing the inventor’s
testimony.446  The district court found that it could not conclude as a
matter of law that the engineering proposal was an “enabling
disclosure.”447  The district court did hold, however, that the patentee
had “legal conception” of the invention and that it was, accordingly,
ready for patenting.448  The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that an
invention is not ready for patenting if it has not been reduced to
practice nor described before the critical date in sufficient detail to
enable one skilled in the art to practice it.449  Thus, the Federal
Circuit reversed and remanded.450
E. Enablement
The source of the enablement requirement is 35 U.S.C. § 112,
which states that a patent must include a written description of the
invention that enables any person skilled in the art to make it and use
it.451  To satisfy the requirement, a patentee must describe the
invention so that one skilled in the art can make and use the
invention without undue experimentation.452  The description,
however, need not include information that those skilled in the art
already know.453
In Union Pacific Resources Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp.,454 the district
court held that a patent on a method of horizontal drilling for oil
and natural gas was invalid for lack of an enabling disclosure.455  The
district court noted that the patent required various measurements to
be correlated or “re-scaled” in order to determine the actual position
of a borehole relative to the surrounding strata.456  The patent
specification did not disclose how the re-scaling operation should be
carried out.457  Indeed, the patentee considered the computer
program that it had designed to perform the re-scaling step to be a
trade secret.458  Based on all the evidence, the Federal Circuit agreed
                                                          
445. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863.
446. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863.
447. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863.
448. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863.
449. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
450. Id. at 1080-81, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
451. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
452. ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 69 (1999).
453. Id.
454. 236 F.3d 684, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
455. Id. at 687, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294.
456. Id. at 690, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296.
457. Id. at 691, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297.
458. Id. at 690, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296.
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with the district court that one skilled in the art would not
understand how to perform the re-scaling operation from the
information in the patent.459
In Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania Inc.,460 the patent at issue related to
electroluminescent phosphor particles encapsulated in metal oxide
coatings.461  The Federal Circuit found the district court’s analysis of
the enablement question inadequate because the district court had
examined only whether the patents enabled the use of the accused
product.462  The court noted that, to be enabling, the patent must
teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of
the claimed invention without undue experimentation.463  The
defendant alleged that the patent was not enabling because undue
experimentation would be required to produce certain metal oxide
coatings from different precursors.464  The Federal Circuit responded
by stating that, so long as the patent enabled the preparation of a
particular metal oxide coating from at least one of the suggested
precursors, the enablement requirement for that oxide coating would
be satisfied.465  Because the district court had not made specific
factual determinations as to whether the disclosure enabled the
preparation of oxide coatings within the full scope of the claims, the
Federal Circuit was unable to decide the issue as a matter of law.466
However, since the court had decided that the claims were not
infringed by the accused product, a remand to consider the validity
of the patent would have been inappropriate.467  Accordingly, the
court simply vacated the portion of the district court’s judgment that
held that the patents were not invalid.468
In Bio-Technology General Corp. v. Genentech, Inc.,469 the patent was
directed to a method for using recombinant DNA technology to
produce human growth hormone (“hGH”) in bacteria.470  After a jury
trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law, holding
that the claim at issue was invalid for lack of enablement.471  The
district court ruled that the patent was required to enable the
                                                          
459. Id. at 691, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297.
460. 256 F.3d 1298, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
461. Id. at 1300-01, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239.
462. Id. at 1306-07, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244.
463. Id. at 1306, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244.
464. Id. at 1307, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244.
465. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244.
466. Id. at 1307-08, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244.
467. Id. at 1308, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245.
468. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245.
469. 267 F.3d 1325, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
470. Id. at 1327, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431.
471. Id. at 1329, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433.
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production of “mature” hGH, i.e., hGH of 191 amino acids, without
an attached methionine molecule.472  There was conflicting evidence
on whether the use of the claimed method produced both
“met-hGH” and mature hGH.473  The Federal Circuit, however, found
that there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s conclusion
that the defendant had failed to prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the patent did not enable production of “any” mature
hGH.474  The record contained extensive expert testimony that the
patent enabled the production of some mature hGH, including the
defendant’s own New Drug Application to the Food and Drug
Administration, which stated that hGH made by the process of the
patent included 93.8% met-hGH and 6.2% mature hGH.475
F. Written Description
The source of the written description requirement is 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, which states that a patent must include a “written description
of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using
it.”476  Today, the written description requirement is usually at issue
only when the claims have been amended during a patent
application’s prosecution.477
In Turbocare Division of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. General
Electric Co.,478 the patent related to a shaft-sealing system for fluid
turbines.479  The original written description disclosed the use of flat
springs located between the ends of ring segments.480  During
prosecution, the patentee added a new claim, which placed the
springs in a different location.481  The district court held that the new
claim constituted “new matter” and was invalid for failing to satisfy
the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(1).482  The
                                                          
472. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433.
473. Id. at 1330-31, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
474. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
475. Id. at 1329-30, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433.  In reinstating the jury verdict as
based on substantial evidence, the court noted that, “[w]hen scientific certainty is
not available, and the scientific theories and evidence are within a reasonable range
of difference of scientific opinion, resolution of such difference based on weight and
credibility of evidence is the province of the trier of fact.”  Id. at 1330-31, 60
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434 (citing Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156
F.3d 1182, 1189, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
476. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
477. DURHAM, supra note 452, at 76-77.
478. 264 F.3d 1111, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
479. Id. at 1113, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1019.  
480. Id. at 1119, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023.
481. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023.
482. Id. at 1118, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1022.  When a new claim is added after
the filing date, the new claim must find support in the original specification.  This
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Federal Circuit agreed, based on the evidence, that the alternative
locations were neither disclosed nor inherent in the original
disclosure and that no reasonable juror could find that the original
disclosure was sufficiently detailed to enable one of skill in the art to
recognize that the inventor had invented what was claimed.483  The
court stated that in order for a disclosure to be inherent, “the missing
descriptive matter must necessarily be present in the [original]
application’s specification such that one skilled in the art would
recognize such a disclosure.”484
G. Best Mode
The best mode requirement is found at 35 U.S.C. § 112, which
states that a specification must provide “the best mode contemplated
by the inventor for carrying out his invention.”485  The best mode
requirement has both a subjective and objective element.486  To satisfy
the subjective element, the inventor must disclose the one mode he
felt was the best at the time of filing.487  Satisfaction of the objective
element depends on whether that one best mode was disclosed in
sufficient detail and clarity to allow one skilled in the art to realize it
is the best mode and to be capable of practicing the mode himself.488
In Mentor H/S Inc. v. Medical Device Alliance, Inc.,489 the district court
granted judgment as a matter of law, holding a patent related to a
method for carrying out liposuction with the use of ultrasound
invalid for failure to disclose a circuit used to stabilize the ultrasound
frequency.490  The Federal Circuit, in reversing the district court,
observed that a patent is required to disclose the “best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”491  The
                                                          
requirement ensures that the patent applicant fully possessed the claimed subject
matter on the application filing date.  Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1022.
483. Id. at 1119, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1023-24.
484. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023 (quoting Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d
1154, 1159, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1829, 1834 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
485. See DURHAM, supra note 452, at 72.
486. Id. at 73-74.
487. Id. at 74.
488. Id.
489. 244 F.3d 1365, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
490. Id. at 1371, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323. 
491. Id. at 1375, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1326-27
Determining whether a patent fails to comply with the best mode
requirement and is thus invalid involves two factual inquiries.  First, the fact-
finder must determine whether at the time an applicant filed an application
for patent, the applicant had a best mode of practicing the invention, which
is a subjective determination.  Second, if the inventor had a best mode of
practicing the invention, the fact-finder must determine whether the best
mode was disclosed in sufficient detail to allow a skilled artisan to practice it
without under experimentation, which is an objective determination.
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patentee is not required to disclose each detail of prototypes made
prior to filing the patent, nor is the applicant required to disclose
unclaimed elements unless they are “necessary to the operation of
the invention.”492  The Federal Circuit held that the invention was
directed to a method of using ultrasonic vibration to create heat and
melt fat, not to a particular circuit developed by a technician.493  The
court believed that such a circuit was outside of the inventor’s field of
expertise.494  While the patent did disclose the inventor’s preferred
frequencies of vibration, the defendants failed to show at trial that
one skilled in the art would be unable to select an appropriate circuit
to stabilize the frequency.495  Because substantial evidence supported
the jury’s verdict, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s
grant of judgment as a matter of law.496
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.,497 the Federal Circuit
affirmed a district court’s holding, on summary judgment, that the
claims at issue did not violate the best mode requirement.498  The
patent in question related to the pharmaceutical compound
fluoxetine hydrochloride, the active ingredient in Lilly’s
anti-depressant drug Prozac.499  The Federal Circuit applied the rule
that “the inventor need not disclose a mode for obtaining unclaimed
subject matter unless the subject matter is novel and essential for
carrying out the best mode of the invention.”500  The court also added
that production details and routine details need not be disclosed.501
In the present case, the challenger claimed that the inventor failed to
disclose his best mode for synthesizing a starting compound used to
make the claimed compound.502  The evidence established, however,
that the starting compound was not claimed in the patent, nor was it
novel.503  In fact, it was commercially available, and the inventor’s
                                                          
Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1326-27 (citing Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc.,
141 F.3d 1054, 1064, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
492. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
493. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
494. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
495. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
496. Id. at 1376, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
497. 251 F.3d 955, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
498. Id. at 967, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
499. Id. at 959, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
500. Id. at 963, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874 (citing Applied Med. Res. Corp. v.
United States Surgical Corp., 147 F.3d 1374, 1377, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1291
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
501. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874 (citing Young Dental Mfg. Co. v. Q3 Special
Prods., Inc., 112 F.3d 1137, 1143, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1589, 1594-95 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Wahl
Instruments, Inc. v. Acvious, Inc., 950 F.2d 1575, 1581, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123,
1128 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
502. Id. at 964, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875.
503. Id. at 964-65, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875-76.
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method for synthesizing it was designed merely to increase efficiency
and save costs.504  The court distinguished cases in which the
intermediate compound itself was a novel compound.505  The Federal
Circuit further held that the inventors did not need to disclose their
preferred solvent for carrying out a recrystallization step, since this
was a routine detail falling outside the best mode requirement.506
The patent did not claim a recrystallization process or a
recrystallization  solvent.507  Instead, the patent disclosed that a
recrystallization step was used to purify the claimed compound.508
Since solvents and methods for performing recrystallization were well
known to those of skill in the art, the inventor was not required to
disclose his preferred but unclaimed solvent.509  The fact that some
experimentation might be necessary to find an appropriate solvent
did not result in a best mode violation.510
H. Indefiniteness
Section 112 of the United States Code requires claims to
“particularly” and “distinctly” define the subject matter claimed.511 In
order to avoid being considered fatally indefinite, a claim must
contain enough detail that those who are skilled in the art would
understand the utilization and scope of the invention.512  The Federal
Circuit has recently examined multiple indefiniteness issues.
In Union Pacific Resources Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp.,513 the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment holding a
patent claim invalid for indefiniteness.514  The claims at issue referred
                                                          
504. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875-76.
505. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875-76 (distinguishing N. Telecom, Inc. v.
Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 940-41, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir.
1990); Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd., 860 F.2d 415, 418, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1692, 1696-97
(Fed. Cir. 1988); Clayton v. Akiba, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 374 (Bd. Pat. App. 1982)).
506. Id. at 966, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876.
507. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
508. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
509. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
510. Id. at 966-67, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
511. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); see also HARMON, supra note 329, § 5.3, at 155-56
(providing information on how a patent is filed and examined).
512. See HARMON, supra note 329, § 5.3 (interpreting the requirements of
“definiteness”).
513. 236 F.3d 684, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
514. Id. at 694, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299.  Whether a claim is invalid for
indefiniteness is a question of law reviewed de novo, and turns on whether one
skilled in the art would understand the scope of the claim when reading it in light of
the rest of the specification.  Id. at 692, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297; see also
Personalized Media Communications, L.L.C. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696,
702, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1880, 1886 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that the claim
construction may be reviewed de novo by the court of appeals); Orthokinetics, Inc. v.
Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1088 (Fed.
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to a method for determining the location of a borehole relative to
strata, which comprised a step of “comparing” information.515
Neither the claim nor the specification explicitly defined the term
“comparing,” nor did the patent suggest that the term “comparing”
was used in a technical or scientific sense.516  Based on trial testimony,
it appeared that the “comparing” step referred to a complex
correlation step suggested but “not explained” in the written
description.517  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the district
court properly granted summary judgment of invalidity based on the
claims’ indefiniteness.518
In S3 Inc. v. NVIDIA Corp.,519 the Federal Circuit reversed a
judgment of invalidity based on indefiniteness relating to an
integrated circuit for use in computer video color displays.520  The
claim was written in means-plus-function form.521  The court held that
the requirement that the claims must particularly and distinctly
define the invention is met if a person experienced in the field of the
invention would understand the scope of the subject matter, reading
the claim in conjunction with the rest of the specification.522  In
claims subject to § 112 ¶ 6 of the Patent Code, the claimed function
and the supporting structure in the specification must both be
described with sufficient particularity to meet the requirements of
§ 112 ¶ 2 of the Patent Code.523  A claim cannot be regarded as
indefinite simply because it is difficult to understand when viewed
                                                          
Cir. 1986) (reviewing the claim construction for indefiniteness).
515. Union Pac. Res. Co., 236 F.3d at 692, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297-98.
516. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297-98.
517. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298.
518. Id. at 694, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299-1300.
519. 259 F.3d 1364, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
520. Id. at 1374, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750.
521. See id. at 1367, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746 (determining that if a claim uses
“means-plus-function” form, then it must still meet the requirements of § 112
paragraph 2, which requires the means-plus-function claim to disclose the limitations
in the specification so that they can be understood by those skilled in the art).  Since
the indefiniteness requirement involves claim construction, the Federal Circuit
provides plenary review of decisions on indefiniteness.  See Atmel Corp. v. Info.
Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1378, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1227 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (finding that indefiniteness is a question of law to be reviewed de novo);
Personalized Media Communications L.L.C. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696,
705, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1880, 1888 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
522. See NVIDIA Corp., 259 F.3d at 1367, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.  “If the
claims when read in light of the specification reasonably apprise those skilled in the
art of the scope of the invention, § 112 demands no more.”  Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1747 (citing Miles Labs., Inc. v. Standon, 997 F.2d 870, 875, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1123, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
523. See id. at 1367-68, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747 (“[T]he corresponding
structure(s) of a means-plus-function limitation must be disclosed in the written
description in such a manner that one skilled in the art will know and understand
what structure corresponds to the means limitation.”).
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without benefit of the rest of the specification.524  In this case, the
defendant argued, inter alia, that the specification did not disclose a
structure corresponding to the “means . . . for selectively receiving”
the limitation.525  While the specification disclosed a “selector,” it did
not show the electronic structure of the selector or the details of its
electronic operation.526  There was testimony that a person of skill in
the art would recognize the selector shown in the specification to be
an electronic device, “such as a simple multiplexer, whose structure is
well known.”527  The court concluded this was adequate stating, “[i]t is
not the criterion for compliance with § 112, whether a lay person
having no skill whatsoever in this field would know how a selector is
constructed.”528 Judge Gajarsa dissented, arguing that the district
court was correct in holding the claims indefinite because the
independent claims used the term “video information data stream”
inconsistently.529
In Exxon Research & Engineering Co. v. United States,530 the Court of
Federal Claims held a patent invalid for indefiniteness on summary
judgment.531  The claims related to a method for converting natural
gas into liquid hydrocarbon products and included the terms “for a
period sufficient to increase substantially the initial catalyst,” and
“substantial absence of slug flow.”532  The Court of Federal Claims
found these terms indefinite.533
The Federal Circuit noted that, in this case, the specification
defines “substantially increased” as an increase of at least thirty
percent and provides reasonable guidance through the examples of
how the increase should be measured.534  The court also observed that
the specification discloses suggestions for how long a “period
sufficient” might be, and the parties agreed that a “period sufficient”
could be determined by doing activity checks.535  The Federal Circuit
noted that, “[w]hen a word of degree is used the district court must
                                                          
524. See id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748 (finding that when determining whether
a claim is indefinite, the claim must be examined in light of the specification).
525. Id. at 1370, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749.
526. Id. at 1370-71, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749.
527. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749.
528. Id. at 1371, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750.
529. Id. at 1371-72, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting) (finding
the majority’s reference to intrinsic evidence insufficient to salvage the claims at
issue).
530. 265 F.3d 1371, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
531. Id. at 1373, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1274.
532. Id. at 1374, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275.
533. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275-76.
534. Id. at 1377, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277-78.
535. Id. at 1378-79, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
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determine whether the patent’s specification provides some standard
for measuring that degree.”536  In this case, the specification provided
guidance as to what was meant by “substantial absence” with a
reasonable degree of particularity and definiteness.537  Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit reversed the summary judgment of invalidity and
remanded the case to the Court of Federal Claims.538
I. Inventorship
An inventor is anyone who conceived the invention, and can
include more than one person.539  For more than one person to be
named as an inventor, they must have collaborated, but they need
not have physically worked on every claim nor must they have
collaborated at the same time.540  If an application names the wrong
inventors, it can generally be corrected without affecting the validity
of the patent, so long as it occurred through error and without
deception.541  The Federal Circuit discussed inventorship in three
separate instances.
In Acromed Corp. v. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc.,542 the district court
granted judgment as a matter of law that the plaintiff’s patent for a
plate system used for implantation into a patient’s spinal column was
not invalid for failure to name an inventor.543  The challenger to the
                                                          
536. Id. at 1381, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280 (quoting Seattle Box Co. v. Indus.
Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 826, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 568, 574 (Fed. Cir.
1984)).
537. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280-81 (indicating that because the
specification taught that slug flow should be avoided due to a possibility of
interference with reactor operations, one skilled in the art would know that whether
there was a “substantial absence” could be determined with reference to whether
reactor efficiency was materially affected).
538. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280-81.
If one skilled in the art would understand the bounds of the claim when read
in light of the specification, then the claim satisfies section 112 paragraph
2 . . . .  [W]e have not held that a claim is indefinite merely because it poses a
difficult issue of claim construction . . . .  By finding claims indefinite only if
reasonable efforts at claim construction prove futile, we accord respect to the
statutory presumption of patent validity.
Id. at 1375, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276 (citations omitted).
539. See ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS § 6.1, at 41 (1991) (describing
the role of the ‘inventor’ in a patent application).
540. Id. at 42 (noting that inventors who are unaware of each other’s work could
not be considered joint inventors, regardless of whether their work overlaps).
541. Id.
542. 253 F.3d 1371, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
543. Id. at 1381, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137.  The Federal Circuit reviews the
district court’s determination of inventorship as a question of law, without deference.
See Ethicon, Inc. v. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545,
1547 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  The presumption of validity which is accorded to each issued
patent also applies to create a presumption that the inventors named in the patent
are the true and only inventors.  See Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys. Inc., 106
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patent asserted that the patent failed to name as an inventor a person
who conceived the idea of using arcuate recesses and a conical nut to
prevent movement of screws in a plate having elongated slots.544  The
evidence suggested that the purportedly omitted inventor, however,
was simply following the instructions of the named inventor when he
made his alleged contribution.545  Moreover, the court observed that
the patent claim was a “combination” claim and that all of the
individual elements of the claim, including arcuate recesses in a
plate, were part of the prior art.546  The claimed invention, however,
was a new combination.547  Thus, the challenger had failed to present
clear and convincing evidence that the allegedly omitted inventor
had actually made an inventive contribution.548
In Winbond Electronics Corp. v. International Trade Commission,549 the
Federal Circuit affirmed a decision of the International Trade
Commission holding that the alleged infringers failed to establish
that a patent was unenforceable for failure to name the correct
inventors.550  In an earlier proceeding, the Commission had declared
the patent unenforceable for failure to name an inventor,
presumably one Mr. Gupta, whom the respondents had argued was
an inventor.551  Following the Commission’s decision, the assignee of
the patent obtained a Certificate of Correction adding Mr. Gupta as
an inventor.552  In a second proceeding, the Administrative Law Judge
again found the patent unenforceable, concluding that Mr. Gupta
was not an inventor.553  The Commission, however, disagreed and
held that the Certificate of Correction listed the correct inventors.554
                                                          
F.3d 976, 980, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1782, 1785-86 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  A party seeking
to invalidate a patent for failure to name an inventor must present clear and
convincing evidence that the person omitted actually invented the claimed
invention.  See Environ Prods. v. Furon Co., 215 F.3d 1261, 1265, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1038, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  To prove that an omitted individual was an
inventor, the purported inventor must have contributed to the conception of the
invention and must provide corroborating evidence of any asserted contributions to
the conception.  See Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1474, 43
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1935, 1942 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  Moreover, the contribution must be
one that is “not insignificant in quality, when that contribution is measured against
the dimension of the full invention.”  Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1351, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1657, 1663 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
544. See Acromed Corp., 253 F.3d at 1379, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
545. Id. at 1380, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
546. Id. at 1381, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137.
547. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137.
548. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137.
549. 262 F.3d 1363, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
550. Id. at 1372, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035.
551. Id. at 1368, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032.
552. Id. at 1368-69, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032.
553. Id. at 1369, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032.
554. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032-33.
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The Federal Circuit held that the presumption of validity applies to
the Certificate of Correction as well as to the original patent.555  The
Federal Circuit agreed with the Commission that the testimony
offered by the respondents did not provide clear and convincing
evidence to establish that Mr. Gupta was not an inventor.556
In Fina Technology, Inc. v. Ewen,557 the Federal Circuit reversed an
order of the district court, which had directed the Patent Office to
issue a Certificate of Correction reversing the order of inventors
named in the patent.558  The Federal Circuit held that the court had
no authority under 35 U.S.C. § 255 or § 256 to order the Patent
Office to change the order of inventors of an issued patent.559  Section
256 has been interpreted to apply to two kinds of error, misjoinder
and non-joinder, but the language is not broad enough to allow the
court to require a change in the order in which the inventors are
listed.560  Section 255 deals with clerical errors and it does not
authorize action by the district court, nor is the order in which the
inventors are listed the kind of error contemplated by that section.561
The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure instructs the examiners
to list the inventors in the order used in the inventors’ oath or
declaration.562  Since the order in which the names appear is of no
legal consequence,563 the court’s inability to require a change poses
no legal concern.
J. Other Patent Office Procedures
1. Interferences
When two patent applications claim the same invention, the
applications are deemed “interfering” and the Patent Office may
                                                          
555. Id. at 1371, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034.  “Because Atmel complied with
[Rule 324], it properly corrected the inventors of the ‘903 patent and acquired a
presumption of validity for the correction.”  Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034.  Rule
324 requires a party who is requesting a correction of inventorship to submit a
“proper petition” which includes a statement from the person being added as an
inventor that there was no deceptive intention on his or her part, a statement from
the current named inventors as to the requested change, and a statement from all
parties submitting a statement agreeing to the change of inventorship in the patent.
Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034.
556. Id. at 1372, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1035.
557. 265 F.3d 1325, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
558. Id. at 1325-26, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315.
559. Id. at 1328, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317.
560. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316-17.
561. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317.
562. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 605.04(f) (7th ed. Rev. 1
2001).
563. Id.
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declare an “interference” to determine which applicant was the first
to invent.564  In an interference, the applicant to file first is referred to
as the “senior party” and all other applicants are “junior parties.”565
In Cooper v. Goldfarb,566 the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences awarded priority of invention to the junior party.567  The
question on appeal was whether priority should have been given to
the engineer, the senior party, who developed a material for use in
vascular grafts or to the surgeon, the junior party, who tested the
material and recognized the importance of certain structural
features.568  The material had a structure consisting of solid nodes
connected by thin fibrils.569  The distance between the nodes, or fibril
length, was important to the suitability of the material for use as a
vascular graft.570
On a prior appeal, the Federal Circuit had affirmed the Board’s
determination as to dates of conception and reduction to practice,
but had remanded for determination of whether the engineer could
claim that testing work conducted by the surgeon inured to the
benefit of the engineer.571  Here, the engineer claimed that he
conceived the invention after he sent it to the surgeon for testing, but
before the surgeon reduced it to practice at his request.572  While the
engineer had made an embodiment of the invention that met the
limitations of the count, the engineer did not determine that the
material would work and did not know the material met the fibril
length limitation of the count.573  Accordingly, the engineer sought to
rely on the inurement doctrine to obtain the benefit of the surgeon’s
recognition that the material worked and that the fibril lengths were
as described in the claim.574  Although the court held that the
                                                          
564. See DURHAM, supra note 452, § 5.4, at 35-36 (discussing the procedure for
handling interferences).
565. Id. § 5.4, at 36.  There is a rebuttable presumption that the senior party was
first to invent, which can be overcome by evidence provided by the junior party.  Id.
566. 240 F.3d 1378, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1990 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
567. Id. at 1380, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1991.
568. Id. at 1380-81, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1991-92.
569. Id. at 1381, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1991.
570. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1991-92.
571. Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1323, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1896, 1898
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 220 F.3d 1345, 1351,
55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1636, 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  Using the precedent of
Genentech, the Goldfarb court concluded that inurement is a question of law that the
court reviews de novo.  Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904-05.
572. Cooper v. Goldfarb, 240 F.3d 1378, 1383, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1990, 1993
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
573. Id. at 1384, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994.
574. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994.  To take advantage of the surgeon’s
reduction to practice, the engineer was required to establish three things:  that he
had conceived the invention; that he had an expectation that the tested embodiment
AUTHREVBENAMIPP 9/11/02  11:00 AM
2002] 2001 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 695
engineer could take advantage of the surgeon’s recognition that the
material was suitable for use as a vascular implant, since that was the
purpose of the testing, there was no basis for finding that the
engineer had any recognition of the fibril lengths of the material
prior to the surgeon’s reduction to practice.575
In Hitzeman v. Rutter,576 the Federal Circuit affirmed a decision of
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences awarding priority to
the senior applicant.577  The dispute related to an invention for using
genetically modified yeast cells to produce a hepatitis B antigen in
which the protein molecules of the antigen aggregated with lipids
into spherical particles having diameters ranging from about 16 to
25nm.578  The court found that the particle size and sedimentation
rate of the particles were material limitations of the invention.579  The
priority dispute turned on whether the junior party had conceived
not only the idea of producing hepatitis B antigen proteins in yeast,
but also that they would aggregate into appropriate sized particles.580
Although the junior party claimed he had hoped that such particles
would form, the court found that such a hope was insufficient to
show conception.581
Because the particle size and sedimentation rate were express
limitations of the counts, they could not be ignored.582  Although the
                                                          
worked; and that he submitted the embodiment for testing with the intended
purpose of the invention.  Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994 (citing Genentech Inc.,
220 F.3d at 1354, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643)).
575. Id. at 1385, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994 (adopting a “modified” version of
the Genentech test, which would have required the engineer to have conceived of the
fibril length limitation, to have had an expectation that his material had the required
lengths and to have submitted the material for testing of the fibril lengths).
576. 243 F.3d 1345, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
577. Id. at 1348, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162.
578. Id. at 1349, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162.
579. Id. at 1355, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
580. Id. at 1357, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169.
581. Id. at 1359, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.  Priority, conception and reduction
to practice are questions of law that are based on subsidiary factual findings.  Cooper
v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1896, 1900-01 (Fed. Cir.
1998).  The factual findings of the Board are affirmed if they are supported by
substantial evidence, i.e., “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.”  In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1312, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1774 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).  In particular, conception requires an idea that is definite
and permanent.  Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228, 32
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915, 1919 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  “An idea is definite and permanent
when the inventor has a specific, settled idea, a particular solution to the problem at
hand, not just a general goal or research plan he hopes to pursue.”  Id., 32
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919.
582. Hitzman, 243 F.3d at 1354, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (“[N]othing is better
settled in patent law than that in interference cases express limitations in counts may
not be ignored.”) (quoting McBride v. Teeple, 109 F.3d 789, 799, 44 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
523, 533 (1940)).  An inherent property cannot be material to the patentability of
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junior party’s goal was to obtain particles of the appropriate size, his
hope, general goal, or research plan was insufficient to show
conception.583  Moreover, in this case, the junior party had asserted
during prosecution that the result achieved in yeast cells was
unexpected.584  His statement during prosecution, that “[o]ne skilled
in the art at the time this application was filed would not have been
able to reasonably predict” the formation of the antibody in particle
form, demonstrated that he lacked complete conception.585  The
Federal Circuit distinguished586 Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr
Laboratories, Inc.,587 which stated, “[a]n inventor’s belief that his
invention will work or his reasons for choosing a particular approach
are irrelevant to conception.”588  In Burroughs, however, the question
was not “whether [the] inventor had a reasonable expectation of
producing the claimed device or composition, but . . . whether the
inventor had a reasonable expectation that the device or
composition, once completed, would work for its intended
purpose.”589  Therefore, the court held the junior party did not have a
reasonable expectation that he would actually produce the claimed
invention.590
In In re Roemer,591 the court reviewed another decision from the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.  In the interference
proceeding below, the Board had determined the claims of a reissue
patent application to be unpatentable over prior art.592  After the
Board had defined the count, and concluded that the count was
unpatentable over prior art, the parties agreed that any claim which
corresponded to the count was also unpatentable.593  The sole issue
on appeal was whether the Board correctly determined that the
                                                          
the invention and must necessarily be present in the invention and so recognized by
persons of ordinary skill.  Id. at 1355, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.  On rare
occasions, commonplace properties of a claimed invention may be deemed inherent
and, therefore, the court will not require specific conception of these properties.
Such inherent properties represent rare exceptions to the rule that the putative
inventor must show possession of every feature listed in the count.  Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1167.
583. Id. at 1356-57, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169 (citing Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d. 1200, 1206, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
584. Id. at 1357, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169.
585. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169.
586. Id. at 1357-58, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170.
587. 40 F.3d 1223, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
588. Id. at 1228, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920 (citation omitted).
589. Hitzeman, 243 F.3d at 1358, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170.
590. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170.
591. 258 F.3d 1303, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1527 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
592. Id. at 1304, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
593. Id. at 1306-07, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529.
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claims of the application corresponded to the unpatentable count.594
The Federal Circuit held that the Board had not correctly construed
the claims,595 which related to a set of shielded gradient coils for
nuclear magnetic resonance imaging.596  The Federal Circuit
concluded, when properly construed, the claims did not correspond
to the count and were not obvious in view of the prior art.597
2. Reissue
When a patent is deemed wholly or partly invalid because the
patentee or his attorney made an innocent error in the specification,
drawing, or scope of the patent claim, the patentee may institute a
reissue proceeding with the Patent and Trademark Office.598  Thus,
reissue is a process by which pantentees may correct errors in a
patent.599
In Shockley v. Arcan, Inc.,600 the defendants challenged the validity of
a reissued patent based upon the alleged failure of the reissue
declarations to comply with a rule in effect at the time the reissue
application was filed.601  There was no dispute that the declarations
would have complied with a revised rule adopted during the
pendency of the application.602  The Federal Circuit held that the new
rule applied to all reissue applications pending on its effective date.603
The court also considered the question of intervening rights
potentially arising from a reissued patent.604  According to the court’s
interpretation, the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 252 provides for
two kinds of intervening rights: absolute and equitable.605  Absolute
                                                          
594. Id. at 1307, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530.
595. Id. at 1310-11, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531-32.
596. Id. at 1304, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
597. Id. at 1309-10, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531 (reasoning that the prior art
gave only general guidance to the form of the claimed invention and therefore did
not render the reissue claim obvious nor did it supply substantial evidence the claim
corresponded to the count).
598. See HARMON, supra note 329, § 15.3(a).
599. See DURHAM, supra note 452, at 36.
600. 248 F.3d 1349, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
601. Id. at 1358-59, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1697-98 (noting the former rule
effective at the time the reissue application was filed required the patentee to detail
the nature and origin of each error, while the rule that took effect on December 1,
1997 merely required the patentee to disclose only a single error and offer only a
general statement about the patentee’s lack of deceptive intent).
602. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698.
603. Id. at 1359, 58 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1697 (“Because the application which led to
the . . . reissue patent was pending when the new rule took effect, the new rule
applies in this case.”).
604. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698 (identifying “absolute” intervening rights
and “equitable” intervening rights as two separate and distinct defenses to patent
infringement under the statutory scheme).
605. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698 (citing BIC Leisure Prods. Inc. v.
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intervening rights attach to specific goods offered for sale prior to
reissue.606  In comparison, equitable intervening rights may be
granted to allow a defendant to continue manufacturing new alleged
infringing products.607  While absolute intervening rights are granted
for “the specific thing” offered for sale, the equitable intervening
rights provision only attaches to “the thing” offered for sale.608
Relying, in part, on this distinction, the court held that only goods
actually in existence at the reissue date qualify for absolute
intervening rights.609  Whether to grant equitable intervening rights,
however, is a decision committed to the discretion of the district
court.610  In this case, although the district court did not make
findings as to whether the defendants had made substantial
preparations before the reissue date,611 the Federal Circuit held that
the record amply supported the district court’s denial of equitable
intervening rights.612  Citing the jury’s conclusion that the defendant’s
infringement of the reissued patent was willful, the Federal Circuit
believed the district court was entitled to decline use of its equitable
powers on the defendant’s behalf.613
In Pannu v. Storz Instruments, Inc.,614 the district court granted
summary judgment holding a reissued patent invalid on the ground
that it broadened the original claims and violated the “recapture”
rule.615  The patent at issue covered an intra-ocular lens with attached
structures (also called ‘haptics’) designed to position and secure the
                                                          
Windsurfing Int’l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1220, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671, 1675 (Fed.
Cir. 1993)).
606. Id. at 1360, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698.
607. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698.
608. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698 (noting section 252 of the code “continues
to distinguish between ‘specific things’ and ‘things’”).
609. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698 (citing BIC Leisure Prods. Inc., 1 F.3d at 1221,
27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676).
610. Id. at 1361, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699.
611. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699.
612. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699.
613. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699.
614. 258 F.3d 1366, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1597 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
615. Id. at 1370, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1599.  The recapture rule is designed to
prevent a patentee from regaining “through reissue [proceedings] the subject matter
that he surrendered in an effort to obtain allowance of the original claims.”  In re
Clement, 131 F.3d 1464, 1468, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(citing Mentor Corp. v. Coloplast, Inc., 998 F.2d 992, 995, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1521, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).  As described in Clement, the rule requires application
of a three step process:  first, “to determine whether and in what aspect the reissue
claims are broader than the patent claims,” second, “to determine whether the
broader aspects of the reissue claims relate to the surrendered subject matter,” and
third, to determine whether the reissued claims were materially narrowed in other
respects to avoid the recapture rule.  Id. at 1468-70, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164-65
(explaining if the scope of the reissue claim is the same or broader, then the
patentee violates the recapture rule).
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lens in the eye.616  During prosecution, the applicant added
limitations as to the shape of the haptics in order to obtain issuance
of his claims.617  On reissue, the patentee asserted that he had
unnecessarily narrowed the claims by adding the shape limitations.618
The subsequent reissue application removed the limitations on the
shape of the haptics.619  In affirming the district court’s grant of
summary judgment, the Federal Circuit found that the application
added limitations that related to the dimensions and positioning of
the haptics, but not their shape.620  Thus, the added limitations did
not narrow the claims and prevent application of the recapture
rule.621
In Dethmers Manufacturing Co. v. Automatic Equipment Manufacturing
Co.,622 the Federal Circuit considered whether a reissued patent
should be invalidated for failure of the reissue declaration to satisfy
the requirements of Rule 1.75 of the Code of Federal Regulations as
it was in effect prior to December 1, 1997.623  In examining the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the
Federal Circuit conducted a de novo review of the administrative
record.624  The court raised, sua sponte, the issue of whether it should
apply a more deferential standard,625 but held that to depart from the
de novo standard of review set forth in prior Federal Circuit cases
would require a decision of the court sitting en banc.626  The court
examined without deference the determination of the Patent Office,
and concluded that, while some of the reissued claims had adequate
support in the reissue declaration, others did not.627  Therefore, the
court only affirmed the district court’s judgment with respect to the
invalidity of reissue claims 4 through 7.628
                                                          
616. Pannu, 258 F.3d at 1368, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1598.
617. Id. at 1369, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1598.
618. Id. at 1369-70, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1599.
619. Id. at 1370, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1599.
620. Id. at 1372, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1600-01.
621. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1600-01.
622. 272 F.3d 1365, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1929 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
623. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931 (interpreting Rule 1.75 as provided in 37
C.F.R. § 1.17(a) (1996)). At the time, Rule 1.75 required the patentee to detail
precisely the nature and origin of all errors.  Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931
(quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.17(a)(2)-(5) (1996)).  The court ruled in Shockley v. Arcan,
Inc., that the new, more liberal rule only became effective for all applications
pending on December 1, 1997 or later. 248 F.3d 1349, 1358, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1692, 1697 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
624. Dethmers Mfg. Co., 272 F.3d at 1369, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931.
625. Id. at 1370 n.2, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932 n.2.
626. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932 n.2.
627. Id. at 1377, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937-38.
628. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937-38.
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3. Certificates of correction
35 U.S.C. § 255, entitled “Certificate of correction of applicant’s
mistake,” authorizes the director of the Patent and Trademark Office
to issue a certificate of correction when a good faith mistake of a
clerical, typographical or otherwise minor character appears in a
patent.629
In Superior Fireplace Co. v. Majestic Products Co.,630 the Federal Circuit
conducted an extensive analysis of the powers of the Patent and
Trademark Office and the courts in connection with certificates of
correction under 35 U.S.C. § 255.631  The district court determined
that a certificate of correction relating to gas fireplace technology was
invalid and that the uncorrected patent was not infringed.632  In
reviewing, the Federal Circuit first discussed the standard of proof
that the district court should have applied to the certificate of
correction.633  The court held that, since a certificate of correction
becomes part of the patent and thereafter has the same effect and
operation as if it originally had been issued in corrected form, the
certificate is entitled to a presumption of validity and any challenge
to the certificate of correction would have to be supported by clear
and convincing evidence.634  The court noted that such a standard of
proof was also consistent with the presumption that the Patent and
Trademark Office does its job properly.635  In this case, the district
court had not applied or discussed the clear and convincing evidence
standard, believing that its review of the certificate of correction was
governed by the Administrative Procedure Act.636  The parties had not
briefed the issue, and the same ultimate conclusion would have been
reached under either standard.  Therefore, the Federal Circuit did
not address the question of whether the Administrative Procedure
Act standard of review supplanted the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard.637
Next, the Federal Circuit confronted an issue of first impression,
namely, whether § 255 allows the correction of mistakes when the
                                                          
629. 35 U.S.C. § 255 (Supp. V 1999).
630. 270 F.3d 1358, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1668 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
631. Id. at 1366-76, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674-81.
632. Id. at 1364, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
633. Id. at 1367, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674 (stating the district court may have
failed to apply the correct standard because it determined the Administrative
Procedure Act applied).
634. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674.
635. Id. at 1367 n.1, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674 n.1.
636. Id. at 1367, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674 (noting the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706
(1994), provides for a variety of standards of review including de novo, “arbitrary and
capricious, “abuse of discretion,” and “unsupported by substantial evidence”).
637. Id. at 1367-68, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675.
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correction would broaden a claim, and if so, under what
circumstances.638  Analyzing the language of § 255, the court noted
that § 255 permits the correction of errors of a “clerical or
typographical nature.”639  Since that term is not explicitly defined in
the section,640 the court looked to the plain meaning of the phrase
and concluded “clerical or typographical mistakes are generally
understood to include simple mistakes such as obvious misspellings
that are immediately apparent.”641  The court found nothing in the
plain language of the statute, however, which prohibited corrections
of clerical or typographical mistakes that have the effect of
broadening claims, and therefore interpreted § 255 “to allow
broadening corrections of clerical or typographical mistakes.”642
In addition, the court addressed the disputed question of whether
a clerical or typographical mistake must be evident from the public
record before it can be corrected under § 255 so as to broaden a
claim.643  The court examined the statutory scheme, including 35
U.S.C. § 251 through § 256 governing the amendment and
correction of patents.644  The court noted that § 251 and § 252, which
explicitly permit post-issuance amendments that may broaden claim
scope, include specific protections for the public, such as a
prohibition of new matter, a time limit on broadening claims, and a
provision for intervening rights.645  This statutory scheme “reveals
Congress’ concern for public notice and for protecting the public
from the unanticipated broadening of a claim” after the grant of the
patent by the PTO.646  Hence, the court found that under § 255, it
would be inconsistent with the congressional objective to allow
broadening corrections of errors that are not apparent from the
public record.647
                                                          
638. Id. at 1369, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
639. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
640. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
641. Id. at 1369-70, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.  In a later portion of its opinion,
the court also addressed the meaning of the phrase “or of minor character” also
contained in § 255.  Id. at 1375-76, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680-81.  The court held,
“[a] mistake that, if corrected, would broaden . . . a claim must . . . be viewed as
highly important and thus cannot be a mistake of ‘minor character.’” Id. at 1375, 60
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
642. Id. at 1370, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677 (“[T]he words of § 255 do not
preclude broadening corrections.”).
643. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
644. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
645. Id. at 1370-71, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
646. Id. at 1371, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
647. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678 (“Such a broadening claim would leave the
public without effective notice, without the constraint of a two-year time bar, and
without the hope of intervening rights.”).
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Judge Dyk dissented, claiming the majority was wrong in reading
into § 255 a requirement that “the error be apparent from the
prosecution history, a requirement which is equally lacking an
‘express indication’ in the statute.”648  Judge Dyk argued that the
public would be adequately protected by the rule adopted in
Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin, Inc.649 that the certificate of
correction should be enforced only with respect to infringing acts
occurring after the issuance of the certificate.650
III. INFRINGEMENT
A. Claim Construction
Infringement analysis requires a two-step process:  first, the claims
must be construed to determine their scope; second, the properly
construed claims must be compared to the accused device.651 Because
the Federal Circuit regards claim construction as a matter of law and
provides de novo review to claim construction determinations made
by the district courts,652 many of the Federal Circuit’s decisions
contain extensive and detailed analysis of particular claim terms.653
Most of the decisions explain and illustrate useful principles of claim
construction designed to provide guidance, predictability, and
uniformity in the area of claim construction, and apply well-known
claim construction methods to particular claim terms.654  Cases that
turned, in large part, on claim construction issues, as well as a list of
the claim terms construed, are contained in the appendix.655
While the district court is required to construe patent claims for
validity and infringement,656 it need not follow any particular
                                                          
648. Id. at 1378, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
649. 226 F.3d 1280, 1294, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
650. See Superior Fireplace Co., 270 F.3d at 1380, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684-85.
The majority responded, again relying on the statutory scheme, that this rule would
not provide adequate protection.  Id. at 1373, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.  The
majority pointed out that although reissue patents that broaden claims are also not
retroactive, § 251 and § 252 nevertheless contain added protections—a two-year time
limitation and intervening rights.  Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
651. Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1576, 27
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1839 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (describing the two-step analysis as
well-established).
652. Id. at 1577, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839 (citations omitted).
653. See, e.g., infra appendix.
654. See, e.g., id.
655. See, e.g., id.
656. Although the claim construction process is discussed here under the
infringement heading, the court must also construe claims to determine validity.
The claim construction for validity must be consistent with that for infringement.
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
AUTHREVBENAMIPP 9/11/02  11:00 AM
2002] 2001 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 703
procedure in doing so.657  Nor is the district court obliged to construe
every term of the claims; it may construe only those claim terms
necessary for a resolution of the infringement issues.658
In construing the claims, the court should follow the general
sequence laid out in Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.:659 “[T]he court
should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent
itself, including the claims, the specification and, if in evidence, the
prosecution history.”660 In the rare instances where the claim terms
remain unclear after consideration of the intrinsic evidence and the
general rules of construction,661 the court may consider extrinsic
evidence, including “expert testimony, inventor testimony,
dictionaries, and technical treatises and articles.”662
Dictionaries and technical treatises have a special role in claim
construction.  Although they are not “intrinsic” evidence, the court
may consult them “at any time” to determine the ordinary meaning
of technical claim terms.663  Likewise, the court may always consider
extrinsic evidence for the purpose of coming to a better
understanding of the technology involved in an invention.664
                                                          
(BNA) 1747, 1752 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“A claim must be construed before determining
its validity just as it is first construed before deciding infringement.”) (quoting
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 996 n.7, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1321, 1344 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J., concurring), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996));
see also Sterner Lighting, Inc. v. Allied Elec. Supply, Inc., 431 F.2d 539, 544, 166
U.S.P.Q  (BNA) 454, 459 (5th Cir. 1970) (“A patent may not, like a ‘nose of wax,’ be
twisted one way to avoid anticipation and another to find infringement.”).
657. See Ballard Med. Prods. v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 268 F.3d 1352, 1358,
60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1493, 1498 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“District courts have wide latitude
in how they conduct the proceedings before them, and there is nothing unique
about claim construction that requires the court to proceed according to any
particular protocol.”).
658. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1498.
659. 90 F.3d 1576, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
660. Id. at 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576 (citing Markman, 52 F.3d at 979, 34
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257
F.3d 1364, 1372, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1614 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Interactive Gift
Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401,
1407 (Fed. Cir. 2001); DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc., 239 F.3d 1314, 1323, 57
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1889, 1893 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
661. See Interactive Gift Express, Inc., 256 F.3d at 1332, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1407
(“Relying on extrinsic evidence to construe a claim is ‘proper only when the claim
language remains genuinely ambiguous after consideration of the intrinsic
evidence.’”) (quoting Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co. v. Altek Sys., 132
F.3d 701, 706, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
662. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Scimed Life Sys., Inc., 261 F.3d 1329,
1344, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Vitronics Corp., 90
F.3d at 1584, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578).
663. See Dow Chem. Co., 257 F.3d at 1373, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (citing
Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1584 n.6, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578 n.6).
664. See, e.g., DeMarini Sports, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1323, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1893
(“Extrinsic evidence may . . . be accepted by the court to enhance its understanding
of the technology.”); Interactive Gift Express, Inc., 256 F.3d at 1332, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d
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There is a “heavy presumption” that claim terms should be given
their ordinary and customary import,665 as understood by a person of
ordinary skill in the art.666  Thus, the court applies an objective test to
construe disputed claim language.667  Although it is presumed that
the patentee used the claim terms in their ordinary sense, the court
must always consult the entire specification to determine the
following: whether the patentee included an explicit definition which
differs from the ordinary meaning, whether the patentee disclaimed
subject matter that might otherwise be covered by the literal claim
terms, or whether the patentee has limited the claims in some other
way.668
If the patentee has chosen to be his own lexicographer, the
specification must clearly state any special definition that the
patentee wishes to apply to the claim terms.669  In addition, while the
                                                          
(BNA) at 1408 (“Extrinsic evidence may always be consulted . . . to assist in
understanding the underlying technology.”).
665. Bell Atl. Network Serv., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d
1258, 1268, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Johnson
Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1607,
1610 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
666. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610; see also Dayco Prod., Inc. v. Total
Containment, Inc., 258 F.3d 1317, 1324, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1489, 1494-95 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (“[W]e must always be conscious that our objective is to interpret the
claims from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art . . . not from the
viewpoint of counsel or expert witnesses retained to offer creative arguments in
infringement litigation.”) (citing Haynes Int’l, Inc. v. Jessop Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1573,
1578 n.4, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1652, 1656 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); Interactive Gift
Express, Inc., 256 F.3d at 1332, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408 (“[I]t is important to
bear in mind that the viewing glass through which the claims are construed is that of
a person skilled in the art.”).
667. See Kopykake Enter. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1383, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1124, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he focus in construing disputed terms in claim
language is not the subjective intent of the parties . . . Rather the focus is on the
objective test of what one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention
would have understood the term to mean.”) (quoting Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 968, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
1995)).
668. Day Int’l, Inc. v. Reeves Bros., Inc., 260 F.3d 1343, 1348, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1790, 1793 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Interactive Gift Express, Inc., 256 F.3d at
1331-32, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1407-08; SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1340-42,  58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059, 1062-
64 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1341, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1290, 1294-95 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  The court in Gart held,
[I]t is certainly correct that the specification and the prosecution history
should be consulted to construe the language of the claims.  However, we
perform this consultation to determine if the patentee has chosen to be his
or her own lexicographer . . . or when the language itself lacks sufficient
clarity such that there is no means by which the scope of the claim may be
ascertained from the language used . . . However, when the foregoing
circumstances are not present, we follow the general rule that terms in the
claim are to be given their ordinary and accustomed meaning.
Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294-95 (citations omitted).
669. See Bell Atl. Network Serv., Inc., 262 F.3d at 1268, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
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concept of “prosecution history estoppel” does not apply to literal
infringement,670 the court must nevertheless determine whether the
prosecution history provides a basis for limiting the literal claim
scope.671
The court must always read the claims in light of the
specification.672 It may not, however, import limitations from the
specification or drawings into the claims where the claim language is
unambiguous.673  The Federal Circuit has acknowledged the difficulty
of distinguishing between a proper use and a forbidden use of the
specification to narrow the claims.674
In SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.,675 the
patent claims covered a balloon dilatation catheter construction
having two passageways or lumens.676  The parties agreed that only
two arrangements of the lumens were “known and practiced in the
                                                          
[I]n redefining the meaning of particular claim terms away from the
ordinary meaning, the intrinsic evidence must ‘clearly set forth’ or ‘clearly
redefine’ a claim term so as to put one reasonably skilled in the art on notice
that the patentee intended to so redefine the claim term . . . . [T]he
specification must exhibit an ‘express intent to impart a novel meaning’ to
claim terms . . . . However, a claim term may be clearly redefined without an
explicit statement of redefinition.
Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870 (citations omitted).
670. Ballard Med. Prod. v. Alligeance Healthcare Corp., 268 F.3d 1352, 1358, 60
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1493, 1498 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
671. See Interactive Gift Express, Inc., 256 F.3d at 1331, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1407
(“A deviation may also be necessary if a patentee has ‘relinquished [a] potential
claim construction in an amendment to the claim or in an argument to overcome or
distinguish a reference.’”) (quoting Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973,
979, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); see also Biovail Corp. Int’l v.
Andrx Pharm., Inc., 239 F.3d 1297, 1300-02, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813, 1816-17
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that the prosecution history, including that of related
patents, demonstrated that the “admixture” of the claims had to be homogeneous).
672. See Netword L.L.C. v. Cent. Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1352, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1076, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the specification describes the
technological aspects of the invention, and the claim sets forth the subject matter of
the patented invention).
673. See, e.g., Gart, 254 F.3d at 1341-42, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296 (finding that
the district court’s interpretation of the claim language was erroneous because it
added a limitation appearing in the specification and not in the claim, despite the
unambiguous language of the claim); Netword L.L.C., 242 F.3d at 1353, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1079-80 (holding that the district court properly interpreted the claim in
light of the specification and did not use the specification to limit the scope of the
claim); SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d at 1340-42, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062-63
(stating that if the specification unambiguously excludes a feature from the
invention, it can properly be used to limit the scope of the claim in cases where the
claim language is broad enough to include the feature in question).
674. See Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186, 48
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“We recognize that there is
sometimes a fine line between reading a claim in light of the specification, and
reading a limitation into the claim from the specification.”).
675. 242 F.3d 1337, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
676. Id. at 1339, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.
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art”:  the side-by-side configuration and the co-axial configuration.677
The district court interpreted the asserted claims to include only
catheters with co-axial lumens.678  The Federal Circuit agreed, holding
that the district court had not improperly read a limitation from the
written description into the claims, but had properly followed the
rule that claims must be read in light of the specification.679
Where the specification makes clear that the invention does not
include a particular feature, that feature is deemed to be outside
the reach of the claims of the patent, even though the language of
the claims, read without reference to the specification, might be
considered broad enough to encompass the feature in question.680
Here, the specification described the advantages of the co-axial
structure and distinguished the prior art on the basis of using dual
lumens.681 The specification described the co-axial structure as the
“present invention” and stated specifically that the co-axial structure
“is the basic sleeve structure for all embodiments of the present
invention contemplated and disclosed herein.”682  The court found
that this specific language, “defines SciMed’s invention in a way that
excludes the dual, or side-by-side, lumen arrangement.”683  The court
rejected SciMed’s argument that statements in the written description
could restrict the scope of a claim only when the specification
explicitly defined the claim term.684  Instead, the court determined
“[t]he written description can provide guidance as to the meaning of
the claims, thereby dictating the manner in which the claims are to
be construed, even if the guidance is not provided in explicit
definitional format.”685  The Federal Circuit concluded that the
side-by-side lumen configuration was outside the literal scope of the
claims and could not be saved by the doctrine of equivalents.686
Judge Dyk concurred in the result and joined in the opinion, but
expressed his concern that the court’s decisions have done little to
clarify the appropriate extent to which the specification can be used
                                                          
677. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.
678. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061-62.
679. Id. at 1340, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065-66.
680. Id. at 1341, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062-63.
681. Id. at 1342-43, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1064.
682. Id. at 1343, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.
683. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065.
684. Id. at 1344, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065.
685. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065.
686. Id. at 1345, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066 (“Having specifically identified,
criticized and disclaimed the dual lumen configuration, the patentee cannot now
invoke the doctrine of equivalents to ‘embrace a structure that was specifically
excluded from the claims.’”) (quoting Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 16 F.3d
394, 400, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767, 1771 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
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to limit the claim.687
In Pall Corp. v. PTI Tech., Inc.,688 the claims related to technology
used for filtering high-temperature corrosive chemicals.689  The
Federal Circuit held that the district court had incorrectly construed
the claims, and that the patentee had explicitly disclaimed certain
subject matter during prosecution.690  The disclaimer was based on
statements made to accompany an information disclosure statement
to the Patent Office.691  The Federal Circuit confirmed that, “[e]ven
where the ordinary meaning of the claim is clear, it is well established
that ‘[t]he prosecution history limits the interpretation of claim
terms so as to exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during
prosecution.’”692  The Federal Circuit remanded the action for
determination of whether the disclaimed subject matter was the same
or substantially the same as the accused device.693
In Day International, Inc. v. Reeves Bros., Inc.,694 the Federal Circuit
confirmed that even where the claim terms appear to be clear, the
court must nevertheless examine the specification and prosecution
history to determine whether: the patentee has adopted an explicit
definition different from the ordinary meaning of the term; has
disclaimed subject matter; or has limited the scope of the claims in
any other way.695  In this case, the patent related to a method for
curing a compressible printing blanket.696  In the prosecution history,
the patentee had explicitly distinguished and disclaimed the use of
prior art temperatures in his curing process.697
In Advanced Cardiovascular Systems., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc.,698 the
Federal Circuit noted that the prosecution history of a related patent
                                                          
687. SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d at 1347, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068 (Dyk, J.,
concurring)(“[O]ur decisions provide inadequate guidance as to when it is
appropriate to look to the specification to narrow the claim by interpretation and
when it is not appropriate to do so.  Until we provide better guidance, I fear that the
lower courts and litigants will remain confused.”).
688. 259 F.3d 1383, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1763 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
689. Id. at 1385, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764.
690. Id. at 1393, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770.
691. Id. at 1391-92, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1769.
692. Id. at 1392, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768 (quoting Southwall Techs., Inc. v.
Cardinal I.G. Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1676 (Fed. Cir.
1995)).
693. Id. at 1394, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770.
694. 260 F.3d 1343, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1790 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
695. Id. at 1348, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1769 (citations omitted); see also Biodex
Corp. v. Loredan Boimedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 862-63, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1252,
1262 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
696. Day Int’l, Inc., 260 F.3d at 1343, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1791.
697. Id. at 1348, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1794.
698. 265 F.3d 1294, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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may be relevant if the two patents have common claim limitations.699
In this case, however, there were no common claim terms in
dispute.700  Instead, the patent claims related to balloon dilatation
catheters, and the issue was whether the claims should be limited to
coaxial designs or whether they should include a side-by-side
design.701  The claims did not contain any limitation to the coaxial
design and, in fact, the written description of the patent in suit
explicitly stated that “[a]lthough the present invention has been
described principally in conjunction with catheters having coaxial
lumens, it should be appreciated that the invention is as applicable, if
not more applicable, to catheters having side-by-side lumens.”702
B. Means-Plus-Function Claims
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a
means or step for performing a specified function without the
recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such
claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure,
material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
thereof.703
The construction and application of means-plus-function claims
raise additional issues.  One particular issue, addressed in Wenger
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Coating Machine Systems, Inc.,704 is whether a
claim limitation falls under paragraph 6 of § 112.  The Federal
Circuit noted a presumption is created that paragraph 6 of § 112
applies whenever the word “means” is used in a claim.705 However, a
limitation using the word “means” without reciting a function that
corresponds to the means does not fall under paragraph 6.706
A second issue relates to the problem of identifying the structure
corresponding to the means.707  In Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced
                                                          
699. Id. at 1305, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168-69.
700. Id. at 1305-06, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168.
701. Id. at 1303-04, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
702. Id. at 1305, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168.
703. 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 (1994).
704. 239 F.3d 1225, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1679 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
705. Id. at 1232, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684 (citing Personalized Media
Communications, L.L.C. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 703, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA)  1880, 1886 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
706. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (citing Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc.,
174 F.3d 1294, 1302, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).  Moreover,
paragraph 6 of § 112 is also not applicable if the claim itself describes sufficient
structure to correspond to any claimed function.  Generation II Orthotics Inc. v.
Med. Tech. Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 1368-69, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1919, 1929-30 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
707. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 248 F.3d 1303,
1311, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1607, 1614 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Structure disclosed in the
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Cardiovascular Systems, Inc.,708 the court construed a
means-plus-function claim relating to coronary stent technology.709
The language of the claims stated “means for connecting adjacent
elements together.”710  The only structure disclosed in the
specification for connecting adjacent elements of the claimed device
was a helically wound continuous wire.711  The Federal Circuit
rejected the argument that the straight wire and hooks of certain
figures in the patent also corresponded to the claimed function.712
Instead, the court found that the straight wire and hooks were a
means to prevent longitudinal overstretch and were not associated in
the specification with the function of connecting adjacent elements
(and therefore not a corresponding structure).713
A third means-plus-function issue relates to the scope of the
limitations included within the language of the means-plus-function
claim.  The first step in construing a means-plus function-claim is to
identify the claimed function.714  The claimed function may not be
narrowed or limited beyond the scope of the claim language.715  “The
function is properly identified as the language after the ‘means for’
clause and before the ‘whereby’ clause, because a whereby clause that
merely states the result of the limitations in the claim adds nothing to
the substance of the claim.”716
Although the structure for performing the claimed function is not
recited in the claim itself, it must be identified in the specification
with sufficient particularity to satisfy the requirements of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, paragraph 1.717  If the specification fails to disclose an adequate
                                                          
specification is ‘corresponding’ structure only if the specification or prosecution
history clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.”)
(quoting B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1896, 1900 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
708. 248 F.3d 1303, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1607 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
709. Id. at 1305, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1608.
710. Id. at 1308, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
711. Id. at 1307, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
712. Id. at 1311, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616.
713. Id. at 1313, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617 (“[O]ne skilled in the art would not
perceive any clear link or association between these structures and the function of
connecting adjacent elements together.”).
714. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 249 F.3d 1314, 1324, 58
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671, 1678 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
715. See id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678 (explaining that the claim language may
not be used to expand the function either (citing Micro Chem. Inc v. Great Plains
Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1258, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
716. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678 (citing Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United
States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1172, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1018, 1023-24
(Fed. Cir. 1993)).
717. Budde v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 250 F.3d 1369, 1376, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1801, 1806 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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structure, the claim may be held invalid as indefinite.718  An
indefiniteness challenge to a means-plus-function claim requires the
challenger to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that a person
skilled in the art would not find, in the specification, a structure
adequate to perform the recited function.719
In Budde v. Harley-Davidson, Inc.,720 the Federal Circuit found error
in the district court’s holding that the challenged patent failed to
disclose structures for “electronic sensing means”721 and structures
corresponding to “a status sensing means for measuring a
combination of air intake and engine temperature, and vacuum in
the intake manifold and producing electronic signals therefrom.”722
In analyzing the electronic sensing means, the Federal Circuit found
ample disclosure in the specification to identify a number of
alternative sensors.723  With respect to the status sensing means, the
only structure identified in the specification for measuring vacuum
was a “commercially available” unit.724  Because the record reflected
that vacuum sensors were well-known in the art, the court held that
the language at issue would be understood by one skilled in the art as
a structure capable of performing the function recited in the claim
limitation.725
C. Literal Infringement
To find literal infringement, each limitation of the claim must be
present in the accused device.726  Any deviation from the claim
precludes such a finding.727
                                                          
718. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(2) (2001) (requiring that “the specification shall
conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming
the subject matter” of the invention); Budde, 250 F.3d at 1376, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1806 (citing In re Dossel, 115 F.3d 942, 945, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1881, 1884 (Fed.
Cir. 1997)).
719. See Budde, 250 F.3d at 1376-77, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806.
720. 250 F.3d 1369, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
721. Id. at 1377, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806 (reciting that claim 1 of the ‘348
patent requires “an electronic sensing means for determining when the ignition
system of the engine delivers an electronic pulse to fire each spark plug of the
cylinders and producing an electronic signal in response thereto.”).
722. Id. at 1380, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
723. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809 (listing four separate sensors disclosed in
the ‘348 patent).
724. Id. at 1381, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810 (noting that the specification stated
that “vacuum sensors are commercially available units which produce analog signals
for the control unit.”).
725. Id. at 1382, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810.
726. Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 532, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001,
1007 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
727. Id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
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In Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc.,728 the patentee’s claims
described a mobile phone system which automatically debited the
cost of calls to a prepaid credit account stored within the phone.729
The court construed the claims to require that the phone system
calculate charges using call rates based upon local, long distance,
international and roaming call categories.730  The accused device was
a phone system that did not permit the user to make international
calls.731  The patentee claimed that the ability to bill for international
calls was present in the phone’s source code and that the system was,
therefore, capable of being modified to charge for international
calls.732  The district court held and the Federal Circuit affirmed that
this capability did not support a claim of literal infringement.733
In Dow Chemical Co. v. Sumitomo Chemical Co.,734 the patent at issue
related to an improvement in a process for preparing certain types of
“epoxy resins.”735  The Federal Circuit ruled that the district court
erred in finding that the accused processes did not literally infringe
the claims because the accused processes consisted of two stages, one
of which differed from the claimed processes.736  In particular, the
district court had incorrectly relied on language from the Federal
Circuit’s decision in Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp.,737 where the court
stated that an accused product would not escape infringement if it
contained additional modifications and “merely colorable variations”
in addition to the claimed limitations.738  The Federal Circuit
announced, however, that the language the district court relied on
did not alter “the well-established principle that the ‘mere addition of
elements [in the accused product or process] cannot negate
                                                          
728. 247 F.3d 1316, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
729. Id. at 1319-20, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546.
730. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546.
731. Id.  at 1320-21, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.
732. Id. at 1330, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554.
733. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554 (recognizing that under Federal Circuit
precedent, the fact that “a device is capable of being modified to operate in an
infringing manner is not sufficient, by itself, to support a finding of infringement”
and that the allegations of literal infringement failed because a user of the accused
device could not directly place international calls).
734. 257 F.3d 1364, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
735. Id. at 1367, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610.
736. Id. at 1380, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620 (disagreeing with the district court’s
reasoning that the claimed processes should be compared with both of the accused
processes because the patentee failed to show that the first stages of the accused
processes were “merely colorable variations, unimportant and insubstantial changes
and substitutions, or extraneous limitations” thereby precluding a finding of literal
infringement).
737. 730 F.2d 1476, 1483, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 649, 654 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
738. See Dow Chem. Co., 257 F.3d at 1380, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620.
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infringement.’”739  In the case at bar, the preamble of the claim used
the transitional phrase “which comprises.”740  The court held that the
infringer cannot avoid literal infringement by adding steps to those
explicitly recited in the claim.741  The court also noted that, in
addition to using the “which comprises” language, the claimed
process was written in “‘Jepson format’,742 describ[ing] certain
conditions as an improvement over a well-known process.”743  An
accused process in a claim written in the ‘Jepson format’ cannot
avoid infringement by adding additional steps.744
In Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc.,745 the patent at issue
described a traffic radar device that permitted the operator to select
an operating mode that would search for either the strongest or
highest frequency signal (corresponding, respectively, to the largest
target vehicle or the fastest target vehicle).746  The accused device
searched for both the strongest and fastest signals simultaneously and
permitted the operator to choose which one would be displayed.747
The court construed the claim and held that the ordinary meaning of
“or” when used with two alternatives included one or the other but
not both, although Boolean logic would allow “or” to include both
alternatives.748  The patentee argued that the accused device literally
infringed because it merely added a step to the operation performed
by the claimed device.749  The Federal Circuit held, however, that the
use of the term “or” excludes devices that search for both magnitude
                                                          
739. See id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620 (reasoning that the Amstar “merely
colorable variation” language “simply recognized that the accused product in that
case was ‘the same’ as the claimed invention and already contained the claimed
limitations.”).
740. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620.
741. Id. at 1380-81, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620.  “‘Comprising’ is a term of art
used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but
other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the
claim.” Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620 (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp.,
112 F.3d 495, 501, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1608, 1613 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
742. Jepson format refers to a manner of writing a claim which “first describes the
scope of the prior art and then claims an improvement over the prior art.”  Id. at
1368, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610.
743. Id. at 1381, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620.
744. See id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620 (noting that literal infringement cannot
be avoided even if the extra steps are considered “extraneous” or mere “colorable
variations”).
745. 264 F.3d 1326, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
746. Id. at 1329, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
747. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137.
748. See id. at 1330-32, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137-39 (upholding district court’s
claim construction analysis that “or” was intended to be used for its ordinary
meaning despite the presumption that technical terms are ordinarily used in patent
documents).
749. Id. at 1332, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
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and frequency.750
In Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp.,751 the Federal Circuit reversed a district
court’s holding, on summary judgment, that the accused system did
not infringe.752  The patent at issue described a system of symbols
used for computer recognition of handwritten text.753  The Federal
Circuit held that the district court had committed clear error in
applying its own claim construction to the accused system.754
In Novartis Corp. v. Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc.,755 the district court
found no literal infringement and granted summary judgment for
the defendant.756  The patent in controversy described a crystalline
form of pamidronate disodium.757  The defendant had submitted an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) requesting approval
for a liquid formulation in which the pamidronate disodium was
dissolved in water.758  The parties agreed on claim construction and
that none of the crystalline form of the pamidronate disodium
compound was present at the beginning or end of the alleged
infringer’s process.759  The only issue was whether the crystalline form
was present transiently at some time during the defendant’s allegedly
infringing process.760  In order to establish infringement, the patentee
submitted, inter alia, an expert’s affidavit based upon a computer
model designed to simulate the defendant’s process.761  The district
court held, however, that the computer model was fatally deficient
and that the expert’s affidavit amounted to no more than a
                                                          
750. See id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139 (recognizing that the use of the term
“comprising” does not “free the claim from its own limitations” and that any device
that searches for both the strongest and fastest target “is outside the literal scope of
the claims”).
751. 267 F.3d 1361, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
752. Id. at 1369, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531.
753. See id. at 1363-64, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527 (discussing Xerox’s claim that
3Com’s handwriting recognition software in its “Palm Pilot” device infringed Xerox’s
patent).
754. See id. at 1367, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530 (applying clear error standard of
review for factual determinations of literal infringement and infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents and finding that the district court had incorrectly applied the
properly construed claims of Xerox to 3Com’s handwriting recognition software).
755. 271 F.3d 1043, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
756. Id. at 1046, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838.
757. Id. at 1045, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.  Pamidronate disodium is a “bone-
resorption inhibitor used to treat disorders of bone metabolism, including bone
metastases, cancer-associated hypercalcemia, and Paget’s disease.”  Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1837.
758. Id. at 1045, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836.
759. Id. at 1047, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838-39.
760. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839.
761. Id. at 1059, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840-41.  The expert’s computer
program predicted the creation of an infringing precipitate during the defendant’s
accused process.  Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840-41.
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conclusory opinion by the expert.762  The Federal Circuit stated that
conclusory opinions by experts are not sufficient to raise material
issues of fact and preclude summary judgment.763  The Federal Circuit
was unable to discern the assumptions underlying the computer
model, and therefore held the expert’s computer model and affidavit
insufficient to preclude summary judgment of non-infringement for
the defendant.764
D. Infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents
The Federal Circuit evaluates a claim of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents by seeking to determine whether the
differences between the claim and the accused device
are “insubstantial.”  The court frequently applies the
“function-way-result” test to examine, with regard to each element
not literally present, “whether the accused device performs
substantially the same function, in substantially the same way, to
achieve substantially the same result.”765  The Federal Circuit
discussed this standard of evaluation in a number of different
contexts in 2001.
In Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc.,766 after finding that the
accused cellular telephone system did not literally meet the claim
limitation requiring the system to permit billing for international
calls,767 the district court examined whether that limitation was
                                                          
762. See id. at 1049-50, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841 (questioning expert’s use of a
forty year old scholarly article and expert’s failure to consider defendant’s mixing
equipment in determining that computer model did not accurately describe
defendant’s manufacturing process, and that opinions were so “empirically
groundless” that they constituted nothing more than “self-serving conclusion[s]”).
763. See id. at 1050-51, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841-42 (recognizing that patentee
may “run risk” of peremptory non-suit and summary judgment of non-infringement
by merely submitting affidavit of expert who “opines that the accused device meets
the claim limitations”).  The Federal Circuit echoed its previous statement that when
opposing a motion for summary judgment, an “expert must set forth the factual
foundation for his opinion . . . in sufficient detail for the court to determine whether
that factual foundation would support a finding of infringement under the claim
construction adopted by the court, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of
the non-movant.”  See id. at 1051, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842 (quoting Arthur A.
Collins, Inc. v. N. Telecom Ltd., 216 F.3d 1042, 1047-48, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1143,
1147 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
764. Id. at 1054, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1894 (“[E]very simulation of a physical
process embodies at least some simplifying assumptions, and requires both a solid
theoretical foundation and realistic input parameters to yield meaningful results.
Without knowing these foundations, a court cannot evaluate whether the simulation
is probative . . . .”).
765. Unidynamics Corp. v. Automatic Prods. Int’l, Ltd., 157 F.3d 1311, 1322, 48
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1099, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
766. 247 F.3d 1316, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
767. See supra notes 729-32 and accompanying text (discussing Telemac Cellular
Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir.
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present under the doctrine of equivalents.768  The court held that the
limitation was not present because the accused system blocked
international calls, which could be made only by using the services of
an outside international carrier.769  Such calls would then be billed as
local or roaming calls.770  The Federal Circuit agreed with the district
court finding that no reasonable jury could consider this feature an
equivalent to the missing international rate calculation limitation of
the claim as construed.771
In Viskase Corp. v. American National Can Co.,772 the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment on
the issue of infringement.773  The Federal Circuit found ample
evidence presented by each side to create a genuine dispute of
material fact over whether the copolymers used in making one form
of shrink wrap material were equivalent to linear copolymers used in
the patentee’s shrink wrap material.774  Therefore, the court held that
a reasonable jury could have found that the accused products were
not equivalent.775
In Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc.,776 the court also
considered the application of the doctrine of equivalents.777  The
patent claim, describing a traffic radar system, denoted that the
system searched for and processed either magnitude or frequency.778
The district court held that applying the claims to a device that
searched for both magnitude or frequency would eliminate the “or”
element of the claims and violate the all-elements rule.779  In this case,
                                                          
2001)).
768. See Telemac Cellular Corp., 247 F.3d at 1332, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556.
769. Id. at 1330-31, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554-55.
770. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
771. See id. at 1331, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555 (“Where no equivalent element
can be identified in the accused device, the district court is not at liberty to
altogether ignore limitations of a claim.”).  The Federal Circuit also repeated the
Supreme Court’s admonition that, “if a theory of equivalence would entirely vitiate a
particular claim element, partial or complete judgment should be rendered by the
court, as there would be no further material issue for the jury to resolve.”  Id., 58
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555 (quoting  Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem.
Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8 (1997)).
772. 261 F.3d 1316, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
773. Id. at 1325, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829.
774. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829.
775. See id. at 1324, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829 (“[T]he factual question of
equivalency requires determination of whether the accused composition is only
insubstantially changed from what is claimed, applying appropriate criteria to the
determination of insubstantial change.”) (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 25).
776. 264 F.3d 1326, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
777. Id. at 1333, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139-40.
778. Id. at 1329, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136-37.
779. Id. at 1333, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139-40.  “The all-elements rule is that an
accused device must contain every claimed element of the invention or the
AUTHREVBENAMIPP 9/11/02  11:00 AM
716 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:639
the Federal Circuit held that the word “or” is not an element.780
However, prosecution history estoppel precluded the application of
the claims to a device that searched for both magnitude and
frequency signals and therefore prevented the application of the
doctrine of equivalents.781
In Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Industries,782 the district court
granted summary judgment holding that the defendant’s
vacuum-blower did not infringe the plaintiff’s patent under the
doctrine of equivalents.783  The patent disclosed a design in which the
vacuum-blower had a removable cover with an attached restriction
ring.784  The accused device had a two-piece ring and cover.785  The
Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the record raised material
issues of fact as to whether the accused device could be found
equivalent to the claims.786  The court discussed both the insubstantial
differences test787 and the function-way-result test.788  The district court
had relied on the latter test and had determined that there could be
no infringement because the two-piece system did not automatically
perform the function of placing the restriction ring.789  The Federal
Circuit held that, since the claims were described solely in structural
terms, it was inappropriate to import into them a functional
limitation.790
In Schoell v. Regal Marine Industries,791 the invention related to hulls
used on powerboats.792  The Federal Circuit found, however, that
                                                          
equivalent of every claimed element.”  Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139-40 (citing
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29).
780. Id. at 1333, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
781. See id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140 (noting that Kustom had previously
argued in a prosecution in response to a rejection for obviousness that the claim “was
directed to operator-selected alternative search modes for magnitude or frequency”).
782. 266 F.3d 1367, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
783. Id. at 1369, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437-38.
784. Id. at 1368-69, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437-38.
785. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437-38.
786. Id. at 1369-70, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438-39.
787. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438-39. This test prevents a copyist from making
“unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions in [a] patent which,
though adding nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter outside the
claim, and hence outside the reach of the law.”  Id. at 1370, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1438-39.
788. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1969. The function-way-result test asks the
factfinder to determine “whether the element in the accused device ‘does
substantially the same thing in substantially the same way to get substantially the
same result.’” Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1969.
789. Id. at 1370-71, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439.
790. See id. at 1371, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439 (reasoning that the restriction
ring structure at issue could not become part of the claimed structure unless
specifically claimed).
791. 247 F.3d 1202, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1450 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
792. Id. at 1204, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451.
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there was insufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether
the defendant’s v-shaped aft keel was insubstantially different from
the claimed “generally flat” aft keel.793
E. Prosecution History Estoppel
Prosecution history estoppel can restrict the availability of the
doctrine of equivalents.794 Prosecution history estoppel arises not only
from the express disclaimer or abandonment of subject matter,795 but
also from claim-narrowing amendments made for any reasons related
to patentability, as well as from amendments which cancel broad
claims and replace them with narrower claims.796
In Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp.,797 the Federal Circuit
held that prosecution history estoppel arose from a narrowing
amendment, even though the amendment was voluntary.798  The
court noted that many factors must be examined to establish whether
prosecution history estoppel applies.  First, the court must decide
which of the claim limitations are alleged to be infringed because of
the doctrine of equivalents and whether an amendment narrows the
literal scope of the claim.799  Next, the court must determine the
reason for the amendment.800  The burden lies with the patent holder
to show that the amendment was not made for a reason related to
patentability.801  If the amendment was made for a reason related to
patentability, then no range of equivalents is available as to the
                                                          
793. See id. at 1210, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456 (rejecting evidence of similar
performance results between two boat hulls to show that the patented item performs
the same function in the same way as insufficient to create material issue of fact for
trial).
794. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09
(1950) (noting that the doctrine of equivalents requires only that an article or
process be substantially the same, or perform in substantially the same way and
provide substantially the same function and result, for infringement to occur).
795. See Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that prosecution history
estoppel prevents a patentee from gaining coverage under the doctrine of
equivalents when the patentee has relinquished the subject matter in question
during prosecution).
796. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30-34
(1997) (describing estoppel by amendment).
797. 238 F.3d 1341, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
798. Id. at 1346, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556 (noting that voluntary claim
amendments are to be treated in the same manner as other amendments and that “a
voluntary amendment that narrows the scope of a claim for reasons related to the
statutory requirements for a patent will give rise to prosecution history estoppel as to
the amended claim element”) (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shokeetsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabashiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 568, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1871 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
799. Id. at 1344, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
800. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
801. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
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subject matter of the amendment.802  If the court determines that the
amendment was not made for a reason related to patentability, then
the court must still consider whether estoppel will apply.803
In Pioneer Magnetics, the claims related to a circuit designed to
receive input voltage at varying levels and to emit output voltage at a
constant level.804  The claim amendments, made in response to prior
art-based rejections, added a limitation for a “switching analog
multiplier circuit” to the elements previously included in the
unamended claims.805  The Federal Circuit, based on its de novo
examination of the prosecution history,806 concluded that the
amendment was made to avoid prior art, and therefore prosecution
history estoppel applied.807
In Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral, Inc.,808 the Federal
Circuit rejected the patentee’s effort to persuade the court to apply a
“flexible bar” approach to determine the proper scope of
equivalents.809  Instead, the court reaffirmed its comprehensive and
explicit rejection of a “flexible bar” approach to the scope of
equivalents.810  Because the flexible bar approach was rejected,
prosecution history estoppel did not apply.811
In Dow Chemical Co. v. Sumitomo Chemical Co.,812 the Federal Circuit
held that statements made during reexamination proceedings did
                                                          
802. Id. at 1345, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555 (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at
32-33).
803. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555 (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40-41).
804. Id. at 1343, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554.
805. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554 (noting that the applicant’s original
application contained the terms “circuit means” and “multiplier,” which were
amended to read “circuit means including a pulse-width modulator” and “switching
analog multiplier circuit,” respectively).
806. See id. at 1344, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555 (declaring that the Federal
Circuit reviews the issue of prosecution history estoppel de novo because it regards
the issue as a legal question) (citing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448,
1459-60, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1177-78 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
807. See id. at 1346, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556 (noting that avoidance of prior
art is “the classic basis for the application of prosecution history estoppel”).
808. 249 F.3d 1314, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
809. Id. at 1326-27, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.  The flexible bar approach
provided that prosecution history estoppel would force the patentee to give up only
the “exact subject matter” that the patentee had in fact surrendered.  See Festo Corp.
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 574, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865, 1876.
810. See Lockheed Martin Corp., 249 F.3d at 1327, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677
(stating that the Federal Circuit has rejected the flexible bar approach because of the
critical importance of providing notice through the patent claims process of exactly
what is protected by a patent) (citing Festo Corp., 234 F.3d at 574-78, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1877-80).
811. Id. at 1314, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
812. 257 F.3d 1364, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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not give rise to argument-based prosecution history estoppel.813  The
Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s interpretation that
statements made during reexamination proceedings evidenced that
Dow’s process could not be infringed by defendant’s two-stage
process.814  The Federal Circuit found the reexamination proceeding
statements to be in contrast with Dow’s statements during
prosecution, which attempted to clarify possible misconceptions
based on the examiner’s statements and made clear that its invention
was not limited to a one-step process.815  Thus, the court held Dow’s
reexamination statements did not prove the surrender of subject
matter needed to invoke argument-based prosecution history
estoppel.816
In Mycogen Plant Science, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,817 the court denied the
patentee’s petition for rehearing, reaffirming its holding that
prosecution history estoppel precluded the application of the
doctrine of equivalents to the patentee’s claims for synthetic genes.818
During prosecution, the claims had been rejected on the ground that
the specification enabled only one embodiment.819  The issue on the
petition for rehearing was whether the complete bar rule of Festo
would apply in a situation where a claim had been cancelled and
replaced with another.820  The Federal Circuit confirmed that the
scope of the independent claim “was clearly limited when it was
replaced by a claim the language of which was drawn from a prior
dependent claim.821
F. Inducement of Infringement
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) provides that, “Whoever actively induces
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”  In 2001, the
                                                          
813. Id. at 1382, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621.
814. See id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621 (finding that the district court
incorrectly compared Dow’s claimed process to both stages of the two-staged process
of the defendant, whereas the defendant’s second stage alone could have been
found to infringe, and that Dow, in response to examiner’s statements, had made
clear during reexamination that their claim was not limited to a one-stage process).
815. See id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621.
816. See id. at 1382, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621-22 (noting that a surrender of
subject matter necessary to invoke prosecution history estoppel must be “clear and
unmistakable”).
817. 261 F.3d 1345, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1852 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
818. Id. at 1350, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856.
819. Id. at 1346, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853 (noting that the specification was
enabling for only one specific sequence of DNA).
820. See id. at 1349, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885 (stating that the complete bar
rule prevents the application of the doctrine of equivalents where a claim has been
replaced with a claim that added a limitation to the original claim).
821. Id. at 1350, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856.
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Federal Circuit decided one case which turned on the question of
whether a corporation could be liable for inducing infringement by
its affiliates.
In Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Co.,822 the defendant was accused of
having violated an injunction that prohibited acts constituting
contributory infringement or inducement of infringement.823
Although there was no evidence that the defendant itself had sold or
serviced infringing devices after the injunction was entered, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had an affirmative obligation to
prevent its corporate affiliates from selling or servicing infringing
devices.824  The Federal Circuit said, however, that “in the absence of
a showing of control over another party, merely permitting that party
to commit infringing acts does not constitute infringement, and it
likewise cannot constitute ‘facilitating infringing acts.’”825  Moreover,
in the absence of a showing “that a parent company was either an
alter ego of its subsidiary or controlled the conduct of the subsidiary,”
the parent’s failure to stop infringement by a subsidiary could not
constitute either direct infringement or active inducement.826 The
Federal Circuit held that because there was no evidence that the
defendant controlled the conduct of its affiliates and subsidiaries, the
defendant did not violate the portion of the injunction regarding
inducement of infringement.827
G. Infringement under § 271(f)
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) provides that:
[w]hoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or
from the United States any component of a patented invention that
is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention
and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial non-infringing use, where such component is
uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component is
so made or adapted and intending that such component will be
combined outside of the United States in a manner that would
                                                          
822. 248 F.3d 1376, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1791 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
823. Id. at 1377, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1791-92.
824. Id. at 1378, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1792.
825. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1792 (citations omitted).  The term “facilitate”
requires some affirmative act.  Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1792-93; see also 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(b) (1994) (noting the statutory provision that prohibits active inducement of
infringement also requires some affirmative act).
826. See Tegal Corp., 248 F.3d at 1379, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1793  (citing
A. Stucki Co. v. Worthington Indus., 849 F.2d 593, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1066 (Fed.
Cir. 1988)).
827. Id. at 1380, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1794.
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infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United
States, shall be liable as an infringer.828
In Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems Corp.,829 the district court held that
the defendant could not be liable for infringement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(f)(2).830  The defendant had shipped components of a battery
scanning system to Mexico for assembly.831  The components were
never assembled and were returned to the United States.832  The
district court held that, because no infringing combination of
components was ever assembled, there could be no infringement
under § 271(f)(2).833  The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that
§ 271(f)(2) does not require the actual combination or assembly of
shipped components.834  It requires only that the components be
shipped with the intention that they be combined outside the United
States in an infringing manner.835
H. Infringement under § 271(g)
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) provides:
[w]hoever without authority imports into the United States or
offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which
is made by a process patented in the United States shall be liable as
an infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the
product occurs during the term of such process patent.836
In Mycogen Plant Science, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,837 the court
determined whether 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) applies to render illegal the
sale in the United States of products made outside the United States
prior to the issuance of a U.S. patent.838  The court determined that a
“process patented in the United States” must mean a process that was
patented at the time the product was manufactured overseas.839
Because the genes at issue in the patent in this case had been
manufactured prior to the issuance of the patent in the United
States, even though the genes were sold by the defendant in the
United States later, the sale in the United States did not infringe.840
                                                          
828. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) (1994).
829. 245 F.3d 1364, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
830. Id. at 1365, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457.
831. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
832. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
833. Id. at 1366, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
834. Id. at 1367-68, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459-60.
835. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
836. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (1994).
837. 252 F.3d 1306, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1891 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
838. Id. at 1308, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1893.
839. Id. at 1318-19, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1900-01.
840. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1900.  A similar conclusion would apply if the
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I. Repair and Reconstruction
Purchasers of patented items are allowed to make repairs to the
item, including the replacement of non-patented parts, without
infringing the patents of the manufacturer.841  However, purchasers
are not allowed to reconstruct the articles so as to make an essentially
different or recreated item for resale.842  In 2001, the Federal Circuit
examined the scope and application of repair and reconstruction in
two separate cases.
In Jazz Photo Corp. v. International Trade Commission,843 the alleged
infringer defendant claimed that, under the repair defense, he was
entitled to refurbish “single-use” cameras, (also called “lens-fitted film
packages”) by replacing the film and batteries and resetting the
counters.844  First, the court discussed the burdens of proof applicable
to the repair issue.845  The court noted that the doctrine of repair was
an affirmative defense and therefore the defendant had the burden
of establishing the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.846  In
determining whether the defendant in this case met his burden, the
court distinguished “repair” from “reconstruction,” which is not a
defense to infringement.847 According to the court, reconstruction
occurs when a “new article” is made after the patented article,
“viewed as a whole, has become spent.”848  The court held that the
                                                          
products had been made in the United States prior to the issuance of the process
patent, since a process patent is not infringed if the process is used prior to the
“beginning of the patent term, even if the products of the process are sold during
the term of the patent.”  Id. at 1318, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1900.
841. See Argo Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 342-46
(1961) (defining and contrasting permissible repair and impermissible
reconstruction).
842. See id. at 345 (noting that for a patent to be infringed by impermissible
reconstruction, there must be a “second creation” of the patented item).
843. 264 F.3d 1094, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1907 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
844. Id. at 1101, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
845. Id. at 1101-02, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911-12.
846. See id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911-12 (noting that the defendant carries
this burden only after the patentee has presented evidence that one of his patent
claims is infringed).
847. See id. at 1105-07, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914-16 (holding that the
precedent on point make “the acts of inserting new film and film container, resetting
the film counter, and resealing the broken case—the principle steps performed by
the remanufacturers—as more akin to repair” than to prohibited reconstruction).
The court noted in its statement of applicable law that a “purchaser of a patented
article has the rights of any owner of personal property, including the right to use it,
repair it, modify it, discard it, or resell it, subject only to overriding conditions of the
sale.”  Id. at 1101, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.  However, the purchaser does not
have the right to “construct an essentially new article on the template of the
original.”  Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
848. Id. at 1102-05, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912-14 (quoting Sandvik
Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co., 121 F.3d 669, 673, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1620, 1623 (Fed. Cir.
1997)).
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replacement of film and batteries in the lens-fitted film packages, the
related resetting of indicators, and replacement of covers constituted
repair rather than reconstruction.849
In Surfco Hawaii v. Fin Control Systems Pty, Ltd.,850 the district court
granted summary judgment for the patentee.851  The patent at issue
related to a surfboard with replaceable fins.852  The declaratory
judgment plaintiff made fins853 and defended the product under the
doctrine of repair.854  The district court held that the repair right
included only the right to replace worn or broken parts.855  The
Federal Circuit held, however, that ownership includes the right to
replace parts that are neither broken nor worn.856  Therefore, the
alleged infringer was not liable because the doctrine of repair
applied.857
IV. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AND OTHER DEFENSES
A. Inequitable Conduct
A patent may be held unenforceable for inequitable conduct if the
applicant has withheld material information from the examiner or
has made false statements to the examiner with the intent to deceive
or mislead the examiner into granting a patent.858  A determination of
inequitable conduct requires a two-stage inquiry.859  First, the court
must determine whether the challenger has made a threshold
showing that the information withheld or inaccurately represented
was material and that the non-disclosure or misrepresentation was
                                                          
849. See id. at 1105-07, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416 (finding that the “common
thread” in all of the pertinent cases is that the purchaser of an item has the right to
take steps to prolong the useful life of the article, which is precisely what the
defendants in the current case attempted to accomplish with their process).
850. 264 F.3d 1062, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
851. Id. at 1064, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057.
852. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057.
853. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057.
854. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057.
855. Id. at 1065, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
856. See id. at 1066, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058-59 (noting that the reason for
the replacement is not determinative, rather, it is the extent of the replacement that
controls).
857. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
858. See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1823, 1826 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (requiring a showing of “affirmative misrepresentation of
material fact, failure to disclose material information, or submission of false, material
information, coupled with an intent to deceive” in order to prove inequitable
conduct).
859. See Monon Corp. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 239 F.3d 1253, 1261, 57
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1699, 1706 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (describing the two step process).
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carried out with intent to deceive.860  Second, if the threshold
requirements of materiality and intent are established, then the court
must weigh its factual findings on these issues to make an equitable
determination whether to deny enforcement of the patent.861
The district court has considerable latitude in determining
inequitable conduct.862  The Federal Circuit will overturn a finding of
inequitable conduct only when the district court commits a serious
error of judgment, determines inequitable conduct based on clearly
erroneous factual findings, or misapplies or misinterprets the
applicable law.863  Moreover, where the district court has made
findings of fact based on the credibility of witnesses, such
determinations “can virtually never be clear error.”864  The district
court’s discretion in determining inequitable conduct generally
results in the Federal Circuit upholding most district court decisions
on the issue of inequitable conduct.  The majority of the cases the
Federal Circuit decided in 2001 on this issue were not exceptions.865
In a few instances, however, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the
district courts over the issue of inequitable conduct.  For example, in
Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Medical Device Alliance, Inc.,866 the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court’s grant of a new trial on the issue of
inequitable conduct867  and found error in the district court’s ruling
                                                          
860. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1705 (noting that the challenger must make
the threshold showing by clear and convincing evidence).
861. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1705-06 (explaining that the balancing test
employs a sliding scale such that if information is highly material then inequitable
conduct can be established with a comparatively lower level of intent).
862. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 551, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1587, 1592-93 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
863. Id., 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1596.
864. See Monon Corp., 239 F.3d at 1263-64, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707.
When a trial judge’s finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony
of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially
plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if
not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error.
Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707 (citing First Interstate Bank of Billings v. United
States, 61 F.3d 876, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470
U.S. 564, 595 (1985))).
865. See, e.g., Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 236 F.3d 684, 57
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (affirming the district court’s refusal to find
inequitable conduct); Monon Corp., 239 F.3d at 1253, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699;
Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 257 F.3d 1331, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Winbond Elecs. Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 262 F.3d 1363, 60
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v.
Medtronic, Inc., 265 F.3d 1294, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2001); GFI,
Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(affirming the district court’s finding of inequitable conduct); Brasseler, U.S.A. I L.P.
v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1482 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
866. 244 F.3d 1365, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
867. Id. at 1380-81, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331.
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of inequitable conduct by the patent applicant.868  First, the district
court should not have inferred deceptive intent from the inventor’s
intentional non-disclosure of a reference.869 Second, the district court
erred in finding materiality in the inventor’s failure to disclose
opinions and knowledge regarding a prior art device when references
concerning that device were already before the examiner.870
The Federal Circuit also addressed a number of other issues
regarding inequitable conduct including the scope of materiality and
effect of an applicant’s failure to make an inquiry.  In GFI, Inc. v.
Franklin Corp.,871 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
finding of inequitable conduct.872 Here, the patent involved claims for
a sectional sofa in which controls for operating the reclining seats
were located in a center console.873  The patentee claimed that certain
references, called the “Durling references,”874 were not prior art and
therefore not material for purposes of inequitable conduct.875 The
court held, however, that material information is not exclusively
limited to prior art.876  The court declared that the examiner would
have considered the Durling references important and therefore
material because they disclosed a significant combination of elements
not present in any of the references before the examiner.877
                                                          
868. Id. at 1378, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
869. See id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328 (recognizing the undisclosed reference
was cumulative in nature).
870. See id. at 1377-78, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (“An inventor’s opinions
regarding a prior art device known to the examiner are not within the domain of
material that must be submitted to the PTO.”).
871. 265 F.3d 1268, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
872. Id. at 1273, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
873. Id. at 1272, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141.
874. See id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143 (noting that the Durling references
included a similar design to the applicant’s on which Durling had filed a patent
application two months earlier).
875. See id. at 1274, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1144 (declining to make a finding that
Durling was not material because “a reasonable examiner would have been
substantially likely to find ‘important’ the distinction between the conflicting patent
applications”).
876. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
877. Id. at 1275, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144-45.  The Durling references were
considered important because the patentee was aware of Durling, had a copy of the
Durling application, and had seen a model of the Durling invention with
center-mounted controls before filing the subject application.  Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1144-45.  Moreover, the patentee had been in active negotiations with
Durling to obtain priority information so it could assess the patentability of its own
application and its potential need for a license.  Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
Furthermore, the applicant also distinguished other, disclosed references on the
ground that they did not include center-mounted controls, although the inventor
knew that Durling had built a model with center-mounted controls before the filing
of the subject application.  Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
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In Brasseler, U.S.A. I L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp.,878 the Federal Circuit
addressed the question of when inequitable conduct can be based on
a failure to make inquiries.879  The court agreed with the district
court’s findings that the patentee had committed inequitable
conduct by failing to disclose facts to the PTO relating to a potential
on-sale bar.880  The court further relied on the district court’s opinion
in upholding its inequitable conduct decision stating that although a
finding of intent to deceive may not be based solely on gross
negligence, “one should not be able to cultivate ignorance, or
disregard numerous warnings that material information or prior art
may exist, merely to avoid actual knowledge of that information or
prior art.”881
Despite the applicant’s argument that the inequitable conduct
doctrine should not be applied in this case because of the special
circumstances involved,882 the Federal Circuit upheld the district
court’s decision in full.883
In Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc.,884 the Federal Circuit
upheld a district court dismissal of the plaintiff’s patent infringement
and the award of attorney’s fees to the defendant.885  On the other
claim, the Federal Circuit disagreed with part of the district court’s
reasoning and vacated the district court’s determination that the
plaintiff’s patent-in-suit was rendered permanently unenforceable by
reason of litigation misconduct.886  The Federal Circuit distinguished
litigation misconduct, which justifies the denial of relief to a
particular party, from inequitable conduct, which affects the property
                                                          
878. 267 F.3d 1370, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1482 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
879. Id. at 1380, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488.
880. Id. at 1386, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.  The district court further noted
that the attorneys who filed and prosecuted the patent application were aware of a
potentially barring event, but made no inquiry or investigation into the facts.  Id., 60
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491.
881. Id. at 1383, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278 (quoting FMC Corp. v. Hennessy
Indus., 836 F.2d 521, 526 n.6, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272, 1275 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
The Federal Circuit also accepted the district court’s opinion that the inventors
themselves were guilty of inequitable conduct. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491-92
(noting inventors knew that the sale which gave rise to the on-sale bar had taken
place).
882. See id. at 1379, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487 (discussing the applicant’s
argument that this case is unique because the applicant did not understand that he
had a duty to disclose the potential on-sale bar information to the PTO).
883. Id. at 1380, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1488.
884. 269 F.3d 1369, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
885. Id. at 1382, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
886. See id. at 1375, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709-10 (noting that the alleged
litigation misconduct consisted of fabricating inventor’s notebooks and destroying
evidence).
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right that is the patent.887 The court found that the conduct at issue in
the present case was not inequitable conduct.888
B. Estoppels
1. Interference estoppel
The Federal Circuit decided one interference estoppel case in
2001.  In Exxon Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,889 the court strongly
supported the district court’s position that the patentee’s alleged
failure to follow proper interference procedure was not a recognized
ground of patent invalidity.890 The Federal Circuit reasoned that,
“[a]bsent proof of inequitable conduct, the examiner’s or the
applicant’s absolute compliance with the internal rules of patent
examination becomes irrelevant after the patent has issued.”891
Therefore, the defendant could not assert that the patentee was
estopped from asserting the validity of its patent.892
2. Licensee estoppel
The Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of licensee estoppel in
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins.893 Subsequent decisions by the Federal Circuit
have distinguished this doctrine from other forms of estoppel.  In
2001, the court distinguished licensee estoppel in one case.
In Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc.,894 the Federal Circuit distinguished
contractual estoppel, which arose out of a settlement agreement in
which the alleged infringer expressly waived validity defenses, from
licensee estoppel.895  In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,896 the Supreme Court
simply held that it was against public policy to preclude a licensee
from challenging patent validity.897  In Lear, however, the licensee had
                                                          
887. See id. at 1376, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709 (explaining the importance of
the litigation/inequitable distinction by stating “[T]he remedies for litigation
misconduct differ from the remedies for misconduct in acquisition of a property
right.  While inequitable conduct before the PTO renders the patent unenforceable
by any party, the unclean hands doctrine bars only the offending party.”) (quoting
Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244-45 (1933)).
888. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
889. 265 F.3d 1249, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
890. Id. at 1254, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371 (recognizing that interference
estoppel, caused by a procedural lapse in the interference proceeding, does not
affect the validity of patent claims).
891. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372 (quoting Magnivision, Inc. v. Bonneau Co.,
115 F.3d 956, 960, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1925, 1929 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
892. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372.
893. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
894. 238 F.3d 1362, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
895. Id. at 1368-69, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640-41.
896. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
897. Id. at 673-74.
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not expressly agreed to waive validity defenses.898  Moreover, the
agreement in Lear was not entered into as part of a settlement of
litigation.899
3. Equitable estoppel and laches
In A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co.,900 the Federal
Circuit held that the defense of laches may bar an applicant’s claim
for damages.901  Successful assertion of the laches defense requires
that delay in bringing suit be both unreasonable and inexcusable and
that material prejudice result from the delay.902 Laches is presumed
when there is a delay of six or more years between the date when the
holder of the patent knew or should have known about the
infringement and the commencement of the suit.903  This
presumption shifts the burden of going forward, but not the burden
of persuasion.904
In Winbond Electronics Corp. v. International Trade Commission,905 the
Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of the International Trade
Commission that the alleged infringer did not have an implied
license to use the patented technology.906 The court stated that there
could be no implied license by reason of equitable estoppel unless
the patentee, through statements or conduct, gave an affirmative
grant of consent or permission to the alleged infringer to use the
patented technology.907  In the case at bar, the alleged infringer
admitted he was unaware of the patent-in-suit before the patentee
sought to persuade him to accept a license.908 The alleged infringer
argued that the patentee had proposed to an industry association
committee that it would provide any manufacturer royalty-free
licenses for a one-time fee if its technology were adopted as an
industry standard.909  The court ruled that the technology was not
                                                          
898. See id. at 657 (detailing Adkin’s contractual arrangement with Lear prior to
litigation).
899. See id. (explaining that the agreement was created “[a]t the very beginning of
the parties’ relationship); Flex-Foot, Inc., 238 F.3d at 1368, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1640-41.
900. 960 F.2d 1020, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
901. See HARMON, supra note 329, § 9.2.
902. Id. § 9.3.
903. Id.
904. Id.
905. 262 F.3d 1363, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
906. See id. at 1374, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036 (“An implied license may arise
by equitable estoppel, acquiescence, conduct, or legal estoppel.”).
907. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036 (citing Wang Labs. Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs.
Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1581, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1263, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
908. Id. at 1375, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036-37.
909. Id. at 1372, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037.
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adopted as an industry standard and the alleged infringers were
unaware of the patentee’s offer to provide single payment licenses.
Therefore, the conditions of the offer had not been accepted and did
not give rise to an implied license by reason of equitable estoppel.910
In Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc.,911 the Federal Circuit affirmed a
district court ruling that granted summary judgment to the patentee,
dismissing the alleged infringer’s defenses of equitable estoppel and
laches.912  The defendant developed a new line of products it believed
to be non-infringing,913 and asserted that it had sent the patentee a
sample of the new products for testing in September 1993.914  The
patentee did not communicate with the alleged infringer until the
summer of 1995, and brought suit in December 1995.915  The
defendant contended that these facts gave rise to equitable estoppel
and laches.916  Upholding summary judgment, the Federal Circuit
agreed with the district court’s determination that the defendant
failed to present evidence demonstrating economic or defense
prejudice, a required element in a laches or equitable estoppel
defense.917
V. REMEDIES
A. Preliminary Injunction
A preliminary injunction may be granted to prevent infringement
pending trial.918  This injunctive remedy requires consideration of the
following four factors: “(1) the relative rights and hardships of the
parties; (2) the likelihood of ultimate success on the merits; (3) the
possibility of irreparable harm; and (4) the public interest.”919
                                                          
910. Id. at 1375, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036-37.
911. 264 F.3d 1358, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
912. Id. at 1371-72, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1183-84 (finding no abuse of
discretion on the part of the district court).
913. See id. at 1362, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175 (basing belief on prior litigation
between the parties in the form of a consent judgment entered on January 5, 1993).
914. Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1175.
915. Id. at 1362-63, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175-76.
916. See id. at 1371, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1183 (arguing that a two year period
with no communication constitutes unreasonable delay).
917. See id. at 1371-72, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1183 (explaining that succeeding
on a defense of equitable estoppel or laches requires proof of prejudice arising from
the infringer’s reliance on the patentee’s conduct (equitable estoppel) or resulting
from the patentee’s unreasonable and inexcusable delay in filing suit (laches)).
Moreover, the court found that the defendant had acted primarily in reliance on its
belief that its products were not infringing, rather than in reliance on any statements
or conduct by the patentee.  Id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1183.
918. See HARMON, supra note 329, § 13.2.
919. Id.
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In Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc.,920 the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the patentee’s
motion for a preliminary injunction.921  The patentee alleged that the
district court had denied the injunction by reason of an error of law
in construing the claims.922  The Federal Circuit held that the district
court had properly construed the claims because it had used a
“means-plus-function” limitation analysis in making its decision to
grant summary judgement.923
In Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingleheim GmbH,924 the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction
against the defendant, which enjoined it from further infringement
of three of the plaintiff’s patents.925  The court reviewed the
four-factor test used in patent cases to evaluate preliminary
injunction motions926 and analyzed the district court’s decision for an
abuse of discretion.927  The court found no clear error and that the
moving party had met the burden of the four-factor test,928 but noted
that findings of fact and conclusions of law made at the preliminary
injunction stage are “subject to change upon the ultimate [full] trial
on the merits.”929
In Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc.,930 the Federal Circuit
found that the district court, in granting a preliminary injunction,
                                                          
920. 236 F.3d 1363, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1542 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
921. See id. at 1367, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1544-45 (reviewing the decision to
determine whether the court had abused its discretion, committed an error of law or
seriously misjudged the evidence) (citing Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d
1446, 1449, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
922. Id. at 1364, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542.
923. Id. at 1367, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1545.
924. 237 F.3d 1359, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
925. Id. at 1362, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
926. See id. at 1363, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649 (stating that the test requires the
moving party to show “(1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) irreparable harm if the injunction were not granted; (3) the balance of the
hardships and (4) the impact  of the injunction on the public interest.”) (quoting
Polymer Techs. v. Bridwell, 103 F.3d 970, 973, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1185, 1188 (Fed.
Cir. 1996)).
927. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649 (relying heavily on 35 U.S.C. § 283
(1994), which provides that “[t]he several courts having jurisdiction of cases under
this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent
the violation of any right secured by a patent, on such terms as the court deems
reasonable”).
928. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649 (noting that the appellants only contest
the first two factors of the four part test, but stating that these factors had been
satisfied).  The court continued by saying that “there appears to be no real dispute
that Roxane’s accused product infringes under the . . . claim construction” and that
based on the plaintiff’s expert testimony that “price erosion and loss of market
position” was foreseeable; irreparable harm had been shown.  Id. at 1365-68, 57
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650-53.
929. Id. at 1363, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649.
930. 239 F.3d 1343, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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had “committed clear error by misreading the factual content of the
prior art references . . . and by failing to recognize that [the
defendant] had raised a substantial question of invalidity . . . in view
of prior art references.”931 The Federal Circuit observed that the
challenger bears a lower burden of proof at the preliminary
injunction stage than at trial.932  Thus, the court found that the
challenger raised a substantial question of invalidity based on this
lower standard.933
In Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,934 the Federal
Circuit held that the district court had incorrectly construed the
claims of the patent, and that, under a proper construction, the
patentee was unlikely to succeed on its claim of infringement and
therefore should not have been granted a preliminary injunction.935
The patent at issue related to an antibiotic product, and
infringement was alleged under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).936  To
determine infringement, the court compared the construed claims of
the plaintiff with the product that the defendant was likely to market
if its Abbreviated New Drug Application was approved.937  In this case,
the court construed the plaintiff’s claims to require a product
containing less than 10% crystalline material.938  The product
described by the defendant’s ANDA was proposed to contain about
10 to 15% crystalline material.939  Not only did the court hold that the
plaintiff’s literal infringement claim was unlikely to succeed because
                                                          
931. Id. at 1358, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757.  The court explained that the
district court had failed to recognize differences such as the location of the site,
log-in steps, and the number of actions that needed to be taken in order to make an
online purchase.  Id. at 1361-63, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760-61.
932. See id. at 1359, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758 (discussing the lower burden
and stating that “vulnerability is the issue at the preliminary injunction stage, while
validity is the issue at trial”).
933. See id. at 1358, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757 (noting that invalidity can be
shown at the preliminary injunction stage “on evidence that would not suffice to
support a judgment of invalidity at trial.”) (citing Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208
F.3d 1339, 1352, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1299, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
934. 262 F.3d 1333, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1950 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
935. Id. at 1334, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951.
936. See id. at 1337-38, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953 (stating that section
271(e)(2) makes it an act of infringement to file an Abbreviated New Drug
Application with the Food and Drug Administration for a drug claimed in an existing
patent or the use of which is claimed in an existing patent).
937. See id. at 1336-37, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952-53  (comparing not only the
amounts of crystalline material in each product, but also the differing language used
to describe the contents of the products).
938. Id. at 1337, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953.
939. See id. at 1338, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953-54 (stating that “[b]ecause the
product for which Ranbaxy seeks FDA approval contains a higher content of
crystalline cefuroxime axetil than permitted by claim 1, Glaxo is unlikely to succeed
in showing that Ranbaxy’s product literally infringes the ‘181 patent’”).
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of the higher crystalline content in the defendant’s ANDA, but it also
held that the patentee could not assert any scope of equivalents for its
claim limitation that the product be “essentially free from crystalline
material” because this limitation was added through amendment
during prosecution.940  Thus, Glaxo was unlikely to succeed on its
infringement claim because it could not show either literal
infringement or assert any scope of equivalents and should not have
been granted a preliminary injunction.941
B. Damages
1. Notice and marking
Title 35 U.S.C. § 287 allows patentees to “give notice to the public
that [a product]” is patented by marking the property with the words
“patent” or “pat.” accompanied by the patent number.  If a patentee
fails to mark a product, he or she may recover no damages for
infringement prior to the time when the accused infringer had notice
of the infringement.942
In Lans v. Digital Equipment Corp.,943 the Federal Circuit upheld the
district court’s dismissal of an action by the patent inventor’s assignee
for lack of proper notice to the alleged infringer.944  The inventor had
assigned his patent to a corporation of which he was the sole
shareholder, but he sent notice letters to alleged infringers in his own
name, identifying himself as the patentee.945  After sending notice
letters to the alleged infringers, the inventor brought suit against the
alleged infringers in his own name.946  The district court granted
                                                          
940. See id. at 1336, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952 (noting that the originally filed
claims, which described the products as in “highly pure, substantially amorphous
form,” were rejected as indefinite).  Subsequently, Glaxo amended the claims by
adding the narrowing limitation, “essentially free from crystalline material,” which
the court construed to require material having less than ten percent of the crystalline
form.  Id. at 1336-37, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953.
941. See id. at 1339, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1955 (vacating the lower court’s
decision to grant a preliminary injunction).  Although not required to address other
issues in the case because it did not find a likelihood of success on the merits by the
plaintiff, the Federal Circuit noted that the district court also erred in finding that
the patentee would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were denied.  Id., 59
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954.  The Federal Circuit felt the plaintiff’s alleged irreparable
harm claim, based on the defendant’s alleged inability to pay damages, failed
because patent damages are not measured by the total amount of lost sales, but by
lost profits or reasonable royalties, of which the record contained no proof.  Id.,
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954-55.
942. 35 U.S.C. § 287 (1954).
943. 252 F.3d 1320, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
944. Id. at 1328, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061-62.
945. Id. at 1324-25, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
946. Id. at 1325, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
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summary judgment dismissing his action for lack of standing.947
Subsequently, the assignee corporation brought suit.  The case was
dismissed on grounds that the patent had expired during the time
between suits and, more importantly, because the assignee had never
given notice to the alleged infringers.948  Therefore, the district court
concluded it could not grant relief to the assignee for prior
infringements.949  The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s
conclusion based on Supreme Court precedent in Dunlap v.
Schofield,950 which determined that the notice requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 287(a)951 could be fulfilled only by some “affirmative act” by
the patentee.952  Thus, the notice requirement could not be satisfied
by the infringer’s knowledge gained from some other source, such as
notice from the inventor.953  Although acknowledging the unique and
unprecedented nature of the case, the Federal Circuit refused to
accept the argument that the notice element of section 287(a) is met
if the notice came from someone closely associated with the
patentee.954
In Gart v. Logitech, Inc.,955 the Federal Circuit held that the district
court erred in finding that the patentee, despite having sent two
notice letters to the alleged infringers, had failed to comply with
section 287(a).956  Although the first letter did not specifically use the
                                                          
947. See id. at 1325-26, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059 (recognizing the plaintiff had
no standing because he was not the owner of the patent).
948. Id. at 1326, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060-61.
949. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
950. 152 U.S. 244 (1894).
951. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1994) (providing that when there is a “failure so to
mark, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any action for infringement,
except on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to
infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered only for infringement
occurring after such notice” and that the “filing an action for infringement shall
constitute such notice”).
952. See Lans, 252 F.3d at 1327, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060 (citing Dunlap, 152
U.S. at 248); see also Amsted Indus. v. Buckeye Steel Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187, 30
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1462, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that “Dunlap thus established
that notice must be an affirmative [act] on the part of the patentee which informs
the defendant of his infringement”).  The Lans court further explained that the
“purpose of the actual notice requirement is met when the recipient is notified with
sufficient specificity, that the patent holder believes that the recipient of the notice
may be an infringer.”  Lans, 252 F.3d at 1327, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061 (citing
SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs, Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1422, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
953. See Lans, 252 F.3d at 1327, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061 (distinguishing the
patentee’s acts and the infringer’s knowledge).
954. See id. at 1327, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061 (stating that notice from
“someone closely associated with the patentee” does not “meet the statutory
requirements” because “only the patentee has authority to grant licenses or accept
design changes to facilitate the purposes of the notification requirement”).
955. 254 F.3d 1334, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
956. See id. at 1345-46, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298-99.
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word “infringement,” it suggested that the recipient might have its
patent counsel examine the patent “to determine whether a
non-exclusive license under the patent is needed.”957  The court held
that the language of the letters constituted a sufficient charge of
infringement to satisfy the notice provision.958  Moreover, the court
concluded that, although the second letter merely suggested the
recipient might find the patent “particularly interesting” relative to
two of its products, this in combination with the prior letter, had
given the defendant reasonable notice of the patentee’s belief that
the second product infringed as well.959
2. Lost profits
   The patent damages statute, 35 U.S.C. § 284, provides that the
patent holder should receive damages “adequate to compensate for
the infringement.”  When the patent holder sells a product in direct
competition with the infringing product, the patentee is entitled to
prove that, absent the infringement, the patentee would have made
additional sales of its own product, and to claim as damages the
profits he would have made on those additional sales.960 This “but for”
the infringement test requires the patentee to show a “reasonable
probability” that it would have made such additional sales if there
had been no infringing product on the market.961
In a two supplier market, the courts generally apply the test set out
in Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works,962 requiring the patentee to
establish (1) a demand for the patented product; (2) absence of
acceptable non-infringing substitutes, (3) the patentee’s
manufacturing and marketing capacity to make and sell the
additional products and (4) the amount of profits the patentee would
have made.963  The Panduit test is not the exclusive test, however,964
and the patentee may recover lost profits on a “market share” theory
                                                          
957. See id. at 1346, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292 (noting that the letter also made
specific reference to particular claims of the patent, specific reference to the
products being sold).
958. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299.
959. See id. at 1344-47, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297-99 (discussing the product in
question, a computer mouse, and whether the “claim language” limited the design to
a “controller with an angular medial ledge”).
960. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1065 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (permitting recovery of lost profits on a device for
locking a vehicle to a loading dock).
961. Id. at 1545, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
962. 575 F.2d 1152, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726 (6th Cir. 1978).
963. Id. at 1156, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 730.
964. See State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc. 883 F.2d 1573, 1578, 12
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1989)(holding that the district court did not
err in awarding the patentee lost profits on its market share of the infringing sales).
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by showing that, even where there were other suppliers in the market,
the patentee would have made a portion of the infringer’s sales,
corresponding to the patentee’s established market share.965
In Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech Microelectronics International,
Inc.,966 the Federal Circuit held that there was adequate evidence to
support an award of lost profits under a market share theory.967  Thus,
the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment as a matter
of law.968  The district court set aside the jury verdict on lost profits
and refused to increase the reasonable royalty damages to take
account of the sales on which the jury had previously awarded lost
profits.969  The Federal Circuit repeated the statutory requirement
that damages should be awarded for “no less than a ‘reasonable
royalty’ for every infringing sale.”970  Therefore, a patentee should
receive a reasonable royalty “for any of the infringer’s sales not
included in the lost profit calculation.”971 The Federal Circuit held,
however, that there was insufficient evidence to support an award of
damages for price erosion.972  In seeking to establish price erosion
damages, the plaintiff’s expert had used an inappropriate benchmark
and had failed to take into consideration the decrease in sales (and
consequently the decrease in lost profits) that would have resulted
from higher prices.973  Therefore, no price erosion damages were
awarded.974
In Schaefer Fan Co. v. J&D Manufacturing,975 the Federal Circuit
upheld a district court decision finding the defendant in contempt
for violating a settlement agreement and awarding the patentee
damages976 related to the patentee’s invention of safety guards on
industrial-sized fans.977
                                                          
965. Id. at 1580, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1034.
966. 246 F.3d 1336, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1953 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
967. See id. at 1353-57, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1962-65 (noting that even the
defendant’s experts supported a lost profits award).
968. Id. at 1362, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1969.
969. See id. at 1355, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1964.  (finding that “the district
court’s actions left Crystal with no recovery for approximately 42% of the infringing
sales”).
970. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1964 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 284 (1994)).
971. Id. at 1354, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1962 (citing Minco Inc. v. Combustion
Eng’g Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1119, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 1966) and
State Indus. v. Mor-Flo Indus., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026, 1028
(Fed. Cir. 1989)).
972. Id. at 1357-61, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1965-68.
973. See id. at 1360-61, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1967-68 (noting that lost sales and
damages through price erosion are closely related).
974. Id. at 1362, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1969.
975. 265 F.3d 1282, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
976. Id. at 1289-90, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199-2000.
977. Id. at 1286, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197.
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First, the court addressed the contempt issue finding the district
court did not abuse its discretion.978  The Federal Circuit relied
mainly on the finding that the defendant willfully breached the
settlement agreement.979  In addition, the court noted that the
defendant failed to obtain the opinion of counsel on whether its
design would breach the agreement.980
Second, the Federal Circuit addressed the damages issue.  Again, it
found that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
assessed damages in the amount of the defendant’s total profits from
its sales of the allegedly infringing fans plus attorney fees.981
Moreover, even if the court had awarded damages solely on the
breach of the settlement agreement and not factored in the willful
contempt, damages could have been awarded based on the entire
market value.982  In the case at hand, however, the contempt damages
were intended to be punitive and “beyond mere compensation.”983
3. Enhanced damages and willfulness
When either the jury or the court awards a claimant damages, the
court may “increase the damages up to three times the amount found
or assessed.”984  This provision is intended to deter willful patent
infringement.985
In Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics
International,986 the Federal Circuit upheld a jury verdict and district
court ruling finding infringement on the part of the defendant, but it
                                                          
978. Id. at 1289, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199-2000.
979. See id. at 1285-89, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1196-99 (recognizing the
defendant was aware of the agreement and of the Special Master’s interpretation of
it, which it did not dispute).
980. Id. at 1289, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199.
981. Id. at 1285-86, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1196-97.  The Federal Circuit noted
the district court was correct in defining “entire profits” as the profits the defendant
earned on its sales of the completed fan units and not limiting the profits to the
patented fan guard alone.  Id. at 1290, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200.
982. See Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1552, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1801, 1808 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (applying the entire market value rule to permit an
award of reasonable royalties based on the total price of the infringing devices).  In
contrast to Fonar, the court in Schaefer awarded damages consisting of the defendant’s
profits, not the patentee’s lost profits.  Compare id. at 1552-53, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1808 (upholding district court award based on lost profits for sales not made by
Fonar due to infringement), with Schaefer, 265 F.3d at 1290, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1200 (upholding district court’s award based on sale of fans by the infringer).
983. Schaefer Fan Co., 265 F.3d at 1290, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200.
984. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994).
985. See HARMON, supra note 329, § 14.1 (contending that increased damages
usually occur when there is a finding of willful infringement, but noting that there is
no requirement for showing that the infringement was committed with bad faith).
986. 246 F.3d 1336, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1953 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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modified the damage award.987 The patentee sued a manufacturer
and a seller for allegedly infringing upon its audio chip patents.988
The jury found the manufacturer liable for willfully infringing on the
claims and apportioned liability for sixty percent of the damages to
the manufacturer.989  The district court doubled the jury award
because the jury found that TriTech willfully infringed the patent.990
The manufacturer appealed, asserting inter alia, that the district
court should have doubled only the sixty percent portion of the
actual damages awarded against the manufacturer.991  The Federal
Circuit noted that the manufacturer was liable “for willful
inducement of all of the infringing sales.”992  Thus, the Federal Circuit
assessed punitive damages against the manufacturer for an amount
equal to one-hundred percent of the combined reasonable royalty
and lost profits damages, and assessed compensatory damages for
sixty percent of the same amount.993
In Mentor H/S Inc. v. Medical Device Alliance, Inc.,994 the Federal
Circuit upheld the district court’s refusal to award enhanced damages
and attorney’s fees, despite the jury’s finding that the infringement
had been willful.995  In this case, the district court found that the
question of willfulness was a close determination, and the Federal
Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to award enhanced damages.996
Similarly, in Electro Scientific Industries v. General Scanning Inc.,997 the
district court refused to award enhanced damages despite a jury
                                                          
987. Id. at 1362, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1969.
988. Id. at 1343-44, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1955-56.
989. Id. at 1361, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968.
990. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968.
991. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968.
992. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968 (explaining that when a party did not
willfully infringe a patent, the party cannot be held jointly and serverally liable for
willfullness damages.  Therefore, OPT’s damages could not be increased as a result
of TriTech’s willful infringement).
993. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968.
994. 244 F.3d 1365, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
995. See id. at 1380, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331 (agreeing with the district court
that enhanced damages were inappropriate in this case because the evidence in
support of willfulness was not strong enough to impose enhanced damages under
the totality of circumstances).
996. Id. at 1380, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331 (describing the process the Federal
Circuit uses in reviewing willfulness as “a two-step process”) (citations omitted).
“First, the fact-finder must determine if an accused infringer is guilty of conduct,
such as willfulness, upon which increased damages may be based.  If so, the court
then exercises its discretion to determine if the damages should be increased given
the totality of the circumstances.”  Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331 (citations
omitted).
997. 247 F.3d 1341, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1498 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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verdict of willfulness.998  Again, the district court found that the
willfulness determination was close, and that there was evidence to
support the defendant’s belief in the invalidity of the patents.999  The
Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s refusal to award enhanced
damages.  Based on the totality of evidence, the district court
properly applied its discretion to deny enhanced damages when the
defendant acted upon a good faith belief that the patent was
invalid.1000
4. Attorney fees
Under 35 U.S.C. § 285, the district court may award reasonable
attorney fees in “exceptional” cases.1001  Courts have discretionary
power to impose attorney fees, but even in exceptional cases, the
court is not required to impose attorney fees.1002
In Union Pacific Resources Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp.,1003 the
Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s refusal to grant attorney’s
fees sought by the defendant1004 because of the plaintiff’s alleged
inequitable conduct and litigation misconduct.1005  The Federal
Circuit found that the defendant failed to make a convincing showing
that the district court committed clear error when it held that the
case was not exceptional and there was no inequitable conduct,
despite the finding of patent invalidity.1006
In Electro Scientific Industries v. General Scanning Inc.,1007 the Federal
                                                          
998. See id. at 1353, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1506 (explaining that a finding of
willfulness does not require that the court enhance the damages; rather a court has
discretion to enhance damages) (citing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d
1448, 1461, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
999. Id. at 1353-54, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1506-07.  The alleged infringing
patent in this case involved a new method and system that increased the operating
speed in connection or links between components of a memory device.  Id. at 1345,
58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500.
1000. See id. at 1353-54, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1506-07 (noting that the infringing
party obtained an oral and written opinion from counsel stating that the patent was
invalid).
1001. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994).
1002. See HARMON, supra note 329, § 12.2(a) (stating that the court has
discretionary power to impose attorney fees as compensatory damages, but not
punitive damages).
1003. 236 F.3d 684, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
1004. Id. at 694, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299.
1005. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299.
1006. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299 (describing the standard of review
regarding a district court’s awarding of attorney’s fees as follows: “[t]he district court
must first determine whether the case is exceptional, a factual determination that we
review for clear error; if the case is found to be exceptional, the court must then
determine whether attorney fees should be awarded, a determination that we review
for abuse of discretion.”) (quoting Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d
1362, 1370, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1134-35 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
1007. 247 F.3d 1341, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1498 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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Circuit held that the district court had the discretion to refuse to
award attorney’s fees, even in a case where the jury had found
willfulness.1008  As the court stated, “‘a finding of willful infringement
does not require a finding that a case is exceptional.’”1009
In Brasseler, U.S.A. I L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp.,1010 the Federal Circuit
affirmed a district court decision that the patentee was guilty of
inequitable conduct for failing to disclose the facts relating to a
potential on-sale bar and also upheld the district court’s award of
attorney’s fees.1011  In discussing the district court’s award of attorney
fees, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court was not
required to limit its award of attorney fees to those incurred in
presenting the on-sale bar defense.1012  The court reasoned the
defendant would not have incurred fees if the patentee had not
committed inequitable conduct.1013
5. Prejudgment interest
A district court may require that interest be paid on any monetary
judgments in a civil case.1014  In General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp.,1015
the court held that, unless some justification exists to deny the
interest award,1016 prejudgment interest should be awarded to place
the patentee in the original position it would have been in had the
infringement not occurred.1017
In Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech Microelectronics
International,1018 the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s refusal
to award prejudgment interest on damages.1019  The court reasoned
against awarding prejudgment interest because the plaintiff’s two-year
                                                          
1008. Id. at 1353, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1506.
1009. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1506 (quoting Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc.,
138 F.3d 1448, 1461, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
1010. 267 F.3d 1370, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1482 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
1011. See id. at 1375-78, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483-86 (noting that the district
court’s opinion was a result of a remand from the Federal Circuit where the Federal
Circuit held the patent at issue invalid by reason of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994)).
1012. Id. at 1386, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
1013. See id., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492 (noting that attorney fees would not
have been necessary if the plaintiff had not brought a “frivolous” lawsuit for
infringement of a patent that it knew had been improperly obtained).
1014. 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994).
1015. 461 U.S. 648 (1982).
1016. Id. at 657 (finding that prejudgment interest should be awarded where the
defendant infringed a lubricating process for car parts).
1017. See HARMON, supra note 329, § 12.2(a) (declaring that a court abuses its
discretion if it denies prejudgment interest without providing reasons, but explaining
that this award does not apply to punitive damages).
1018. 246 F.3d 1336, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1953 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
1019. See id. at 1362, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968-69 (reversing the district court’s
damages ruling on other aspects).
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delay in initiating suit escalated the damages owed by the defendants,
“was self-serving, and resulted in prejudice to the defendant.”1020
C. Arbitration
The enforcement provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act1021
became applicable to patent contracts in 1982.1022  Under the
Arbitration Act, an award may be set aside only when: it was
“procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means”; the arbitrator
acted in a corrupt or partial manner; gross misconduct by the
arbitrator caused prejudice against any party; or when the arbitrator
used excessive powers or failed to render a “mutual, final, and
definite” decision.1023  In addition, courts have recognized that an
award also may be vacated for “manifest disregard” of the law.1024
In Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc.,1025 the parties arbitrated patent
infringement claims pursuant to a settlement agreement, which had
terminated a prior litigation.1026  The district court upheld the
arbitration award.1027  The Federal Circuit noted that the arbitration
agreement required the arbitrators to write a formal written
opinion.1028  The arbitrators’ decision set forth their reasoning, and
therefore, it had adequately satisfied the requirements of the
contract.1029  The arbitrators were not required to set forth a “claim
construction such as would be undertaken by a [district] court.”1030
                                                          
1020. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1969. Prejudgment interest is “the rule, not the
exception.”  Id. at 1361, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968 (citing Gen. Motors v. Devex
Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 655 (1983)).  “[T]he discretion of the district court in denying
prejudgment interest is limited to specific circumstances.”  Id. at 1346, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1957-58 (citing Gen. Motors., 461 U.S. at 657).
1021. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-207 (1994).
1022. 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1994); see also Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362,
1365, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635, 1637 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
1023. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994); see also Flex-Foot Inc., 238 F.3d at 1365, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1637.
1024. Flex-Foot, Inc., 238 F.3d at 1365, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637 (citing Wilko v.
Swan, 326 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quyas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)).
1025. 238 F.3d at 1362, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1635.
1026. Id. at 1363-64, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1636-37.
1027. See id. at 1364, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637.  In reviewing an arbitration
award, the court decides which regional circuit law applies on an issue by issue basis.
See id. at 1365, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637.  Here, the court applies Federal Circuit
law to the issue of whether the arbitrators were required to set forth a complete claim
construction in their decision, and to the issue of whether the public policy against
licensee estoppel permitted a party to waive challenges to validity in a settlement
agreement.  Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637-38.  The court stated that these issues
are “intimately related with the substance of enforcement of a patent right.”  Id., 57
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1638.
1028. Id. at 1366, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1638.
1029. Id. at 1367, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639.
1030. Id. at 1366, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1638.
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The Federal Circuit also held that the arbitrators had been correct in
refusing to hear validity defenses that had been waived by the prior
settlement agreement.1031
CONCLUSION
Although the Federal Circuit’s 2001 opinions did not include any
sweeping new interpretations or applications of patent law, the court
addressed some significant issues of first impression, particularly
regarding certificates of correction1032 and notice under 35 U.S.C.
§ 287.1033 The Federal Circuit also clarified the law on burdens of
proof,1034 the on-sale bar,1035 the application of the complete bar rule
adopted in Festo,1036 and the right to a jury trial in an infringement
action that seeks only an injunction and no damages.1037  Overall, the
court’s decisions emphasized the public notice function of patent
claims, and revealed an effort on the court’s part to make the scope
                                                          
1031. Id. at 1367, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1638.
1032. See Superior Fireplace Co. v. Majestic Prods. Co., 270 F.3d 1358, 1373, 60
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1668, 1679 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (concluding that a correction to a
typographical or clerical error, which broadens a claim, is only permitted when the
“specification, drawings, and prosecution history” clearly indicate “how the error
should appropriately be corrected”); see also supra notes 629-50 and accompanying
text (reviewing the court’s analysis regarding a certificate of correction that would
broaden the claim).
1033. See Lans v. Digital Equip. Corp., 252 F.3d 1320, 1327-28, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1057, 1060-61 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that the notice requirement includes both
actual notice of the infringement and of the patentee’s identity, and  that notice by a
person “closely associated” with the patentee fails to satisfy the notice requirement).
1034. See Apotex USA, Inc. v. Merck & Co., 254 F.3d 1031, 1037, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1139, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that “under § 102(g) interference law
involving co-pending applications, once the first party to invent has established
priority of invention, the second party to conceive and reduce the invention to
practice has the burden of proving that the first party suppressed or concealed the
invention”);  see also supra notes 355-67 and accompanying text (discussing whether
an invention was concealed when it was kept from the public for almost five years).
1035. See, e.g., Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards. Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047, 59
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1121, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the on sale bar requires
an “offer for sale” to be analyzed under “generally understood” contract law because
this question is an issue of Federal Circuit law); see also supra notes 382-450 and
accompanying text (reviewing recent cases addressing on-sale bar).
1036. See, e.g., Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Co., 238 F.3d 1341, 1345-46,
57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (clarifying that voluntary
amendments can still give rise to prosecution history estoppel because they are
treated like other amendments); see also supra notes 797-807 and accompanying text
(discussing the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Pioneer Magnetics).
1037. See Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 257 F.3d 1331, 1341, 59
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that defendant is not entitled
to a jury trial when the patentee only seeks an injunction and no damages, and
defendant asserts no counterclaims, but only affirmative defenses); see also supra
notes 822-27 and accompanying text (discussing the alleged injunction violation that
would constitute a patent infringement).
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of patent claims certain and predictable.  By conducting its own de
novo analysis of patent claim terms in so many cases,1038 however, the
Federal Circuit may have encouraged parties to await the court’s
claim construction before resolving disputes.  It remains to be seen
whether the court has provided patent applicants and litigants with
sufficient guidance so that they can confidently predict, in advance of
appeal, how the court will interpret a patent claim in a particular
case.
APPENDIX
CLAIM TERMS ANALYZED AND CONSTRUED BY THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IN
2001
Case Name and Citation Claim Term
Acromed Corporation v. Sofamor Danek
Group, Inc., 253 F.3d 1371, 59
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130.
"means for engaging a portion of the
surface defining the opening in the
bone . . . to restrict movement . . . and
to block effluence . . ."
Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. v.
Scimed Life Systems, Inc., 261 F.3d 1329,
59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801.
"connecting elements"
"generally parallel connecting
elements"
AFG Industries, Inc. v. Cardinal IG
Company, Inc., 239 F.3d 1239, 57
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1776.
"product comprising a transparent
substrate and a 5-layered transparent
coating composed of [five specific
layers]."
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1747.
"single-action ordering component"
"shopping cart ordering model"
Asyst Technologies, Inc. v. Empak, Inc.,
268 F.3d 1364, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1567.
"microcomputer means for receiving
and processing digital information"
"workstation data processing means
. . . for receiving data . . . and
transporting data"
"means for controlling . . . and for
transmitting information"
Ballard Medical Products v. Allegiance
Healthcare Corp., 268 F.3d 1352, 60
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1493.
"valve means"
                                                          
1038. See supra Part I.G (discussing the standard of review that the Federal Circuit
applies to various issues).
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Case Name and Citation Claim Term
Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. v.
Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262
F.3d 1258, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865.
"plurality of different modes"
"ADSL/ADR transceiver"
"first channel" "second channel"
"selectively changing the transmission
rates"
Biotec Biologische Naturverpackungen v.
Biocorp, Inc., 249 F.3d 1341, 58
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737.
"substantially water free"
"homogeneous mixture having a
crystalline content of less than 5% of
starch"
Biovail Corporation International v.
Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 239 F.3d
1297, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813.
“Diltiazem salts and an effective
amount of a wetting agent in
admixture with . . .Diltiazem salts to
maintin the solubility of the Diltiazem
in each bead . . ."
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. Ben
Venue Laboratories, Inc., 246 F.3d 1368,
58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508.
"a method for reducing hematologic
toxicity"
"to effect regression of a taxol-sensitive
tumor, said method being associated
with reduced hematologic toxicity"
"an antineoplastically effective
amount"
Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 60
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1375.
"or"
Budde v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 250
F.3d 1369, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1801.
"electronic sensing means for
determining when the ignition
system . . . delivers an electronic pulse"
"status sensing means for measuring a
combination of air intake and engine
temperature and vacuum in the intake
manifold"
Crystal Semiconductor Corporation v.
Tritech Microelectronics International,
Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1953.
"capacitor having: a first conductive
layer disposed over a portion of the
first face of said semiconductor
substrate . . ., a second . . .
conductive layer disposed over a
portion of said first conductive
layer"
"a method for reducing deleterious
effects of . . . electirical noise . . . said
method comprising a. providing a first
clock signal . . . c. generating a second
clock signal  . . ."
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Day International, Inc. v. Reeves Brothers,
Inc., 260 F.3d 1343, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1790.
"melting point of said microcapsules"
Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total
Containment, Inc., 258 F.3d 1317, 59
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1489.
"projections of said insert means being
respectively received in said recesses of
said inner hose"
DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc., 239
F.3d 1314, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1889.
"a [softball] bat comprising:
a . . . frame . . . and an insert
positioned within the frame . . ."
Dow Chemical Company v. Sumitomo
Chemical Company, Ltd., 257 F.3d 1364,
59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609.
"conducting the reaction in the
presence of an organic solvent which
codistills with water and said
epihalohydrin at a boiling point below
the boiling point of the lowest boiling
compound among the components in
the reaction mixture"
"continuous or intermittent manner"
"continuously removing water"
Durel Corporation v. Osram Sylvania
Inc., 256 F.3d 1298, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1238.
"oxide coating"
AUTHREVBENAMIPP 9/11/02  11:00 AM
2002] 2001 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 745
Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc., 264 F.3d 1358, 60
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1173.
"substantially uniform"
Exxon Research and Engineering Company v. United
States, 265 F.3d 1371, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1272.
"a period sufficient to increase substantially the
initial catalyst activity"
"substantial absence of slug flow"
Fin Control Systems Pty, Ltd. v. Oam, Inc., 265 F.3d
1311, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1203.
"releasable means laterally engaging said
formation . . . applying lateral force"
"side wall of said cavity"
Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 59
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1290.
"an angular medial surface for supporting the
three remaining ulnar fingers in a wrapped
configuration"
Generation II Orthotics Inc. v. Medical Technology
Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1919.
"joint means . . . for allowing controlled medial
and lateral inclination of each rigid arm relative
to the pivotable joint"
Glaxo Group Limited v. Ranbaxy Pharaceuticals,
Inc.,  262 F.3d 1333, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1950.
"essentially free from crystalline material"
Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group,
Inc., 236 F.3d 1363, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1542.
"license file means . . . for storing . . . said licenses"
Hilgraeve Corporation v. Symantec Corporation, 265
F.3d 1336, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1291.
"prior to storage on the destination storage
medium"
Innovad Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation, 260 F.3d
1326, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1676.
"telephone dialer system"
"a case . . . enclosing a small volume"
"a single, bi state switch"
"means for releasably electrically coupling said
reprogrammable memory means and said
programming means"
Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve
Incorporated, 256 F.3d 1323, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1401.
"point of sale location"
"material object"
"information manufacturing machine"
"authorization code"
Karsten Manufacturing Corporation v. Cleveland
Golf Company; 242 F.3d 1376, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA)1286.
"correlated set of iron-type golf clubs"
"back surface adjacent said indented trailing
edge . . . sloping upwardly and inwardly"
Kopykake Enterprises, Inc. v. The Lucks Company,
264 F.3d 1377, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1124.
"screen printing"
Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 264
F.3d 1326, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1135.
"magnitude or frequency"
Lockheed Martin Corporation v. Space Systems/Loral,
Inc., 249 F.3d 1314, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671.
"means for rotating said wheel in accordance with
a predetermined rate schedule which varies
sinusoidally"
Medronic, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems,
Inc., 248 F.3d 1303, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1607.
"means for connecting adjacent elements
together"
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MSM Investments Company, LLC v. Carolwood
Corporation, 259 F.3d 1335, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1856.
"feeding . . . a beneficial amount of methlsulfonyl
“methane"
"increasing the amount of metabolizable sulfur"
Mycogen Plant Science, Inc. v. Monsanto Company,
243 F.3d 1316, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1030.
"codons preferred by the intended plant host"
Netword, LLC v. Centraal Corporation, 242 F.3d
1347, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1076.
"local server computer"
Oak Technology, Incorporated v. International Trade
Commission, 248 F.3d 1316, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1748.
"assembled data"
"after correction of said data"
"cyclic redundancy checker"
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GmbH,
237 F.3d 1359, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1647.
"mean minimum plasma concentration of
oxycodone"
Rexnord Corporation v. Laitram Corporation, 278
F.3d 1336, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1851.
"portion"
Schaefer Fan Co., Inc. v. J & D Manufacturing, 265
F.3d 1282, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1194.
"concentric rings"
Schoell v. Regal Marine Industries, Inc., 247 F.3d
1202, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1450.
"v-shaped keel"
"generally flat aft keel"
Scimed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular
Systems, Inc., 242 F.3d 1337; 58 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1059.
"dilatation catheter including an inflatable
balloon and an inflatable lumen extending
through the catheter separate from the guide wire
lumen"
Tellmac Cellular Corporation v. Topp Telecom, Inc.,
247 F.3d 1316, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545.
"communication means for selectively establishing
a communication link with each mobile phone
unit"
"complex billing algorithm . . . for internally
calculating call charges"
Turbocare Division of Demag Delaval
Turbomachinery Corporation v. General Electric
Company, 264 F.3d 1111, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA)1017.
"radial positioning means comprising a
compressed spring means . . . [and] working
fluid"
"large clearance position"
"small clearance position"
Viskase Corporation v. American National Can
Company; 261 F.3d 1316, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA)1823.
"density not greater than about 0.915 grams per
cubic centimeter"
Wenger Manfacturing, Inc. v. Coating Machinery
Systems, Inc.; 239 F.3d 1225, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA)1679.
"air circulation means;" "means
defining . . . separate product coating zones"
Xerox Corportion v. 3Com Corporation, 267 F.3d
1361, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)1526.
"unistroke symbols"
"without reference to and totally independent of
their spatial relationship with respect to each
other"
